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any program within Civilian Public Service (the alternative service program for COs) 
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Hershey’s approval before it could commence.  As a product of the National Guard, 
Hershey possessed a strong belief in the duty of the citizen to the state in a time of 
national emergency.  However, Hershey also had Mennonite ancestry and a strong belief 
in minority rights.  Though not personally religious, all of his beliefs towards religion, 
duty, minority rights, and service contributed to a much more liberal policy for COs 
during World War II, compared to the insensitive treatment of them during the First 
World War.  In short, “Protector of Conscience, Proponent of Service” argues that Lewis 
Hershey held the primary authority for constructing policy concerning conscientious 
objection during World War II, and his personal beliefs and actions in shaping alternative 
service during that time established precedent for the remaining years of conscription in 
the United States.  From the initial peacetime draft in 1940 to the end of conscription in 
1973, alternative service remained as the central form of a CO’s duty to the state in lieu 
of serving in the military.  Hershey’s beliefs and actions during World War II resulted in 
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the United States, providing an illuminating example of how the concept of the citizen 
soldier evolved in American military history and extended even to those who refused to 
serve in the military. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
From 1941 to 1970, one name was synonymous with the draft in the United 
States: General Lewis Blaine Hershey.  Serving as the Director of Selective Service 
during those years, Hershey was the chief administrator of the institution through which 
the United States conscripted its army for World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.1  As time 
passed in his career and Hershey grew older, he became much more well-known, 
particularly to those who protested American involvement in Vietnam.  During the years 
of the Vietnam War, Hershey was the focus of numerous protests and harassments that 
began to escalate in 1967.  Concurrently, as Hershey aged he displayed an inflexible 
stance on draft classifications and a heavy political hand.  His most infamous action was 
the so-called “Hershey directive,” which reclassified any deferred person interfering with 
the draft, a move intended for at the anti-draft protesters with whom he vehemently 
disagreed.  Those against the war and the draft viewed Hershey as a member of the 
establishment responsible for American involvement in Vietnam and his public image 
                                                 
1The United States also used the Selective Service in World War I, but served in 
France with the American Expeditionary Force, not in the Selective Service.  
 2 
plummeted.  With some members of Congress and the American public calling for 
Hershey’s ousting, President Richard Nixon replaced him, hoping to quell some of the 
protests on college campuses.2 
Though Hershey’s villainization at the hands of the anti-war and anti-draft 
protestors during the Vietnam era provides most of the enduring memory of General 
Hershey, in reality, Hershey was a much more sympathetic, reasonable, and nuanced 
character than he was made out to be.  The best example of this comes from his years as 
the Director of Selective Service during World War II and his efforts in dealing with 
conscientious objection and alternative service.  Among his many duties as the chief 
administrator of the World War II draft, Lewis Hershey held the primary authority for 
constructing policy concerning conscientious objection during World War II, and his 
personal beliefs and actions in shaping alternative service during that time established 
precedent for the remaining years of conscription in the United States. 
The precedent established by Hershey during World War II stood in stark contrast 
to the decentralized policies of the colonial era, the problematic alternatives during the 
Civil War, and the abhorrent treatment of conscientious objectors (COs) in the First 
World War.  Moving toward a more systematized and sympathetic means of dealing with 
                                                 
2George Q. Flynn, The Draft: 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1993), 175-176, 182, 215-218; George Q. Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 307; and Melvin Small, 
Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America’s Hearts and Minds 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002), 1, 109.  
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the problems of conscience during wartime, Hershey, along with input from the Historic 
Peace Churches (Mennonite, Brethren, Society of Friends) and the National Service 
Board for Religious Objectors (NSBRO, the CO affairs organization of the Peace 
Churches in Washington), developed and administered Civilian Public Service (CPS) as 
the means of providing an alternative form of service for those who religiously objected 
to serving in the military.  As the primary authority over COs and alternative service 
during World War II, Hershey was the central figure in providing more institutional 
tolerance for conscientious objection in the mid-twentieth century.  Though CPS did not 
last beyond World War II, the concept of alternative service did, and it remained in place 
throughout the remaining years of the draft with only one minor exception.3 
Though he is not remembered as one of the great celestial military figures of the 
World War II era, such as Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, or Douglas MacArthur, 
Hershey still stands as significant man during that time.  He was a military professional 
during an age in which the professional soldier began to be a more mainstream part of 
American society.4  While he was thoroughly a military man shaped by his experience in 
the National Guard, World War I, and the interwar army, he also displayed many civilian 
                                                 
3During the draft prior to the Korean War, COs received a complete deferment 
and no alternative service was required of them.  However, that deferment did not last 
long and was an anomaly in a discussion of conscription and conscientious objection 
during the twentieth century.  The issue of CO deferment prior to the Korean War is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10.  
4Samuel J. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1985), 
315-316.  
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talents leading to his successes during World War II.  He possessed a keen understanding 
of the federal bureaucracy, a well-reasoned approach to the place of conscience and 
service in American society, and a particular talent for political negotiation.  Because of 
his unique set of skills, Hershey was the ideal choice to administer conscription and 
alternative service during World War II as he was both a professional soldier and 
government bureaucrat sympathetic to the nuances of religious objection. 
It bears mentioning that although Hershey wielded enormous power within the 
Selective Service, he was not a simple government bureaucrat protecting a personal 
fiefdom.  He truly believed in what he was doing.  His beliefs fell under a paradigm 
shaped by his belief in the duty of all eligible men to service, harkening to the citizen 
soldier tradition in American history.  He believed that those who objected held an 
obligation to the state when called.  Those thoughts came from his early experiences 
growing up in rural Indiana, his service in the National Guard, and his deployment during 
the First World War.  Part of administering alternative service also meant protecting it 
from external forces that sought to eliminate, change, or further restrict alternative service 
under Hershey’s watch.  Those who disagreed or argued with Hershey over alternative 
service included veterans’ groups, some members of Congress, strongly patriotic regions 
of the United States, portions of the American public, and even some members of the 
Historic Peace Churches.  
Though unpopular in some quarters, Hershey’s actions provided the most tolerant 
program for COs yet seen in the United States, and that was a fact not lost on many 
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members of the Historic Peace Churches.  Though some within the churches disagreed 
with the fundamental concept of CPS, many of the Peace Church representatives 
expressed their gratitude to Hershey throughout the war, recognizing the uniqueness of 
his views within the military and the government.  Indeed, as both a military professional 
and a government bureaucrat, Hershey provided a necessary alternative for religious 
objectors in World War II.  In doing so he helped to reconcile the ongoing tension 
between service and conscience in American history. 
This dissertation is not a biography of Hershey.  Conscription historian and 
Hershey biographer George Q. Flynn has done that much more ably.  This is the story of 
how Hershey provided for a small minority in the American populace while raising a 
massive army to deal with the largest war in American history.  Put in a simpler way, this 
work examines how the American government, in this case through Hershey, deals with 
the “other” in American history.  It reveals how the duty of service to the state during 
wartime, a central feature of the citizen soldier in the American military tradition, 
extended even to those who objected during World War II.  Hershey fervently believed in 
the concept (real or imagined) of the citizen soldier, and through his administration of 
CPS, he extended the duty of service to religious, and eventually secular, conscientious 
objectors.5  As a result, alternative service remained in place from World War II until the 
end of the draft in 1973, seeking to resolve a theoretical contradiction in the American 
                                                 
5The extension of the privilege of conscientious objection to secular objectors 
came in 1965 with the Supreme Court case United States v. Seeger.  See Chapter 10. 
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political tradition between a citizen’s duty to the state and individual liberty of 
conscience. 
To effectively place this work in its proper context, it is necessary to explore 
some of the historiographical themes.  There are a number of different areas of 
scholarship that examine conscientious objection and conscription during World War II.  
They range from examining the experience of the Historic Peace Churches from a 
celebratory tone to discussing conscientious objection within the framework of the 
American Peace Movement.  Others briefly describe conscientious objection as a part of 
the larger dynamic of conscription in the United States.  Overall, the discussion of 
conscientious objection as a part of the American military tradition does not yet appear in 
the scholarship.  Some works have it as an ancillary part of a larger discussion, but no 
works focus solely on alternative service and American military tradition.  There are five 
volumes of note that deal with the Historic Peace Churches and CPS.  Overwhelmingly, 
all of these works are sympathetic to the CO and do not constitute a foray into military 
history or a stance on military policy.  Instead, they are chronicles of the Peace Churches’ 
experience during World War II.  The three official histories published by the Peace 
Churches are the American Friends Service Committee’s (AFSC) The Experience of the 
American Friends Service Committee in Civilian Public Service, Leslie Eisan’s Pathways 
of Peace, and Melvin Gingerich’s Service for Peace.  The AFSC’s volume chronicles the 
actions undertaken by that group as a part of CPS, as does Eisan’s work for the Church of 
the Brethren.  Both offer little analysis and almost no mention of the work of General 
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Hershey within the CPS program.6  Eisan offers a description of the relationship between 
the Peace Churches and the SSA, but offers no analysis, therefore making it incredibly 
difficult to discern his attitude beyond sympathy for the COs.  Gingerich’s Service for 
Peace is the official history for the Mennonites and is more analytical and offers an 
insightful interpretation on the role of General Hershey.  Gingerich writes, “… the 
ultimate authority of the [Selective Service] and the entire CPS program was in control of 
National Director Hershey.  If he had been arbitrary, hostile, and intolerant, conscientious 
objectors could have been subjected to unbearable conditions.”7 
Another Peace Church oriented scholar is Albert Keim, emeritus professor of 
history at Eastern Mennonite University.  Keim’s The CPS Story: An Illustrated History 
of Civilian Public Service is a short examination of CPS with an excellent collection of 
pictures that provides a solid grounding in the basics of alternative service during World 
War II.  Keim contends that CPS was a “flawed” system, which he goes so far as to say, 
“The provision for work without pay carried a kind of Soviet ‘Gulag’ quality of 
involuntary servitude.”  However, he also cites the important precedent it played in 
establishing alternative service in the federal government.  He also briefly mentions 
General Hershey’s attitudes, discussing his affinity for the Mennonites and his desire to 
                                                 
6Leslie Eisan, Pathways of Peace: A History of the Civilian Public Service 
Program as Directed by the Brethren Service Committee (Elgin, IL: Brethren Publishing 
House), 363-394. 
7Melvin Gingerich, Service for Peace: A History of Mennonite Civilian Public 
Service (Akron, PA: Mennonite Central Committee), 368.  
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keep COs out of the public eye.8 Keim also completed an unfinished project by Grant 
Stolzfus titled The Politics of Conscience: The Historic Peace Churches and America at 
War, 1917-1955.  There, Keim and Stolzfus offer a thin volume with but one chapter on 
CPS during World War II in the book, yet their arguments are among the most even-
handed in all of the scholarship.  They evaluate Civilian Public Service as an illustration 
of “the possibilities as well as the ambiguities of alternative service in the modern total-
war society.  Once the government recognized the appropriateness of alternative service 
for conscientious objectors, the design of the program came reasonably close to satisfying 
all parties involved.”  They state further, “The conscientious objector was a practical 
nuisance, but the Civilian Public Service program provided a means to solve the problem 
with minimum effort….”9   
Perry Bush is another Peace Church scholar who focuses on the Mennonite 
tradition.  Bush, a professor of history at Bluffton University, a Mennonite institute of 
higher education, briefly portrays Hershey in his Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties: 
Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America as a man of the military establishment whose 
entire goal was “to obey orders and to win the war.”  He offers a somewhat insightful 
discussion of Hershey, much of which is based on a 1990 dissertation on CPS by Mitchell 
                                                 
8Albert Keim, The CPS Story: An Illustrated History of Civilian Public Service 
(Intercourse, PA: Good Books), 100, 24-25 (sidebar). 
9Albert Keim and Grant Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience: The Historic Peace 
Churches and America at War, 1917 - 1955 (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1988), 125-
126.  
 9 
Lee Robinson.  He rightly points out that Hershey’s ideology was built upon the concept 
of equity in sacrifice and service during a time of conscription.  He also is correct in 
noting Hershey’s desire for scant public attention towards the CO.  However, he states 
that Hershey possessed “vague personal commitments to the fundamental principle of 
conscientious objection.”10  While Hershey admitted early in the war that he had not 
given much thought to conscientious objection in the draft, it was not something he was 
“vague” on.  Hershey had a well-developed concept of service, minority rights, and 
religious freedom into which he firmly placed the idea of conscientious objection. 
Mulford Sibley and Philip Jacob’s Conscription of Conscience is the standard 
account of conscientious objection in World War II, but it offers a negative interpretation 
towards the role of the Selective Service and General Hershey.  They paint the Selective 
Service as “sharply restrictive” in working with COs and argue that the Selective Service 
was “the chief agency of restraint upon the conscientious objector in CPS.”  Furthermore, 
as they wrote from a civilian’s position sympathetic to COs, they view Hershey and his 
staff as people who “were military men … committed both by the position and personal 
conviction to the prosecution of war as their supreme objective.  Tolerance for the 
conscientious objector should never hamper the overriding task of Selective Service – 
                                                 
10Perry Bush, Two Kingdom's, Two Loyalties: Mennonite Pacifism in Modern 
America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 72-75.  
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recruitment of manpower for the national defense.”11  Sibley and Jacob’s overall tone is 
celebratory of the CO and they criticize the government for restricting them in their 
endeavors.  Their interpretation is a bit overemphasized and overblown. 
In peace history, two historians have devoted a fair amount of their research to 
examining conscientious objection during World War II as a part of the larger American 
Peace Movement in the twentieth century.  The first is Charles Chatfield in For Peace 
and Justice.  Chatfield covers the peace movement from 1914-1941 and points to the 
affiliation between the Peace Churches and the federal government in developing and 
administering CO provisions and alternative service as “unique in American history.”  
Though it may have been unique, there were problems in the relationship that grew out of 
the differences in perception between the two groups.  The Selective Service viewed COs 
as draftees first, subjected to the rules and duties of the federal government, just as all 
other drafted men.  NSBRO saw the COs as independent, with a moral right to object to 
war and military service.  The result was a strained relationship throughout the war.  
Insomuch as General Hershey is concerned, Chatfield offers no analysis on his role other 
than to mention that Hershey’s interpretation of religious-based conscientious objection 
was narrower than his predecessor, Clarence A. Dykstra.12  The other peace historian is 
                                                 
11Mulford Quickert Sibley and Philip Jacob, Conscription of Conscience: The 
American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press), 201, 200, 308. 
12Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1962), 308, 429-430. 
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Lawrence Wittner in Rebels against War.  Overall, Wittner views the distaste for CPS by 
some in the Peace Churches and the COs themselves as a part of the larger American 
Peace Movement.  His interpretation of General Hershey’s role is limited much in the 
same way as Chatfield’s, as Wittner does not see him as an agent of tolerance, but as a 
narrow-minded military man, bearing scrutiny at the hands of Congress for refusing to 
pay CO draftees as a way to deter pacifists from joining CPS.13 
For the most part, the majority of American military history that examines 
conscientious objection and General Hershey comes from the history of conscription.  
The foremost expert on the draft and Hershey is George Flynn.  Flynn’s The Draft: 1940-
1973, Lewis B. Hershey: Mr. Selective Service, and his article “Lewis Hershey and the 
Conscientious Objector: The World War II Experience” form the backbone of the 
scholarship in this area.   In The Draft, Flynn devotes a fair amount of time discussing the 
plight of COs as they related to the larger subject of conscription.   His main thesis on the 
draft as an American institution is that from 1940-1973, the draft was “a system based on 
principles of local control, of decentralization, and of nineteenth-century values, a system 
that responded to pressure from various interests by continually modifying the ideal of 
universality of service.”  Furthermore, regarding conscientious objection, Flynn argues 
that Roosevelt passed the buck on to the Selective Service and Hershey, who then went to 
the Peace Churches asking them to develop a plan for alternative service.  He does point 
                                                 
13Lawrence Wittner, Rebels against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-
1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 84, 74-75. 
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out that because of early problems with the plan such as public hostility, disobedience 
under the strict camp rules, and misunderstandings about the funding of the program, 
“The program was a time bomb waiting to happen.”14   
Flynn’s most important contribution to the scholarship of conscientious objection 
lies in his work on General Hershey.  His Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service is the 
only academic biography of Hershey in existence.  In his determination, Hershey was a 
successful Director of the Selective Service because he had a strong personality coupled 
with a clear sense of integrity, and he possessed a romantic view of rural America 
(defense was the job of the citizen-soldier, patriotism was a virtue, and egalitarianism 
prevailed).  He was the ultimate federal bureaucrat as he was most definitely part of the 
military establishment, but viewed himself as a civilian, allowing him to appeal to both 
civilians and the military brass.  For conscientious objection, Flynn argues that Hershey 
was quite liberal and tolerant in his treatment of COs.  He ordered hostile draft boards to 
recognize individual beliefs of COs and, because of his personal beliefs, he deemed that 
any man who considered war and killing to be wrong (as long as he based it on religion) 
should not be forced to submit to military service.15  Flynn also makes many similar 
                                                 
14Flynn, The Draft, 47  
15Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 126-132  
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arguments in his article “Lewis Hershey and the Conscientious Objector, the World War 
II Experience.”16 
Other conscription historians offer significant insights.  One such scholar is John 
Whiteclay Chambers II.  His To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America is 
a history of manpower but more specifically, the creation of the draft in World War I.   
Though he expressly focuses on the First World War, he provides some analysis into the 
draft during the Second World War.  His interpretation is similar to those who argue that 
CPS was the result of the government wishing to avoid embarrassment.  He writes, 
“…the experience of 1917-1918 was painful enough to lead Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
respond to the suggestions of religious organizations and many liberals to offer certified 
conscientious objectors alternative service from the beginning.” Chambers also offers an 
insightful musing on General Hershey by positing that he received his appointment as the 
Director of Selective Service because of “his ability to manage people and work with 
civilians,” an important trait to posses when working with conscientious objectors and 
leaders of the peace churches.17 
A final scholarly coupling examines the draft during World War II is J. Garry 
Clifford and Samuel Spencer, Jr. in The First Peacetime Draft.  According to Clifford 
and Spencer, the most important facet of the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1940 
                                                 
16George Q. Flynn, "Lewis Hershey and the Conscientious Objector: The World 
War II Experience," Military Affairs 47, no. 1 (February, 1983): passim.  
17John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern 
America (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 219, 250.  
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is that it illustrates how elites can influence the American political landscape.  They 
discuss how a small group of elites, led by Grenville Clark, called for and helped push 
legislation through Congress for a peacetime draft.18  Clifford and Spencer do not 
examine the workings of conscription during World War II – they are more concerned 
with the creation of the Burke-Wadsworth Bill and the elite influence that was a central 
feature of it.  General Hershey plays a minor role in this work and conscientious 
objection receives scant mention. 
This dissertation is a multi-faceted approach that will fill some important but 
currently unoccupied niches within the scholarship.  In the realm of peace studies, this 
work further illuminates how a portion American Peace Movement helped influence 
conscription policy in the federal government and how General Hershey and the Selective 
Service played a vital role in administering and controlling the movement’s tangible 
effects.  It also offers a fresh perspective for the scholarship of the Historic Peace 
Churches.  Much of the identity of the churches is tied directly to the promotion of peace 
and their belief in conscientious objection to military service.  However, conscientious 
objection is a privilege, not a guaranteed right from the American state.  Therefore, the 
most important dynamic in the churches’ relationship with the state in terms of 
conscientious objection is not their peace witness, but how much the federal government 
will allow in terms of objection and service.  This establishes General Hershey and the 
                                                 
18J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft 
(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1986), 5.  
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World War II CO experience as the pivot point for that church/state relationship in regard 
to conscientious objection, in essence presenting an argument that runs counter to the 
traditional Peace Church interpretation. 
It also bears mentioning that that source material used here provides further 
insights into General Hershey’s psyche and actions.  Some of the evidence used here has 
not been published on a large scale using Hershey as the focal point.  For example, much 
of this dissertation relies on the diary of Paul Comly French, a Quaker who served as 
NSBRO’s executive secretary throughout the war.  He personally met with Hershey and 
Lewis Kosch, Hershey’s Director of Camp Operations, more than any other Peace 
Church representative to discuss matters concerning conscientious objection or seeking 
approval for CPS programs.  The premier Hershey scholar, George Flynn, uses material 
from the Lewis B. Hershey Collection at the Army Heritage and Education Center and 
the Records of the Selective Service from the National Archives, but he does not utilize 
French’s diary, or any other materials from the Swarthmore College Peace Collection.  
Melding these collections together is of great importance as it provides a more developed 
insight into Hershey beyond his public statements, official correspondence, or interviews.  
The use of French’s diary, along with other materials in the Swarthmore Collection 
reveals Hershey’s immense power in personal negotiation with the Peace Churches and 
other institutions, along with further refining discussions of his well-developed concept 
of service. 
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Although this dissertation offers fresh interpretations in the aforementioned areas, 
it is in the realm of American military history that this offers the most profound revision 
of the current scholarship.  The issue of conscription and the concept of the citizen soldier 
in American history is not a new area in the field.  However, viewing the subject of 
conscientious objection through the lens of General Hershey is most definitely new and 
unexplored at this level of discussion.  No scholarship in American military 
historiography defines conscientious objection as fundamentally a military topic.  This 
dissertation argues that conscientious objection is a military subject as it further defines 
the concept of the citizen’s service in wartime, reflecting the aforementioned views of 
Hershey. 
Tied directly to this dynamic is the concept of the citizen soldier in American 
history, which holds that the interests of the nation coincide with the interests of the 
citizen, thereby making the American citizen the best defender of the American nation.  
This is a tradition that reaches back to the colonial militia and became further refined in 
the decentralized Jeffersonian government during the early nineteenth century.  Hershey 
strongly believed in a decentralized method of conscription, with local draft boards 
drawn from communities to classify men eligible for service.  In doing so, he continued 
the Jeffersonian tradition of conscription brought forth in World War I and staunchly 
defended that model throughout his career, which ended in 1973.  Not only does this 
study seek to define, interpret, and place Hershey’s beliefs and actions in a new context, 
it will also place conscientious objection alongside a discussion of the citizen soldier and 
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the American military tradition, a dynamic heretofore unexamined in the scholarship.  
Hershey’s role in conscientious objection and alternative service during World War II 
further defined this crucial element of the American character.  
Conscientious objection, when examined through the eyes of Hershey and the 
Selective Service, is a subject that belongs in a historiographical discussion of the rich 
scholarship of the American military tradition.  Understandably, that contention opens 
one to criticism from certain quarters, but a more careful examination of military history 
over the past few decades provides one with the proper foundation to make such an 
assertion.  Since the late-1960s, a new focus in military history began to emerge, called 
the “New Military History.”  The New Military History moved away from the older focus 
on battles and operations and explored the history of the military as it related to 
significantly broader themes, particularly race, gender, and class.  As military historian 
Peter Paret described the school in his 1991 address to the Society for Military History, 
the New Military History is “an expansion of the subject of military history from the 
specifics of military organization and action to their widest implications, and also a 
broadening of the approaches to the subject, [and] of methodologies employed.”19  In 
short, the New Military History is not just rifles, bullets, and bombs.  It examines 
dynamics that do not necessarily concern themselves with military strategy, operations, 
and tactics.  This study adds another classification to the marginalized groups of the New 
                                                 
19John Whiteclay Chambers II, “The New Military History: Myth and Reality,” 
The Journal of Military History 55, no. 3 (July 1991): 397.  
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Military History by examining the ways in which the government and military 
institutions deal with those who conscientiously object to military service while raising 
an army in wartime.  In this particular instance, that dynamic centers on a high-ranking 
United States Army officer with Mennonite heritage.  He was a protector of conscience 
and a proponent of service, and his name was Lewis Blaine Hershey. 
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CHAPTER 2 – AN EMPHASIS ON SERVICE: CIVILIAN PUBLIC SERVICE AND 
THE CITIZEN SOLDIER TRADITION 
 
Effectively discussing the importance of Lewis Hershey to conscientious 
objection during World War II requires a brief examination of both Civilian Public 
Service and the concept of the citizen soldier.  As will be revealed in the following 
chapters, Hershey was not only a firm believer in the right for the CO to object, he also 
strongly believed in citizen soldier tradition.  Thus, his concept of alternative service 
melded the objector’s desire to avoid military service with the duty of all eligible males 
to serve the nation during a national emergency or when the interests of the nation were 
at stake.  CPS was the result of that amalgamation.  It combined the desire of the CO to 
avoid direct military participation with the service duty envisioned by Lewis Hershey.   
Commencing in 1941, CPS marked a significant improvement over the 
unsatisfactory provisions from World War I, as the United States’ draft for that conflict 
was a complete failure for conscientious objection. The language in the Selective Service 
Act of 1917 was much too narrow, allowing only for objection from members of a peace 
sect, and there were no provisions for alternative service.  The result was extremely poor 
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treatment of COs in military camps and military prisons. 1  Throughout the interwar 
period, the Historic Peace Churches undertook a number of initiatives to make sure that 
their peace stance remained relevant and that if conscription came to the United States 
again, they would not be caught unprepared.  The federal government also maintained a 
state of preparedness for conscription with the Joint Army Navy Selective Service 
Committee (JANSSC, the interwar conscription planning organization), though that 
agency planned for military manpower contingencies, not conscientious objection.2  In 
1940, with war in Europe raging once again, the federal government sought to prepare for 
the possibility of war with the passage of the Selective Service Act in September.  From 
that piece of legislation came an important section that laid the groundwork for Hershey, 
the Selective Service, and the Historic Peace Churches to build a program of alternative 
service, hoping to avoid the mistakes of World War I.  In its final iteration, section 5(g) 
of the Selective Service Act of 1940 read,  
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require any person to be 
subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United 
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed 
to war in any form.  Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant 
training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is 
sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the land or naval forces 
under this act, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or 
shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such 
                                                 
1The draft provisions for conscientious objection in World War I are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4.  Please refer to that chapter for specific citations. 
2For a more in-depth discussion of the interwar efforts of the Historic Peace 
Churches and JANSSC, see Chapter 5.  
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noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be assigned to work of national 
importance under civilian direction.3 
That particular section in the conscription bill for 1940 made it a binding law that 
an alternative form of service must be provided for COs who objected to military service.  
The law did not provide for absolutist objectors who refused any form of service to the 
state.  Although there was now a law providing for conscientious objection, there was no 
administrative chief for it, nor was there a program for the so-called “work of national 
importance.”  It was at this point that Lewis Hershey became centrally important due to 
an executive order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt on February 6, 1941.  With his 
order, Roosevelt placed all matters for determining exactly what constituted work of 
national importance in the hands of the Director of Selective Service, delegating his 
authority to the director and giving the director ultimate control as to what projects 
fulfilled the requirements of national importance.4  The power granted to the Director of 
Selective Service provided a wide degree of latitude for a man like Hershey to shape the 
form and direction of alternative service during the war.  As the years progressed into the 
Cold War, it became clear that the power granted to Hershey also had ramifications for 
the remaining years of conscription in the United States. 
                                                 
3Selective Service Act, Statutes at Large 54 Part 1, 889 (1940).  
4U.S. President, Executive Order 8675.  (Document printed in Conscientious 
Objection: Special Monograph No. 11, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1950), 7.)  See Chapter V on the creation of Civilian Public Service for a 
broader discussion of Roosevelt’s executive order conferring the authority over work of 
national importance to the Director of Selective Service.  
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As the central authority over alternative service in the United States, Hershey 
relied on the Historic Peace Churches to help him develop CPS.   Hershey made it clear 
to the Peace Churches that not many people in the Federal Government had devoted 
much time to considering a program of alternative service and he required their input to 
move in a direction agreeable to them.  He also asked that they consolidate their efforts to 
further streamline the process.  Out of that recommendation (and an increasing spirit of 
ecumenism among the Peace Churches during the interwar years) came NSBRO, which 
worked closely with Hershey and his Director of Camp Operations (the division in 
Selective Service for CPS administration), Colonel Lewis Kosch. 
Though Hershey was the primary and most significant figure concerning 
conscientious objection during World War II, he did delegate some authority because of 
his workload.  Hershey was a bureaucrat and an administrator who did not have the time 
to devote all of his energies to the daily administration and operation of alternative 
service.  He left that to Kosch and the Camp Operations Division.  The programs under 
CPS were what constituted work of national importance and all of the CPS projects 
required Hershey’s approval before being allowed to commence. It must be mentioned, 
though, not all of the wartime CPS programs are discussed in the following chapters.  
Only the programs requiring Hershey’s active involvement for establishment, beyond his 
approval, are discussed.  It is imperative to understand that even if Hershey did not work 
on a daily basis to secure a specific program in CPS, he still approved or rejected all of 
the programs presented by NSBRO to the Selective Service. 
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Because this dissertation is not concerned with all of the specific programs 
undertaken by CPS during World War II, it is necessary at this point to briefly discuss 
CPS and the projects it entailed during the war to maintain a better grasp on the entire 
wartime dynamic between Hershey, the Peace Churches, the Federal Government, and 
the individual CO.  When a man appeared before his local draft board and he was a 
conscientious objector, there were two classifications he could receive.  The first was the 
I-A-O classification, meaning he was available for military service, but only as a 
noncombatant.  The second classification was the IV-E classification, meaning the man 
was not available for military service, but was to be assigned to work of national 
importance instead.  During World War II, all of the CPS assignees were of the IV-E 
classification.5 
The earliest manifestations of the work of national importance had a distinct New 
Deal flavor to them, as the Selective Service created CPS work camps in old Civilian 
Conservation Corps camps.  Of these camps, there were two divisions of work – soil 
conservation and forestry work.  A large number of men worked in soil conservation at 
some point during their CPS tenure.  CPS historians estimate that one in six days worked 
in CPS was in soil conservation efforts.  Some of the men in the soil conservation camps 
also worked with the Farm Security Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation.  
Those laboring in soil conservation projects built dams, fences, dug ditches, planted 
                                                 
5Sibley and Jacob, 56-57.  
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ground cover, and built irrigation systems.  Much of this work was wearisome, dreary, 
and monotonous; facts not lost on the assignees to the soil conservation camps.  Many of 
the CPS assignees complained that those efforts were nothing more than make-work 
programs that isolated them and provided them little opportunity to do more than dig a 
ditch or plant a shrub.6 
The work in forestry efforts (which also included a few camps in the National 
Park System) sometimes held the same level of monotony.  The forestry camps usually 
held a few hundred men in each camp and their efforts constituted general maintaining of 
America’s forests.  The men built firebreaks, roads, and trails.  They cleared flammable 
growth and rotten logs.  They also served as fire watchmen, surveying the forest from 
towers spaced across the land.  In addition to this, they also improved the communication 
infrastructure by building and repairing telephone lines throughout the forests.  There was 
one major exception to the monotony of the forestry efforts, though.  The most exciting 
experience in all of CPS was smokejumping, or fighting fires in remote locations using 
parachutists.  Beginning in 1943, CPS men received specialized training in firefighting 
and parachuting to jump from airplanes flying over remote or rough locales to extinguish 
forest fires.  Not only was this adventuresome, it was dangerous as well.  Yet it was quite 
popular amongst the assignees as hundreds of men volunteered to be smokejumpers.  
                                                 
6Eisan, 88-92; Gingerich, 108-124; Keim, The CPS Story, 41-43, 49-55; and 
Sibley and Jacob, 130-132.  
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Overall, a quarter of all CPS work days were in the prevention and fighting of forest 
fires.7 
Soil conservation and forestry camps employed the largest number of men during 
the years of CPS, but there were many other projects implemented in addition to those 
two endeavors.  One such program was in the realm of agricultural production.   As there 
were labor and production shortages on farms during the war, agriculture provided an 
opportunity for CPS assignees to do what they felt to be more meaningful work.  After 
serving for a set amount of time in the work camps, men could volunteer for other 
detached services and one of these was in agriculture.  By 1943, there were CPS 
assignees working in different agricultural projects, whether it was for independent 
farmers and dairymen, or laboring as dairy testers or in agricultural experiment projects.  
Furthermore, some men could gain furlough from their work camp if there was a dire 
need for farm labor in a county and the camp was fifteen miles or less from the area in 
question.  However, this program was controversial amongst the Peace Churches because 
the local county agricultural agent could seemingly declare an emergency to commandeer 
labor from the nearby CPS camp.8  
                                                 
7Robert C. Cottrell, Smokejumpers of the Civilian Public Service in World War II: 
Conscientious Objectors as Firefighters for the National Forest Service (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2006), passim; Eisan, 74-88; Gingerich, 125-147; Keim, The CPS Story, 43-
48; and Sibley and Jacob, 126-130. 
8Eisan, 92-97; Gingerich, 177-212; Keim, The CPS Story, 55-57; Sibley and 
Jacob, 132-134.  
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Another voluntary project in CPS was the Guinea Pig Units, so-called because the 
men volunteered to be human scientific test subjects.  Administered by the Office of 
Scientific Research or the Surgeon General’s Office, the Guinea Pig Units helped study 
such varied subjects as nutrition, disease and illness, dehydration, lice infestation, and 
hypothermia.  There were many projects, with some of them using methods that are at 
least questionable by today’s standards.  The unit at the University of Indiana in 
Bloomington studied the physiological effects of clothing, wrapping men in wet sheets 
with cold room temperatures to see how long they could sleep.  The unit at the University 
of Minnesota Laboratory of Physiological Hygiene studied starvation and nutrition under 
famed nutritionist Dr. Ancel Keys, who developed the K ration.  In this experiment, the 
men at one point looked as though they emerged from a Nazi concentration camp.  Other 
units infected men with typhus, malaria, or hepatitis to study the causes, effects, and best 
treatments of the diseases.9  Though much value came from the findings in the 
experiments, the methods were barbaric when viewed through the lens of the present.  Dr. 
C. Everett Koop, an eventual Surgeon General of the United States, participated in 
administering one test and commented in recent years that many of the men did not know 
                                                 
9Eisan, 290-312; Gingerich, 270-273; Keim, The CPS Story, 75-79; Nicholas A. 
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the risk they exposed themselves to.  As he stated in an interview for the documentary 
The Good War and Those Who Refused to Fight It,  
It couldn’t happen today.  Internal Review Boards would not permit the use of a 
live virus in human subjects unless they really understood what was going to 
happen to them.  And I doubt that even if they knew what the risk was, that an 
Internal Review Board in any academic institution would consent to that kind of 
experimental work.10 
Koop also explained that his actions in helping with the testing in the Guinea Pig Units 
were not something he was proud of.11 
 CPS assignees also worked in mental hospitals as a part of their alternative 
service requirement.  With the draft and the lure of better paying jobs in defense 
industries across the United States, mental hospitals began to feel the pinch of a smaller 
labor pool.  This provided an opportunity for COs to perform their service obligation in 
work they found to be much more meaningful.  Beginning in 1942, CPS assignees began 
to work in mental hospitals around the nation.  It was a popular volunteer program.  By 
the time CPS ended, there had been forty-one hospitals across twenty states that used 
COs as hospital staffers and in excess of two thousand men worked in the hospitals and 
one point during their service commitment.  The duties performed by the men in these 
hospitals included basic patient care, grounds maintenance, and custodial and food 
service jobs.  It was in the arena of patient care that the men of CPS produced one of their 
                                                 
10The Good War and Those Who Refused to Fight It, Paradigm Productions, 
Independent Television Services Script, Bullfrog Films, 2000, 10  
11Ibid. 
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most enduring legacies in terms of their service.  The CPS men in the mental hospitals 
took great care to improve the hygiene and through their use of nonviolent techniques in 
ward administration, helped to change the manner in which hospitals cared for America’s 
mentally ill.  Though not every single assignee avoided the use of violence in the 
hospitals, a large portion of them did, resulting in lasting changes.  As Alex Sareyan, a 
World War II CO and postwar mental health advocate, wrote in 1994,  “The Civilian 
Public Service mental hospital experience triggered the most significant crusade on 
behalf of the mentally ill that has occurred in this century.”12  The impact of COs on 
mental health treatment is debatable, though.  Brethren CPS historian Leslie Eisan argues 
that the actions of the CPS assignees in mental hospitals were not revolutionary as mental 
health advocates had argued for similar treatment for some time.  He contends that 
“[p]erhaps the greatest contribution is yet to come….”13  It should be noted, though, that 
Eisan published his arguments in 1948, well before the arguments of Sareyan in 1994.  It 
is entirely possible that Sareyan would agree with the statements of Eisan. 
 The work done by CPS in soil conservation, forestry, Guinea Pig Units, farm 
labor, and mental hospitals constituted the major portion of alternative service programs 
for the conscientious objector in World War II.  However, there were some projects 
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instituted on a smaller scale in other areas throughout the United States.  One such 
example was the construction and installation of privies in Florida to combat hookworm, 
a project lauded by a Selective Service official inspecting their efforts.  CPS also 
established a unit in Puerto Rico, seeking to improve the public health and continue the 
mission of the New Deal’s Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration that suffered 
from a lack of funding once the war began.14   
 Civilian Public Service lasted from 1941 until 1947.  During World War II, there 
were 34.5 million men drafted and fifty-two thousand of those claimed they were 
conscientious objectors.  Out of that fifty-two thousand, a total of about twelve thousand 
men objected to military service and served in CPS. 15  It was a small number when 
examining the larger picture of the American experience in World War II, but even with 
its lack of numbers it possessed long-standing ramifications.  CPS did not survive the era 
of World War II, but the idea it represented remained in place throughout the years of 
conscription in the United States.  With the exception of a brief deferment period before 
the Korean War, the federal government required COs to perform some form of 
alternative service in lieu of their military duty until the end of the draft in 1973.  The 
precedent of alternative service, manifested in CPS and built and maintained by Lewis 
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15Conscientious Objection, 313-315, 318.  
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Hershey, remained in place throughout the remaining years of conscription in the United 
States.  
As stated earlier, an examination of the citizen soldier tradition is required as 
well.  In American military history, the concept of the citizen soldier is one of the most 
enduring ideas throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  It holds that the 
nation’s and the citizen’s interests are similar and therefore, citizens make the best 
defenders of the nation.  In the ideology of the concept, it also prevents the military from 
gaining too much professional power, as its soldiers are simultaneously citizens.  
However, for this concept to work, it requires large-scale participation in times of 
national crisis, such as World War II.  During World War II, that large-scale national 
participation came in the form of conscription.  The rights of conscientious objectors 
created a question on the issue of conscription and religious freedom, namely what 
balance must be struck between a citizen’s duty to the state during wartime and his rights 
as a religious minority.  Conscientious objection has been a troublesome issue throughout 
American history, particularly during wars in which the American state used conscription 
as a means of raising troops.  Of all the wars in U.S. history, World War II was the 
pivotal conflict in terms of COs and conscription because it established the precedent of 
alternative service and the privilege of religious-based objection, regardless of Historic 
Peace Church membership.  Although World War I had provisions for COs and, 
eventually, alternative service, the results were far from positive for all involved and 
there was not enough time to implement an effective alternative service program.  
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Therefore, World War II represented the watershed in the relationship between the CO 
and the state. 
The citizen soldier concept is a fundamental part of the American military 
tradition.  As stated by Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski in For the Common Defense 
when discussing their six major themes of American military history,  
…American defense policy has traditionally been built upon pluralistic military 
institutions, most noticeably a mixed force of professionals and citizen soldiers.  
These pluralistic institutions reflect the diverse attitudes of professional soldiers, 
citizen-soldiers, and antimilitary and pacifistic citizens about the role of state-
sponsored force in the nation’s life.16 
That definition describes that nature of conscientious objection and alternative service 
during World War II almost perfectly.  It was a pluralistic operation between the 
professionals such as Hershey in the Selective Service and the Historic Peace Churches 
and their constituency, who represented the “pacifistic citizens,” creating the cooperative 
administrative and operational roles that defined conscientious objection.  While Millett 
and Maslowski are speaking of the ways in which the pluralistic military institution 
fought throughout American history, the concept applies to another facet of American 
military history – conscientious objection – due to the professionals in the Selective 
Service administering alternative service. 
The concept of the citizen soldier represents a core American value of the 
egalitarian distribution of a duty of service during times of crisis, placing this dissertation 
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further into a discussion of the nature of American social, political, and military 
dynamics.  From its inception, the United States expressed a fear of a standing 
professional army.  Drawing on historical examples such as Oliver Cromwell and his 
New Model Army or the redcoats of English King George III in the republic’s earliest 
years, Americans traditionally view professional armies as separate from the state, 
therefore representing a threat to its very existence.  A professional army can easily 
become a tyrannical force that infringes upon liberty.  Therefore, the best defenders of the 
nation are those who have the most interest in its fortunes – its own citizens.  In the 
American tradition, the citizen soldier blurs the line between military and civilian society, 
making it clear that the military is not separate from society.  The interests of the two are 
intertwined as society seeks to protect itself with its own military.17   
Some of the best work done on the concept of the citizen-soldier comes from 
military theorist Eliot Cohen.  Cohen posits that there are a number of different 
arguments in what exactly the citizen soldier is.  If the citizen soldier exists as a way to 
prevent tyrannical control of the government by a professional force, then he is more than 
“a soldier who can vote,” but instead it is more of a “civilian-soldier.”  By that idea he 
means that, 
 …it is necessary that the bulk of the armed forces consist of men whose main 
pursuits are pacific, who are fresh from their civilian lives and look forward to 
their swift return to those lives, whose main identity is as citizens and not as 
                                                 
17Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 121-125.  
 33 
soldiers, whose loyalty lies with home and community, and not with the military 
as a corporate body.18 
Cohen also argues that in liberal-democratic states (like the United States), the 
concept of the citizen soldier is a bit more understated and calls for citizens to control the 
military, not just serve in it.  As he states, “According to this view the most proper as 
well as the most effective defense of a country rests with those who have the largest stake 
in it; there is something mean or degenerate in a community that relies on hired members 
of the lower classes to fights its great battles.”19 
Based on that line of reasoning, the American military tradition is rooted in a duty 
of service by its citizens.  Granted, during the years of conscription millions of young 
male citizens did not have a choice whether they served, but they were citizens 
nonetheless and they voted and elected the men who passed conscription laws.  After 
their military service ended, most of them returned to their civilian lives.  As 
conscientious objection and alternative service came to be defined by Lewis Hershey 
during World War II, a similar dynamic emerged.  Because every able-bodied American 
male, in theory, was required to serve his nation in time of war, this meant that 
conscientious objectors must serve as well.  From that dynamic came alternative service.  
Hershey fervently believed in service and the citizen soldier.  Though Cohen does not 
agree with him, Hershey argued near the end of World War II that the militia system in 
                                                 
18Ibid., 123-124.  
19Ibid., 124-125.  
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the United States was the “ancestor” of the Selective Service and the two resembled each 
other closely.20  Hershey also admired the work of General John McAuley Palmer who, 
during the twentieth century, was the foremost proponent the citizen soldier as the 
backbone of the military.21  Hershey’s attitudes towards service, the citizen soldier, and 
conscientious objection, along with his other beliefs and background are discussed in 
detail in Chapter III. 
The preceding pages represent an introduction to two significant components of 
this dissertation: Civilian Public Service and the concept of the citizen soldier.  Hershey’s 
belief in the duty of all eligible males to serve the United States held profound 
ramifications for conscientious objectors as they found themselves in remote work 
camps, mental institutions (as laborers), on farms, and serving as scientific test subjects 
during World War II.  It bears mentioning that even if one disagrees with the concept of 
the citizen soldier as flawed logic, it was something that Hershey strongly believed in and 
he used it as a line of reasoning in his shaping of alternative service.  As will be revealed 
during the discussions covering Hershey’s views on the nature of CPS, he wanted to 
make the sacrifices of the men similar to those who served in the armed forces, minus, of 
course, the armed conflicts.  That desire was the result of his belief in the citizen soldier 
                                                 
20Hershey quoted in Ibid., 125.  Hershey used the word “ancestor” when 
comparing the militia and the Selective Service. 
21Lewis B. Hershey to Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, May 27, 1941, General 
Hershey’s Staybacks, Planning Office Staybacks, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army 
Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
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tradition in American military history.  Coupling that desire with the requirement that all 
eligible men during World War II perform national service of some sort, it becomes 
clearer that Hershey’s actions during that time provided a form of alternative service that 
further defined the concept of the citizen soldier, extending some of its tenets to those 
who objected to serving in the armed forces.   
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CHAPTER 3 – BACKGROUND AND BELIEFS OF HERSHEY 
 
 
 
Some of Lewis Hershey’s beliefs and attitudes towards conscientious objection 
and national service developed well before his appointment as Director of the Selective 
Service.  Comparing his early life experiences to his later musings on the nature of the 
conscientious objector and alternative service reveal that his background and life 
experiences were critical to his approach to alternative service and conscientious 
objection.  Through his Mennonite ancestry and familiarity with Christianity, Hershey 
had an understanding of Christian ethics that spilled over into the realm of conscientious 
objection. His service in the Indiana National Guard shaped his attitudes towards the 
merits of conscription.  His personal experience as the embodiment of the citizen-soldier 
early in his military career helped develop his sense of duty to the state.  His formative 
years growing up on a farm in northeastern Indiana instilled him with a sense of rural 
America that helped lead to an emphasis on decentralization in the draft.  Overall, an 
examination of the life of Lewis Hershey prior to his ascendancy to the Director of 
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Selective Service provides insight into the developing attitudes of Lewis Hershey towards 
conscientious objection and national service.  Hershey believed firmly in national service 
of all eligible males and decentralization of the draft.  He also believed that sincere 
religious objectors should perform some form of alternative service.  As a result of his 
early years, he displayed a nuanced and sympathetic understanding of conscientious 
objection and they shaped his development of alternative service during World War II. 
To gain proper perspective into Hershey’s thoughts, it is necessary to first 
examine his beliefs, ideology, and stance towards conscientious objection that can be 
traced back to his early years in Indiana and his service as a military officer.  One portion 
of his background that affected his stance was his heritage.  Hershey could trace his 
family history to Mennonite ancestry in Switzerland, which provided him with a sense of 
understanding for the position of the Historic Peace Churches.  Though not an active 
Christian, he was not ignorant in the ways of the Mennonites.  Second, and most 
significantly, Hershey fervently believed in the duty of all eligible men to serve their 
country in a time of crisis.  This belief manifested itself at a very early age in Hershey 
and it shaped most of his worldview in terms of alternative service and conscientious 
objection. 
Though not the primary motivation for Hershey’s protection of conscientious 
objection, Hershey’s religious background provided him with a basic knowledge of the 
Historic Peace Churches (or at least the Mennonites) and it provided him with some 
common ground between himself and the Peace Church membership.  He was not a 
practicing Christian, but he did possess religious training.  Part of his formal education 
was six years of Latin and a heavy reading of the Bible, so he possessed a familiarity with 
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Christian ethics.  While he understood the Christian faith, he did not care for the specific 
structure and theology of Christian churches.  He had a particular disdain for those who 
overtly professed their Christianity.  Instead, he possessed what Flynn terms a “personal 
creed which reflected equal parts Greek stoicism, humanitarianism, American 
individualism, and deism.”1   
There is one portion of Hershey’s religious background that is quite intriguing.  
Hershey’s ancestors were Mennonites.  He was a descendent of the Hersche family of 
Appenzell, Switzerland, an area of significance for the beginnings of Anabaptism.2  His 
family came to Lancaster, Pennsylvania (another strong center of Mennonite heritage) in 
1708.  However, Lewis’s grandfather was not actively religious by the time he moved to 
Indiana in 1849, a trait passed on to Lewis.3  Lewis seemed to be quite proud of his 
Mennonite heritage.  His place of birth, Steuben County, Indiana, had a large Amish 
population, and on occasion he referred to himself as the “Mennonite General.”4  He had 
the heritage and early background analogous to a typical conscientious objector, but as an 
individual, he was not an active participant in religious activities. 
His religious beliefs were a noteworthy subject for the manner in which CO 
policy unfolded during World War II.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
provisions for conscientious objection changed from World War I to World War II.  In 
the First World War, COs had to be a member of an established peace church, but in the 
                                                 
1Flynn, "Lewis Hershey and the Conscientious Objector," 1.  
2Anabaptism traces its origins to Switzerland.  
3Flynn, "Lewis Hershey and the Conscientious Objector," 4.   
4Keim, The CPS Story, 24; and Tucker, 45.   
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Second World War, a CO’s objection needed to be based only on “religious training and 
belief.”  Therefore, a person did not have to be a member of one of the Historic Peace 
Churches to be classified as a CO.  Of this dynamic, Hershey was quite supportive, but he 
maintained the position that a CO’s reasoning needed to be grounded in religion and the 
belief had to be personal.5 
The other portion of Hershey’s ideology shaped by his early years was his 
concept of service.  From 1916-1918, Hershey served as a National Guard recruiter, on 
the Mexican border, and in World War I, all of which definitely shaped his worldview 
concerning service and the citizen soldier.  Hershey strongly believed in the duty of every 
eligible male to serve his country when asked.  A large part of his viewpoints concerning 
national service come from his time as a National Guard recruiter based out of New 
Albany, Indiana.  Hershey’s successes as a recruiter during 1916 were limited at best, as 
Flynn notes that he only gained four recruits by October.  This discouraged and unsettled 
Hershey, making him believe that a generation of men was emerging that had no real 
concept of the importance of their duty to the state.  He also felt that the War Department 
shouldered some of the blame, as sending guardsmen home after one month did not 
provide an incentive to join for adventure, travel, or active service.  After one particular 
fruitless attempt, Hershey wrote of one man who seemed not to care about whether or not 
he even held a job: “It is more than I can conceive what some people have in the way of 
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an idea about this old world anyway.  This young man seemed to have absolutely no idea 
of personal responsibility toward anybody or anything.”6 
As Europe and other parts of the world continued to fall deeper into the abyss of 
World War I, Hershey became disillusioned about the reluctance of many Americans to 
get involved or their lack of a desire to serve.  He commented in his diary,  
The people that really believe that something should be done are for the most part 
altogether too willingly to let someone else do it!  As a friend writes me, ‘I wish 
you success in the recruiting business, but I cannot sign.’  More and more the 
feeling grows on me that America, as did Germany in 1815, will some time be 
awakened by a national degradation.  I firmly believe that we [should] prepare to 
maintain peace than fight to regain.7 
Though Hershey was by no means a warmonger (he stated in a number of private 
conversations with Paul French that he did not like war), he was also a realist and 
believed that the best prospects for peace came from preparedness.  That meant that men 
had to serve in the military for the United States to be prepared for any menace that 
threatened its interests. 
In addition to his time as a recruiter, American involvement in World War I had a 
profound effect on Hershey’s concept of service, his views concerning peace, and what 
he perceived as complacency.  Hershey elucidated his beliefs on preparedness not long 
after the official declaration of war by the United States on Germany.  His diary entries 
make it quite clear that he hated the prospect of war, but accepted it as a necessary 
sacrifice, apparently accepting much of President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric with his 
                                                 
6Lewis B. Hershey Diary, September 7-8, 1916, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, 
Trine University, Angola, IN; and Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 18. 
7Hershey Diary, September 14, 1916.  
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calls to “make the world safe for democracy.”  The act of men marrying quickly to avoid 
the draft particularly irked Hershey.  He wrote,  
The horror of war is felt at the very mention of the name.  Yet in that dire need we 
stand of its stimulatory effect.  How tardy indeed is our nation from the legislator 
down.  To a sad pass has come this ‘beacon light’ of the Western Hemisphere 
when provisions have been made to prevent whole droves of young men of 
military age from marrying to shirk their duty.8 
 From this entry, we see that Hershey was disappointed in a nation that espoused 
spreading freedom across the globe, but made exceptions for men who, in his mind, 
married for no other reason than to avoid the draft.  On the surface, it would seem that 
Hershey would not support conscientious objection in his later years based on this 
passage.  But bear in mind that Hershey made it clear that sincere objectors were to be 
given full protection.  His problem lay with those who were irresponsible or shirking 
their national duty. 
Hershey also believed that reversing a trend of anti-interventionism into foreign 
wars was a difficult prospect.  He firmly believed that the United States was doing the 
right thing in actively participating in World War I, writing that, “Personally, I am a 
strong believer in the ultimate good that shall arise from the war, no matter how long it 
may be prolonged.”  He was, however, concerned about complacency he perceived in 
Americans during peacetime.  He believed in preparedness to ensure peace and that the 
hope for ending war in perpetuity was a fallacious aspiration.  War was a part of the 
human condition and like it or not, it would never go away.9  The best way to preserve 
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the American lifestyle and freedoms was to remain vigilant.  Beyond rejecting 
intervention in foreign wars, it also meant the service of all eligible males in some form. 
Hershey’s stance towards conscientious objection was multifaceted, but it was 
built around a concept of service and decentralization that came, in part, from his 
upbringing and early years in the military.  In early 1941, Hershey publicly defined his 
overall ideas for classification of the CO.  His description is an excellent example of both 
his belief in the individualism of conscience and the decentralization of conscription.  
When asked to define exactly what a CO was, he answered,  
It is not possible to pronounce such a definition.  Conscience is an undiscernable 
[sic] something hidden in the heart and head of a man.  Each case must stand on 
its own foundation.  The law has given the local boards (and the boards of appeal 
when appeals are perfected) the power and function to decide this unusual issue in 
each case.  They are the judge and the jury.  Those of us in National Headquarters 
and also in State Headquarters should be careful not to encroach upon their 
peculiar province.10 
He added that the role of the policy makers was to provide a framework for the local 
boards to make their classifications.  According to Hershey, it was up to the local boards  
“to locate the conscience and then measure the extent of its objection to the military 
service.”11 
Though it appears on the surface that this dynamic makes the local draft boards 
the central institution in the tale of conscientious objection in World War II, the reality 
lies a bit deeper.  As many scholars have written, the draft boards tended to be 
inconsistent in granting CO classification.  Some draft boards were quite lenient while 
                                                 
10Selective Service, February 1, 1941.  
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others denied all of the CO classification requests that came before them.12  This 
inconsistency was most definitely a part of the CO experience during World War II and 
that inconsistency was a direct result of Hershey’s desire to have a decentralized mode of 
conscription.  In this particular example, the power was not in Hershey’s hands.  
However, it was his delegation and his desire to have a Jeffersonian model of 
conscription that led to this dynamic.  While he may not have been directly involved in 
classifying objectors (in all fairness, he was the national director and classification was a 
job he had to delegate), his actions in passing the responsibility to the local boards was 
incredibly significant in the way conscientious objection unfolded in World War II.  
Also within his belief structure toward a decentralized draft was the person whom 
Hershey referred to as the “necessary man.”  The necessary man was the person who held 
a job on the homefront significant to the war effort, such as working on a farm or in some 
form of vital industry.  This is an imperative point to discuss because it reflects the 
primary mission of the Selective Service – to raise an army without disruption of the 
economy or production on the homefront.  Hershey made this quite clear in the middle of 
1941 when he wrote,  
The primary purpose of the Selective Service System is to procure men for 
military training, but these men must be obtained in a manner which will cause 
minimum interference with our national life and especially that part of it engaged 
specifically in providing means for national defense.13 
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13Selective Service, May 1, 1941.  
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In short, the goal of the Selective Service was to help win the war.  It was to identify men 
fit for military service and keep the “necessary man” in industry or agriculture if he was 
too important to the production of the homefront.14  He left the classification of these men 
to the local draft boards, with guidance coming from his national office.  Hershey’s 
emphasis on this point remained in place throughout the war: it was the job of the 
Selective Service to select the people who could be spared for military service with the 
purpose of building an army to fight in a modern, industrialized war.  The Selective 
Service’s primary mission was not to provide for or administer conscientious objection, 
but Hershey’s role in that dynamic was still pivotal.  
Hershey’s reasoning for decentralizing conscription reveals a pragmatic approach 
with an eye for the real-world applications of his regulations.  During a 1975 interview, 
though he tended to ramble in his old age, and was a bit unclear in places, his views were 
definitely discernable.  He said,  
You think you can write a dozen books that would cover all of the cases that you 
have [in regards to conscientious objection].  Because in the first place, outside of 
the Mennonites and the Brethren, who happen to [be] pretty well drilled, but the 
Quaker and anybody else that you can think of is an absolute individualist.  He 
probably doesn’t agree with anybody in his group.  I can take a bunch of Quakers 
and have them sit down here and you’d be surprised at what they would tell you.  
“Would you go in the Armed Forces?”  “I would if I had to.  I wouldn’t tell 
anybody, but I would go in.  Because in the first place, I’ve got to go somewhere 
and I’ll go that way.”  “How about you?”  “Oh, I wouldn’t go near the place.”  
“Would you take work of national importance?”  “No, not under any 
circumstances….”  Now, you just start out trying to write up, so that the local 
board when they get a hold of the guy can listen to what he says [meaning heavy 
centralization makes classification nearly impossible]. 
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I’d rather trust the folks that are out there, especially those that work for nothing, 
and a guy who’s working for nothing on a local board is in much better shape than 
a guy who’s getting paid.15 
What this signifies is that Hershey believed that nobody knew the situation of the CO 
better than those who lived in the CO’s community.  Therefore, in his mind, no single 
person was better qualified than the local draft board to determine the CO’s sincerity or 
his classification.  Hershey grew up in a rural portion of northeastern Indiana, near 
Angola, a small town typical of rural American at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
Hershey’s years there helped to shape his views on the importance of local, decentralized 
government, as it was a place where most people knew of one another.  Though he called 
for people to think and serve nationally, he believed in the importance of American 
locales to classify draftees for some from of national service.  It may have made for 
inconsistency, but it was the system in place, it affected conscientious objection, and 
Hershey fought for it throughout his career. 
In October 1941, Hershey responded to a CO who complained that the 
government could not coerce him into working or serving.  His reply provides one of the 
best insights into his beliefs concerning service and minority rights.  In his letter to L. 
Taylor Krawczyk, the CO in question, he consistently argues that if the majority of 
citizens in the United States shirked their duty to the state and society, the entire structure 
could fall apart.  He viewed CPS and the idea of alternative service in general as a 
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privilege for minorities that allows them to avoid military service but did not allow them 
to avoid any service whatsoever.  He wrote, 
As a member of society you daily throughout your life have accepted privileges 
made possible entirely by efforts of others.  So long as you participate as a 
member of society and accept its common privileges, society must reserve the 
right to require and compel services from you.  Military service is basic because 
its objective is the preservation of the life of the organization.  By grace, our 
government permits alternate service for those opposed to bearing arms.  This 
alternate service is not the right of citizens.  It is an indulgence extended to a few.  
Whenever this privilege becomes a common request, it must be denied or the 
nation perishes.16 
Hershey believed that this stance actually benefited conscientious objectors.  If COs were 
allowed to avoid any type of service altogether, the backlash could be so severe that a 
system could be put in place that would be “less favorable” than the current structure of 
conscientious objection.17  This particular letter signifies one of the foundations of CO 
policy as administered by Hershey during World War II.  It also is one of the major 
insights into furthering the definition of the concept of the citizen soldier in the United 
States.  During wartime, it was the duty of every citizen to protect or otherwise serve the 
interests of the nation.  Whether one toiled in the fields, labored in the factories, served in 
the military, or objected to war, everyone must serve.  Society and the structure of 
civilization demanded it.  Therefore, even if one objected to military service, he could not 
avoid service altogether.  The duty to the state and society must be fulfilled by alternate 
means. 
                                                 
16Lewis Hershey to L. Taylor Krawczyk, October 1, 1941, Center for Conscience 
and War, Series A, Correspondence with General Lewis B. Hershey, Swarthmore College 
Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA. 
17Ibid.  
 47 
It also bears mentioning that although Hershey is the focus of this study, and he 
was the central figure for conscientious objection in World War II, he was but one man.  
The Selective Service was a bureaucratic institution, and its official stance as the arbiter 
of policy needs a brief discussion as well.  The best record for the Selective Service 
during World War II is the Reports of the Director of Selective Service.  Though it is an 
institutional governmental report, it reflects the personal views of Hershey filtering 
through to become a matter of institutional policy.  For example, in the chapter of the 
report that discusses conscientious objection, a subheading appears titled “The Individual 
Conscience in a Free Nation.”  The text that comprises this portion of the chapter meshes 
perfectly with the personal beliefs and attitudes of Hershey put forth in the previous 
pages of this chapter.  It reads, 
It is part of those larger and human conceptions of human liberty and human 
personality which are at stake in this war, that the judgment of individual 
conscience opposed to the national will, should be given consideration and 
allowed a form of cooperation consistent with its judgments, if they are the results 
of religious training and belief.  Judgments that are merely economic, or political, 
or social in its grounds, are in the areas where the State imposes its will.18 
In other words, the rights of the individual to object should not be trampled on, and the 
central reason for the objection had to be religious in nature.  If the objector’s reasons 
were secular, the state could rightfully force him to serve in the military as a combatant. 
Also in the report is a discussion of service for COs.  The Selective Service was 
very blunt on this point.  “The [Selective Service and Training Act of 1940] … does not 
recognize the right, nor grant exemption from service to the Nation in its time of peril.”  
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Conscientious objection was absolutely in no way a form of avoiding service altogether.  
Instead, if a CO was eligible for service, his beliefs came into play, and he was either 
drafted into the army as a noncombatant (Class I-A-O) or served in Civilian Public 
Service (Class IV-E).19  Those who objected to any form of military service were the 
objectors who qualified for CPS.  A similar statement appears in the early portions of the 
official history of conscientious objection and the Selective Service.  It reads, “The 
philosophy of Selective Service, as embodied in its basic law of 1940, was that no 
militarily liable citizen had the right of exemption from service to the Nation in time of 
emergency, whatever his religious training or affiliation, and whatever his personal 
beliefs and opinions.”20 
Therefore, of his earliest ideological manifestations, Hershey’s belief in the 
importance of national service to the state as one of the foremost duties of Americans was 
pivotal in his stance towards conscientious objection.  Also playing a significant role was 
his Mennonite heritage and belief in decentralization.  His early years prior to the passage 
of the Selective Service Act of 1940 definitely played a role in shaping those facets of his 
character.  It is now necessary to turn to a discussion of Hershey’s early years to 
understand his ideology more clearly. 
It is now necessary to provide a brief biography of Hershey to provide a better 
grasp on his beliefs.  Lewis Hershey was born on September 12, 1893 to Latta and 
Rosetta Hershey in Steuben County, Indiana.  Northeastern Indiana, near Angola, was 
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Hershey’s home until he graduated from high school.  Rosetta died in 1898, and her 
sister, Alma, helped to raise young Lewis.21  Hershey worked on the family farm and had 
a romantic affinity in later life for the years he spent as a youth laboring there, though he 
never wanted to make it a career.  In later years, Hershey recalled how his upbringing in 
rural Indiana helped to shape his character.  He stated in an interview with biographer 
Richard Seiverling,   
First, we all believed in work – hard work – and long working hours.  Second, we 
learned early in life how important it is to rely on a person’s word.  We would 
never take a man’s note if you couldn’t trust his word.  We took our neighbor’s 
word at face value, because we knew his background and we believed there was 
validity to his word.22 
He began his education in one-room schoolhouse in 1899 and proved to be an 
exceptional student throughout his schooling.  He went on to Fremont High School at a 
time when most of his peers quit school after the eighth grade, graduating in 1910.  His 
aptitude and belief in the strength of a good education were apparent when he continued 
on to Tri-State College (now Trine University) in Angola, from which he graduated with 
honors in 1914.  While there, he displayed particular talents in mathematics, the 
humanities, and athletics.  He played intramural baseball and varsity basketball in 
addition to serving as Deputy Sheriff of Steuben County, working for his father when the 
citizens of Steuben County elected Latta as their sheriff.  He also coached the women’s 
basketball team at Tri-State and was a member of debating clubs.23   
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After graduating from Tri-State, Hershey found employment as principal of Flint 
High School in Steuben County.  Hershey proved to be an exceptional high school 
principal, displaying qualities that would eventually serve him well as the Director of the 
Selective Service.  He endeared himself to the local population in Flint with his 
optimistic nature, paternalistic demeanor, and organizational skill.  In addition to his 
duties as an administrator, Hershey also taught a broad range of subjects alongside four 
other teachers.  He was so popular that parents who normally sent their children to larger 
schools pulled them out and sent them to Flint so Hershey could educate them.  When his 
National Guard duties called him away in 1916, many of his students threatened to quit if 
he left.24 
Hershey began his long service in the military when he enlisted in the Indiana 
National Guard in 1911.  He saw service in the Guard as an opportunity for career 
advancement, something he felt would elude him if he remained in the Angola area as an 
educator or farmer.  As a member of the Guard he advanced quickly, becoming a 
corporal in 1912 and a sergeant a year later.  His imposing physical stature (he was six 
feet tall) along with a talent for organization served him well.  He was an exemplary 
Guardsman who valued drill and punctuality.  His company eventually elected him 
second lieutenant in 1913, with fellow Guardsman and eventual Selective Service 
subordinate Lewis Kosch serving as his campaign manager for the post.  Thus began a 
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long association between the two men that had a significant impact on conscientious 
objectors in World War II.25   
That same year, the federal government called Hershey’s unit to active duty and 
he deployed to the U.S-Mexico border as a part of the U.S. incursion into Mexico to stem 
Pancho Villa’s raids.  It was during this tour that he began to develop his philosophy 
about the United States and its level of military preparedness.  During his deployment 
along the border he experienced the squalid conditions and generally poor military 
decorum of an army lacking decent training.  He came to believe in conscription and 
rejected the practicality and workability of an all-volunteer force.  He also realized that if 
he wanted to advance through the military ranks, his best opportunity would be in the 
regular army.  However, prior to the First World War, an appointment was an unlikely 
possibility.  Yet, he served on active duty for the U.S. Army from June until December 
1916 and chose to remain in the National Guard after his unit was released from federal 
service, also serving for a time as a recruiter in the New Albany area.  His recruiting 
efforts were unsuccessful, as only a few men signed up for the Guard.  Because of the 
low number of men who signed up, he became more firmly convinced that using 
volunteers was not a feasible basis for raising an army prepared for the needs of modern 
warfare and international dynamics.26   
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After his release from active duty in December 1916, Hershey began a graduate 
degree at the University of Indiana in Bloomington.  When the United States entered the 
First World War in April, Hershey found himself working at the headquarters of the First 
Battalion, Third Infantry of the Indiana National Guard to prepare it for commissioning in 
the U.S. Army.  When Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917, he approved, 
as his experience in Mexico and as a recruiter convinced him that volunteering was not 
the efficient way to raise an army.  He went back on active duty in August and shortly 
afterwards his regiment became the 137th Field Artillery in the 38th Division of the 
National Guard of the United States.  In May 1918, he received a promotion to captain 
and that summer he became the division personnel officer.27   
Hershey’s writings on the eve of World War I reveal a man who frequently 
thought, at an early age, about the role of the United States in the world.  He believed that 
much good would ultimately come from American participation in World War I and he 
chided his fellow countrymen who did not support preparedness or intervention.  He 
believed that sectors of American society had become lazy and focused too closely on 
their own problems rather than those of the world.  He contended that many pacifist 
leaders, who called for strict neutrality before World War I, seemed to change their mind 
quickly, yet their followers were not as wont to get involved.  He did not feel that 
American adequately prepared for the role of the United States in the future of the world 
and hoped World War I would change their thinking from a local viewpoint to an 
international one.  He wrote in his diary,  
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Many of these conditions had a great deal to do with the noticeable lethargy that 
had hold of the people as the outbreak of the present war so far as America was 
participating.  Our people unused to thinking in national terms, let alone 
international, could grasp … slowly our interest in the outcomes of the conflict.28 
Before his embarkation for France as a part of the American Expeditionary Force 
(AEF), he still believed in the mission of the United States to aid in the cause of the 
Allied Powers.  He thought that ultimately, the war would solve some of the problems of 
inaction and superfluity that he perceived to have pervaded American culture.  He did not 
believe that the war would fix everything, but it could “…remove many of the superficial 
things that have overcrowded our existence.”  In his mind, the men who served saw 
firsthand what difficulties life presented to people.  Regardless of their wealth or social 
standing, military life allowed soldiers “to live like men” and, “Countless numbers are by 
sacrifice finding out what real life is like after all.”29 
In late September 1918, he embarked overseas as a part of the AEF but never saw 
action, as the belligerents signed the armistice exactly one month after he landed in 
France.  He remained there, serving in an administrative role until September 1919 as a 
Transportation Officer at the AEF Headquarters in Brest (where Kosch coaxed a transfer 
to join him), and he organized the transportation for thousands of doughboys returning 
home.30 
After the war, a disillusioned Hershey believed that there would be a future need 
for a strong military because the peace made at Versailles would not last, so the United 
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States had to be prepared.  This was another reason he sought a commission in the regular 
army, along with being prodded to do so by his wife, Ellen.  Hershey remained in the 
Guard until he accepted an officer’s commission in the regular army in 1920, training as 
an artillery officer.  From 1923 to 1927, Hershey bounced around the United States, 
graduating from the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill in 1923.  After his training at Fort 
Sill, he taught Military Science at Ohio State University from 1923-1927 while serving as 
an ROTC commander at Camp Knox in Kentucky during the summer months from 1924-
1926.  In July 1927, Hershey became the commanding officer of an artillery battery at 
Fort Bliss, Texas.  During these years, the tall and athletic Hershey also displayed a talent 
for polo.  However, in November 1927, this affinity led to a serious setback for his 
advancement as an artillery officer when a polo mallet struck his right eye during 
competition.  He lost the use of his eye but he did not let his disability hinder his success 
in the army.31 
Hershey attended the army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, graduating in 1933.  His first assignment following graduation was 
as a quartermaster in the Arkansas Civilian Conservation Corps.  As a part of the New 
Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt had the military provide officers to establish and 
supervise the CCC work camps.  This was only a temporary assignment for Hershey, 
though, and afterwards he was able to gain admittance into the Army War College.  He 
performed serviceably, if not glowingly.  Interestingly, his War College evaluation noted 
that Hershey was “qualified for duty with civilian components.”  Next, he became the 
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assistant to the G-4 at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and gained a promotion to major in July 
1935.32 
 In 1936, Hershey received orders to report to the personnel branch of the War 
Department in Washington, D.C.33  With this appointment began a long and storied career 
in national manpower policy, which lasted until the early 1970s. He served as secretary of 
the Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee (JANSSC) in 1936, which led to his 
appointment as the Assistant Director of the Selective Service under Clarence Dykstra in 
1940.  He became director after Dykstra’s resignation in 1941, a position he held for 
nearly three decades, serving under six presidents. 
A cursory examination of the background of Lewis Hershey reveals the 
foundation that led to his opinions on the nature of conscientious objection and national 
service during World War II.  From his years growing up on a farm in northeastern 
Indiana, Hershey was man who remained tied to his roots believing in a Jeffersonian 
model of conscription that emphasized decentralization in classification of draftees.  That 
decentralization was of great significance for conscientious objectors as that was the first 
step for them in gaining legal recognition on a personal level.  Furthermore, his 
Mennonite heritage provided him with some sense of identity in which he could relate to 
the objectors.  Though not a practicing Christian, Hershey’s Mennonite background 
provided him, at the very least, with a certain knowledge of the stance of religious 
conscientious objectors.  Finally, and by far most significantly, his years as a recruiter for 
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the National Guard, his service on the Mexican border, and his experience in World War 
I shaped his concept of service that led to his insistence on alternative service for all 
objectors.  Every draftee was to serve in some capacity, as it was his belief that the duty 
of all eligible men was to serve their nation when called upon.  It was this belief that tied 
conscientious objectors to the tradition of the citizen soldier in American history.  As the 
Director, all matters of conscience in the draft went through Hershey’s office as he was 
the singular person in charge of CO policy within the Selective Service.  For that reason, 
his points of view regarding the matter were of the utmost importance.  The foundation 
laid during his early years, such as an emphasis on service and a belief in 
decentralization, provided the necessary basis upon which he built his nuanced and 
sympathetic ideology that shaped alternative service during World War II. 
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CHAPTER 4 – HISTORY AND DEMANDS OF MANPOWER AND 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
 
Throughout the history of the United States, there has been a long-standing 
tradition of conscientious objection to military service beginning with the arrival of 
Quakers in North America during the mid-seventeenth century.  Although conscientious 
objection has been a part of the American military experience almost from its inception, 
the lack of uniformity in dealing with COs meant that there was no firm precedent in 
1940 for how to treat them with the advent of peacetime conscription.  This had to do 
partly with the changing nature of warfare from the seventeenth through the twentieth 
centuries and the differing needs of the military during its history, but it also had to do 
with the changes in federal power during that time and the state’s abilities to muster 
armed services in wartime.  As a result, by World War II, there was no real frame of 
reference for the treatment and provisions for conscientious objection as a matter of 
federal policy.  There were definitely accommodations made for them prior to World War 
II, but those accommodations differed over time and were not firmly established as 
federal law.  Furthermore, many of those accommodations were problematic to the 
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Historic Peace Churches, who did not wish to compromise their beliefs.  This is why 
World War II and General Hershey’s role in developing and supporting the legislation for 
conscientious objection and alternative service is so important.  The history of 
conscientious objection up to the years of World War II reveals that while COs may have 
been recognized by various authorities over time, there was no uniform method of 
providing for conscience.  The localized dynamics of the colonial era and the Revolution 
meant that the laws differed from colony to colony, though they all had some sort of 
provision for COs.  Commutation and the practice of hiring substitutes in the Civil War 
meant that COs had methods to avoid conscription, but those methods were problematic 
for some members of the Peace Churches.  World War I saw the first truly national draft 
intended to raise an army through conscription, but there was no precedent for dealing 
with COs in a conscripted army and the result was a disaster.  Indeed, Hershey’s actions 
during World War II represented the major portion of the first systematized institutional 
effort to provide an alternative form of service for religious objectors, seeking to avoid 
the mistakes of World War I. 
In a discussion of conscientious objection during the colonial era of United States 
military history, it is imperative to explain the militia tradition, because, as Allan Millett 
and Peter Maslowski state, “The most important response to the dangerous military 
realities was the creation of a militia system in each colony.”1  The militia emerged in the 
American colonies for a number of reasons.  It was part of a legacy that harkened back to 
the late twelfth century reign of Henry II and was then further cemented with the 
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Instructions for General Muster in 1572 during the Elizabethan Era.2  The fact that the 
frontier was a dangerous place with the possibility of attack from natives combined with 
the expense of maintaining a professional fighting force created a situation that made the 
militia an attractive option for defense in all of the American colonies.  While it was a 
diverse institution and varied from colony to colony, it also possessed a number of 
similar traits.3 
The militia laid the foundation for the tradition of the citizen soldier in American 
history.  While that particular dynamic did not really emerge until the Early National 
period, there are definitely trappings of it reaching all the way back to the early colonial 
era.  A militia-based defense force assumed that all able-bodied males in the settlement 
held the responsibility of defense.  It was common practice for a colony to declare that all 
able-bodied men within a certain age range were members of the militia.  The age range 
was usually from sixteen to sixty, but there were always exceptions.   In some places the 
upper age limit dropped to forty-five, while in others, the lowest age could be eighteen or 
twenty-one.  In keeping form with the theme of individual responsibility for defense, 
members of the militia were responsible for arming themselves.4 
Because of its structure and purpose, the militia was most definitely a community-
based organization.  The earliest militias defended their own areas and could not aid their 
neighbors without opening themselves to attack.  However, as colonial society began to 
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mature and venture further inland, the militia system began to change and in some ways, 
became obsolete.  The threats of Indian attack were further inland, not near the major 
centers of population along the coasts.  This made the militia more of a ritualistic and 
cultural organization than an actual legitimate form of defense for the large settlements.  
During a time of war, the colonial legislature reorganized these units into the fighting 
entities that served in battle.  As the colonies matured, the militia served as a device for 
training for larger conflicts and expeditions rather than a large-scale local defense force.  
Rather than keep a large active militia on hand, the militia districts added men to the 
ranks during a conflict or expedition through volunteering, drafting, substitution, and 
hiring.5 
The dynamic described in the last few paragraphs was the primary means of 
fighting some of the early conflicts in colonial America, such as the Pequot War (1634-
1638) and King Philip’s War (1675-1676).  As France and Spain became the primary 
enemies of England and, consequently, of the English colonists, the means of military 
manpower procurement shifted, yet the legacy remained, and the militia still played a 
role.  At home, it was still a duty that all eligible men shared, and sometimes they left 
their homes to fight in battle.  Militiamen fought in King William’s War (1689-1697), 
Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713), the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1742), King George’s 
War (1744-1748), and the French and Indian War (1754-1763).  Although the militiamen 
fulfilled their duty, the British regulars had a particular disdain for them, at best seeing 
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them as poor soldiers.6  However, the militia in the early years of American colonization 
played such a significant role that it took on a legacy of its own, evolving into the citizen 
soldier tradition that marked service in America’s armed forces throughout their 
existence. 
For the purposes of this study, conscientious objection during the colonial era 
meant objection to service in the militia.  The first conscientious objectors in the 
American colonies were the Quakers, who first came to the shores of America in the 
latter part of the 1650s following the emergence of Quakerism in England under the 
leadership of George Fox.  They settled in the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Netherlands, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas.7  
Eventually, their largest centers of population were in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Delaware, thanks to the efforts of William Penn who established Pennsylvania in 1682.  
Throughout the colonial era, only the colony of Pennsylvania had a blanket deferment for 
Quakers from military service, but that lasted only until the advent of the American 
Revolution.  All the other colonies required service in the militia, usually for those males 
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aged 18 – 50.  Beyond service in the militia, Quakers also faced the possibility of 
impressment into the Royal Navy, which happened on occasion. 8   
Throughout the colonial era, the official stance of the Society of Friends was that 
of absolutist objection, meaning complete and total exemptions from military service.  
Persecution for their absolutist stance came almost as soon as they arrived in the colonies.  
The first documented examples were in Maryland in 1658, where Quakers were attacked, 
fined, and had some possessions taken from them for their refusal to serve in the militia.  
In some cases, the Quakers’ positive relationship with Indians created much animosity 
toward them by colonial executives and resulted in those executives publicly denouncing 
the doctrine of pacifism.9  Other colonies, such as New York, Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, and Virginia invoked similar punishments as those in Maryland.10  Outside of 
Pennsylvania, the most liberal of the colonies for treatment of COs was Rhode Island, 
which is understandable given the proclivity for religious liberty of the colony’s founder, 
Roger Williams.  The Rhode Island government passed legislation in 1663 that promoted 
religious liberty and ten years later, passed a provision in a militia act that exempted all 
people (not just the Peace Churches) from militia service if their conscience could not 
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allow them to take up arms.  This effectively created some of the first CO legislation in 
the American colonies, along with a similar act in Massachusetts, albeit with 
reservations, after Rhode Island’s 1663 act but before the militia exemption.  The Rhode 
Island legislation owed more to it than just the beliefs of Williams, it was also the result 
of a government that had a large number of Quakers serving in it.  Furthermore, this 
Quaker-dominated legislature absolutely rejected bills that took advantage of Indians, 
choosing instead to live in harmony with their native neighbors.11 
Pennsylvania was the other colony that had significant legislation protecting the 
rights of the conscientious objector.  Much in the same way that Rhode Island’s religious 
dynamic was a result of the influence of Roger Williams, in Pennsylvania it was the 
product of one of the most famous Quakers in history, William Penn.  Experiencing 
persecution at the hands of the English government for his religion, Penn eventually 
received a colony charter and founded the colony of Pennsylvania with religious liberty 
and freedom of conscience as the core values of the colony.  Penn sought to create a 
colony that reflected the values of his Quakerism.  So deep was the Pennsylvanian 
commitment to pacifism that it was only the French and Indian War that forced the 
colonial legislature’s to create a militia.12 
The various conflicts in colonial America, such as the War of Spanish Succession, 
the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and the French and Indian War, led to the continuation of 
Quaker persecution for their refusal to serve.  Beyond their refusal of military service, 
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many also refused to labor in any capacity that the military required, such as building 
forts or digging ditches.  The conflict that produced the most tension in traditionally 
Quaker-friendly Pennsylvania was the French and Indian War.  On the Pennsylvania 
frontier, settlers (most of whom were non-Quaker) called for increased defenses against 
the French-backed Indian attacks on their settlements.  With additional pressure from the 
English government, the Quaker government of Pennsylvania turned away from an 
official stance that reflected the values of the Society of Friends and passed legislation 
providing money for military expenditures.  This marked the end for the “holy 
experiment” of the Quaker government in Pennsylvania.13 
In colonies other than Pennsylvania, the French and Indian War meant a re-
emergence of Quaker persecution.  Needing men to augment the British army to face the 
French and Indian threat, the English government pressured the colonies to improve the 
numbers in recruitment and take an active role in requiring men to serve in the militia.14  
However, there were examples of tolerance.  Perhaps the best example comes from a 
colonel in the Virginia militia whose name until the Revolution was synonymous with an 
embarrassing surrender at Fort Necessity: George Washington.  Under his command, 
Washington had seven Quaker draftees who absolutely refused to hold a musket, pay a 
fine, or hire a substitute. Again, this is evidence of the absolutist stance of the Society of 
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Friends.  Washington proved to be more than accommodating in this instance, as he 
eventually agreed to grant them their freedom from service. 15 
During the colonial era, the Quakers represented the largest peace group in the 
colonies, but there were other Christian sects that refused to serve in the military.  
Though quite small in number during this time, the Rogerenes, the Brethren, and a few 
individual Baptists repudiated military service based on their religious beliefs.  Another , 
much larger group, but without the extensive documentation of the Quakers, were the 
Mennonites.  Coming to Pennsylvania and Virginia in 1683 and still speaking German, 
the Mennonites practiced nonresistance and hence, refused to serve in the colonial militia.  
Their practices differed from the Quakers in that they were willing to pay a fine instead 
of personally drawing the sword against their fellow man.  However, they, like the 
Quakers, rejected hiring substitutes, seeing that practice as little more than sending 
another man to kill and shed blood in one’s place, making them complicit in taking 
another life.  Because of their settlement in Pennsylvania, the Mennonites did not face 
much difficulty when it came to militia service, especially when compared to the Quakers 
in other areas.  Interestingly, the dynamic in Virginia was similar because of the 
Mennonite willingness to a pay a fine in lieu of military service.16 
The militia continued as a part of the American military tradition during the early 
days of the American Revolution.  The militias filled their ranks through both draftees 
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and volunteers, with conscription being resorted to only when manpower needs did not 
meet the situation at hand.  As was the case during the colonial era, the overwhelming 
trend during the Revolutionary years was that citizens saw their duty as protecting the 
interests of their locales.  All eligible adult males were responsible for local defense, but 
the duty of colonial defense fell to the volunteer militia.  In practice, the volunteers were 
much more pertinent, because community-based defense was not as important as colonial 
or regional defense.17 
The creation of the Continental Army imparted a new dynamic to military service 
in the colonies.  Now, there was a military organization that represented all of the 
colonies as a whole.  The Continental Army represented the national identity of the 
fledgling United States.  As the fortunes of the Continental Army went, so went the 
fortunes of the United States.  Throughout its existence, the Continental Army’s biggest 
problems were manpower and supply.  The ideology of the Continental Congress created 
a major roadblock for raising the needed number of troops.  The Congress did not 
wholeheartedly support a standing army and because of that reluctance, supplying the 
army with adequate numbers of men and supplies was a constant headache for General 
Washington.  There was what Revolutionary War military historian E. Wayne Carp calls 
a “localist worldview and deep distrust of the military” in the early American political 
dynamic.  In 1776 an enlistment drive for a twenty thousand man Continental Army fell 
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woefully short, forcing Washington to resort to militia enlistments, a proposition that he 
definitely did not favor.18 
Some of the states resorted to mandatory military service to solve the manpower 
crisis, though the legislatures did so reluctantly.  Massachusetts was the first in 1776, and 
eventually the Continental Congress established a quota for each state to send to the 
Continental Army, which was then divided among each militia district.  This was not a 
complete and total draft as men could hire substitutes or pay a commutation fee, a 
practice that continued through to the Civil War.19  
For the main peace sects in the colonies/states, the American Revolution 
represented a new dilemma, yet most of them remained true to their peaceful convictions 
and refused to serve.  Many of them believed in the ideology of the Revolution, but they 
could not support a violent revolt.20  The biggest problem for the three sects was universal 
military obligation.   There were statutes for conscientious objectors in the colonies with 
a large population of pacifists, but there were eventual problems with substitutions and/or 
commutation fees.21   
As stated earlier, a man could avoid military service by paying a fee or finding a 
substitute, but this posed a particular problem for the Quakers.  They refused both options 
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because they renounced war and military service in all forms.  Hiring someone to do their 
killing for them or paying a fee that would be used to help make war was impossible for 
them as a group.  As a result, the Quakers suffered the harshest treatment of the three 
peace sects during the American Revolution.  Quakers refused to pay war taxes, to use 
paper currency (because they believed it was issued only to help make war), to help 
construct fortifications, and to perform other military labors.  Quakers had their land 
confiscated as a replacement for their service.  While some individual Quakers aided the 
military in one form or another, these members found themselves shunned from their 
meetings.22  
The Revolutionary experience was a bit different for the Mennonites and the 
Brethren.  They did not absolutely reject substitutions and commutation fees in the same 
way that the Quakers did.  The Mennonites and Brethren argued that substitutes or fees 
were a part of their duty to the state and thus did not compromise their peace witness.  
While this was their official stance, they did not enter into this relationship without some 
trepidation.  Mennonites viewed the hiring of substitutes as more problematic than paying 
a fee.  In fact, most Mennonites did not support hiring a substitute.  The Brethren were 
leery of substitution as well, but they eventually adopted the practice.23  Because the 
Mennonites and the Brethren were more willing to provide an alternative form of service, 
their wartime experience was much less harsh than that of the Quakers. 
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Once the United States gained its independence, conscientious objection was a 
part of the discussion in forging a new system of government.  There was talk for 
protection of conscientious objection in the Bill of Rights.  When James Madison brought 
the Bill of Rights into the House of Representatives during the First Congress (he was a 
representative at the time), he called for protection of conscientious objectors from militia 
service.24  His original wording was, “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free 
country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to 
render military service in person.” Though the provision passed in the House after much 
contentious debate, it failed in the Senate.  This debate, which was part of the larger issue 
of a standing army’s threat to liberty, continued through 1790, when North Carolina and 
Rhode Island, both with significant Quaker populations, sought to protect conscientious 
objection with amendments from their ratifying conventions that allowed for the hiring of 
substitutes in one case and complete exemption from a draft “except in the case of 
national emergency” in the other.  Congress struck both of the possible amendments 
down, establishing the precedent of conscientious objection as a privilege granted by the 
federal government rather than a right protected by the Constitution. 25 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the United States participated in a 
number of different conflicts that once again provided a moral dilemma for conscientious 
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objectors.  The War of 1812 was the first major conflict of the era to use American armed 
forces on a large scale.  It was also the first chance for the federal government to 
incorporate a national draft.  Military defeats in the first two years of the war and troop 
shortages led to economic incentives to bolster volunteers to the U.S. Army, but the 
ineffectiveness of that policy led to discussion of a national draft.  When the British 
formally invaded the United States in 1814, the manpower situation became critical, and 
President James Madison called for a national draft.  Political divisions between 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, along with refusals to cooperate between the 
House and the Senate, led to the bill’s death in December 1814.  By then the manpower 
needs were not as pressing, since American forces kept control of the Great Lakes and the 
end of the war was in sight.26   
Further compounding the issue of pacifism and war, during these years a number 
of secular pacifist groups began to emerge.27  Because this study is concerned primarily 
with the Historic Peace Churches, those organizations will not be discussed in great 
detail, but they do bear a passing mention because they illustrate the growing complexity 
of the American Peace Movement and the doctrine of pacifism.  Pacifism also became 
closely aligned with the Abolitionist Movement led by William Lloyd Garrison.  While 
abolitionists resorted to nonviolence to protest slavery, Garrison also called for pacifists 
to challenge military service laws through civil disobedience.  However, because there 
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was no national draft law during the Mexican War, the chance for their efforts to 
challenge that conflict dissipated.28   
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the issue of compulsory militia 
service continued to be problematic for the Historic Peace Churches, particularly the 
Friends.  The Friends’ issue lay with complete and total objection to any form of military 
service.  They not only refused to serve, but they also rejected the idea of hiring a 
substitute or paying a commutation fee.  They continued to be quite vocal about their 
disdain for military service, as they issued a petition to the Virginia Legislature in 1810 
asking for complete immunity to service in the militia.29 
As was the case during the colonial era and the Revolution, in the early nineteenth 
century the Mennonites and the Brethren had little trouble with governmental authority 
regarding military service.  They both were willing to pay their commutation fees and go 
on about their business without personally serving in the military.  As time progressed, 
the Quakers began to soften their stance on absolute objection.  While a small number of 
Quakers had been willing to pay the fee, the official stance of the group called for no 
cooperation.  However, as Quaker society moved into the 1830s, their leaders found that 
the absolutist stance was becoming more and more difficult to control.   More Quakers 
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were willing to pay the fee and cooperate, moving towards the stance of the Mennonites 
and the Brethren.30 
The first instance of comprehensive conscription legislation came during the Civil 
War from the Confederacy.  Faced with the end of the one-year enlistment terms and a 
weakened stomach for war, the Confederate Army needed men to maintain itself as a 
fighting force.  In April 1862, the Confederate Congress, with Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis’s support, passed a conscription act that required all white men from the 
age of eighteen to thirty-five to be eligible for the draft, which had a service period of 
three years.  In addition, the government extended the one-year enlistments for another 
two years of service.  However, as would be a recurring theme in the Civil War draft, a 
number of exemptions existed.  Men could hire substitutes from the ranks of those not 
eligible for the draft, and there were certain occupational deferments, such as for those 
working in the civil service, railroads, river transportation, mining, various industries, 
medicine, religion, and education.31 
The problem with a draft that allowed for substitution and occupational 
deferments was that it opened the door to fraud.  Unlike its Northern counterpart, the 
Confederate draft did not allow men to pay a commutation fee, so the price of substitutes 
skyrocketed.  Men could join as a substitute, desert from the army, then sign up again to 
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collect what was becoming a huge bounty.  Substitutions became so abused through this 
practice that the Confederate government abolished the practice only twenty months after 
the initial passage of conscription.  Another issue was dishonest self-representation in an 
attempt to gain an occupational deferment.  It seemed as though there was a new-found 
emphasis on education in the South, as many locales established new schools.  Large 
numbers of illegitimate apothecaries began to be seen throughout the South.  The state 
governors who did not support conscription vastly expanded the civil service, hoping to 
undercut the draft.  Some men simply avoided the authorities attempting to evade the 
draft calls.32   
Overall, conscription was one of the most unpopular and divisive pieces of 
legislation in the Confederacy, particularly after September and October of 1862, when 
the Confederate Congress extended the age limit to forty-five and granted an exemption 
of one white man per plantation with a slave population of more than twenty.  This 
prompted the time-honored, resentful phrase, “A rich man’s war but a poor man’s 
fight.”33 
The first piece of legislation in the North concerning conscription was a militia 
quota in 1862.  Under the terms of this statute, President Abraham Lincoln could call up 
the state militias for federal service for a time not exceeding nine months of service.  By 
1862, the initial surge of volunteering wavered and the North faced a shortage of men 
needed to fight a much longer war than anticipated.  While this act established legislation 
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that constituted a draft of sorts, the reasoning behind it was to improve recruitment and 
increase the numbers of volunteers.  It was not a national draft in the same manner as the 
one adopted by the Confederacy in the same year.  It was successful as the numbers of 
volunteers did increase.  There were areas, though, where volunteering did not meet the 
quotas, and the federal government used the draft to fill the ranks.  In addition, there were 
violent protests against it in eastern Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin.34 
The first complete form of conscription in the North came in 1863 with the 
Enrollment Act, passed in March.  By this time, the pool of men who volunteered out of 
patriotic fervor, a sense of adventure, or a sense of duty were already in the service, and 
recruitment numbers dropped.  Now, the control of recruitment moved to the national 
level, establishing an important precedent that continued through to the twentieth century.  
The harsh realities of the Civil War battlefield and a bustling wartime economy meant 
that most men had jobs, and few wanted to fight in the army.  As was the case with the 
earlier militia draft, this was an attempt by the North to prod people into volunteering.  In 
actuality, the North drafted few men under the Enrollment Act.  It covered all male 
citizens and immigrants who applied for citizenship from the ages of twenty to forty-five.  
It exempted men if they were unfit mentally or physically or had dependents for which 
they were the only source of support.  If they did not qualify for exemption under these 
tenets, they could still pay a fee of three hundred dollars or sign up a replacement to 
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avoid military service.  Of the 207,000 men drafted, only 46,000 ended up serving in the 
army, with the rest hiring a substitute or paying the commutation fee.35 
Numerous problems and inconsistencies plagued the draft in the Civil War.  As 
esteemed Civil War historian James McPherson writes, conscription in the Civil War was 
meant to increase the numbers of volunteers by threat of a draft and “[a]s such it worked, 
but with such inefficiency, corruption, and perceived injustice that it became one of the 
most divisive issues of the war and served as a model of how not to conduct a draft in 
future wars.”36  One need only look to the New York City Draft Riots of 1863 to see just 
how unpopular and divisive the issue could be.  Corruption was rampant among local 
officials, who sought to pad their numbers and gain pay while making lackadaisical 
effort.  Men could bribe physicians, provide falsified documents claiming dependent 
exemption, or fake afflictions that would give them an exemption.  The practice of hiring 
substitutes caused considerable consternation in some circles, yet this had been a long-
standing precedent reaching back to the colonial era.  Many men became bounty jumpers, 
taking the substitution payment, joining the army, then deserting and going through the 
process many times over.  The fact that many of the substitutes kept deserting and re-
joining meant that they did little actual fighting, providing an insignificant contribution to 
the Northern war effort.  Furthermore, the commutation fee became the target of visceral 
hatred, because it evoked an image of the poor fighting for the rich.  Though McPherson 
and Eugene Murdock, a Civil War draft historian, challenge the actual class distinctions 
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in the Northern draft, the issue was so unpopular that Congress ended the commutation 
fee in July 1864.37 
Viewing the draft as an instrument of gaining manpower through its own 
legislation is problematic when examining the Civil War.  Conscription acts during the 
Civil War were never meant to fill the ranks of the army with draftees.  Instead, those 
acts were a means of encouraging volunteering through negative reinforcement.  As 
McPherson points out in his discussions of conscription during the Civil War, it was a 
ham-fisted “carrot and stick” approach to improving recruitment and volunteering.38   
This is the overwhelming theme in the scholarship on the draft in the North.  
Murdock, author of One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North, argues that the 
Northern draft was a “semidraft,” and its main goal was to encourage men to volunteer.  
Although that was its purpose, some unscrupulous practices appeared, such as bounty 
jumping and deserting.39  Overall, only seven percent of men drafted actually put on a 
uniform in the North.  Totaling all of the Northern draft calls, 46,000 men went to war as 
draftees, and 74,000 hired substitutes, while 800,000 volunteered.  Therefore, the draft in 
the Civil War did what it was intended to do: encourage voluntary enlistments, a 
sentiment echoed by James W. Geary’s study of the Union draft, We Need Men.  He 
writes,  
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The fact that only 3.67 percent of the troops were federal conscripts does not fully 
reveal the extent to which the draft sustained the Union army, despite bounty 
jumpers, substitute brokers, paper credits, and deserters.  In conjunction with 
bounties, it stimulated – some might say forced – communities to fill quotas when 
patriotism began to wane in the last two years of the war.  Further, it encouraged 
another 118, 010 Union men to furnish substitutes.  When these men are added to 
the number of conscripts, the federal draft was directly responsible for 13.02 
percent of the troops raised from March 1863 – April 1865.40 
Also of profound importance was that the national draft in the Civil War 
established the precedent of the federal government demanding military service in 
wartime, further defining the role of federal power in the U.S. political system.41  In terms 
of manpower procurement, the draft in the Civil War was an excellent example of what 
worked and what did not, providing an important reference point for those who 
implemented national conscription with the Selective Service in 1917. 
During the Civil War, once again the Historic Peace Churches made up the central 
population of COs.42  The Quaker experience is the most enlightening for several reasons.  
They were the largest of the Historic Peace Churches in the United States.  They were 
more active in the society as a whole.  They kept better records from which we can study 
their actions.  What is more, they had the most distinctive stance because they still 
claimed the absolutist stance and refused to pay the commutation fees or hire substitutes, 
though they were changing.43  The morality of the Civil War was an issue for objectors 
                                                 
40Geary, 173-174.  
41Ibid., 174.  
42Chambers, "Conscientious Objectors and the American State from Colonial 
Times to the Present," 30.  
43Edward Needles Wright, Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War (New York: 
A.S. Barnes and Co., 1931; reprint, 1961), 4-5. 
 78 
since many of them were active in the Abolitionist Movement.  Serving in a war to end 
slavery (after the Emancipation Proclamation in 1862) presented a profound moral 
dilemma for those objectors who despised the peculiar institution.  A number of men 
from the Historic Peace Churches did sign up to fight and faced punishment from their 
local congregations or meetings.44 
Both President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton possessed somewhat 
of a sympathetic view toward conscientious objection.  They freed most COs from prison 
if they had knowledge of them.45  Lincoln had an understanding of their position, and 
there was a mutual respect between the Friends and Lincoln.  However, Lincoln did not 
go much further than having personal views on the matter, because he did not push for 
Congress to pass legislation protecting conscientious objectors. Stanton’s views were 
similar to Lincoln’s in his sympathy for COs.  He even ordered three drafted Quakers to 
be released in October 1862 with no fine or penalty.  In December 1863, he ordered that 
all conscientious objectors forced into the military and detained to be paroled until 
explicitly recalled by the federal government.  He also attempted (at the request of the 
Provost Marshal General James B. Fry through a report) to gain commutation fee 
exemptions and other pro-CO legislation in the latter parts of 1863 and into early 1864. 
The Northern Congress possessed sympathetic elements toward COs, though this was by 
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no means a universal inclination.46  Stanton also persuaded Congress to allow for 
alternative service in military hospitals or helping freed slaves.  COs could also pay the 
three hundred dollar fee into a fund for “sick and wounded soldiers,” but when some of 
the objectors balked at this arrangement, Stanton relented and ordered that all absolutist 
COs should be paroled.47 
The exemptions in the Northern draft law were not necessarily satisfactory for the 
Peace Churches.  The Quakers, though more willing than in the past to pay a 
commutation fee, did not agree with the lack of legal differentiation between those who 
paid a fee based on conscience and those who merely wished to avoid service.  The 
Mennonites and the Brethren, given their overwhelmingly rural population, objected to 
the high price because few of their members would be able to afford it. Stanton’s actions 
liberalized the 1864 provisions for COs, but the tension was still there.48 
The discussion of conscientious objection in the South is a bit thinner because the 
records do not discuss the matter in as great detail as Northern records, nor were the 
records well preserved.  Furthermore, COs in the South did not have as much interaction 
with their government as COs in the North.  One area that presented a problem for COs 
was the attitude of Confederate President Jefferson Davis.  He relegated all matters of 
conscientious objections to his assistants and did not discuss his personal views on the 
matter to the level that Lincoln did.  Davis told a group of Quakers visiting him in 1862 
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that he was disheartened to discover that there were people in the Confederacy who were 
not willing to defend or fight for their country and, if necessary, die for it.49  From 
Davis’s viewpoint, this is an understandable reaction, as he had an extensive background 
in military affairs.50 
COs in the South faced more difficulty than in the North because most of them 
were opponents of slavery.  There were a number of officials who sympathized with their 
stance (particularly Assistant Secretary of War John Campbell), and those officials fought 
to gain exemptions for the COs acceptable to the objectors, but for the first eighteen 
months of the Confederate draft, the only way to avoid military service was through 
occupational deferments or hiring a substitute.  The Historic Peace Churches detested 
hiring substitutes and, given the skyrocketing price of substitution in the South, most of 
the Peace Church members could not afford them.51 
Eventually, the government officials with the authority to do something about 
conscientious objectors came to the conclusion that the limited exemptions for COs 
worked reasonably well given that the Peace Churches were small and did not threaten 
                                                 
49Wright, 138-139.  
50Davis was a graduate of West Point, served in the Mexican War, and was the 
Secretary of War under President Franklin Pierce.  Although Lincoln also had military 
experience, it was only briefly as an officer in the Illinois militia during the Black Hawk 
War and he never saw combat.  
51Brock, Liberty and Conscience, 113-114.  
 81 
the war-making capability of the state.  This was also a sentiment echoed by some of the 
military brass, such as Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson of the Confederate Army.52 
If the Civil War established what not to do in administering a national draft, the 
First World War established what not to do with conscientious objectors.  The treatment 
of COs in World War I was reprehensible at best and bordered on torture at worst.  
Though there were definite abuses of COs during this time, much of what happened came 
about as a result of inexperience both on the part of the federal government and the 
Historic Peace Churches. 
The involvement of the United States in the First World War produced many 
changes at home for Americans.  One of these changes was an increased federal presence 
that managed production, procurement, and other elements that went into fighting a 
modern, industrial war.  The strong federal state that typified the governmental structure 
of the United States during both world wars was, in John Whiteclay Chambers’s words, 
“… created by a desire for efficient coordination and legitimated by popular 
consciousness and a sense of political participation by and benefit to the citizenry.”53  A 
legitimated state, such as the one that emerged in the United States out of the Progressive 
Era, coupled with the rising tide of nationalism in the United States created the conditions 
for conscription administered by the federal government.  Beyond that social dynamic, 
the federal government also allowed for some measure of local control with local draft 
boards.  This provided a seemingly decentralized structure that played to the sympathies 
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of the American citizenry, while the federal government could maintain control over a 
system pivotal to any chance of success on the battlefields of Europe in 1917. The 
emergence of a strong federal state and the changes brought by World War I created the 
conditions for a nationwide draft that would be reluctantly accepted, though not 
celebrated, by a majority of the American people.54 
This description of the years leading up to and including World War I begs the 
question, “What does this have to do with conscientious objection and the two World 
Wars?”  In a word: everything.  The rising tide of nationalism in America, the need for 
large numbers of able-bodied men, and the increasing power of the state made it much 
more difficult to be a CO than in the previous wars of America.  To be a CO during a 
period of nationalistic-fueled wartime patriotism was to be labeled a traitor or a coward. 
Now that the draft was completely a federal endeavor meant to raise troops (rather than 
encourage enlistment) with no provisions for substitution or commutation, COs faced a 
new set of circumstances.  Granted, the objectors were of such a small number that 
replacements could easily be found, but that did not lessen the hardships faced by COs, 
nor did it lessen the hostility they faced from certain sectors of American society. 
As the cataclysm of World War I saw the nations of Europe systematically 
destroying each other, the federal government of the United States faced a predicament.  
Throughout the years 1914 - 1917, the United States remained officially neutral, though it 
sent supplies across the Atlantic to the Allied Powers.  This “neutrality” eventually 
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morphed into a general declaration of war against the Central Powers, of which Germany 
was the most prominent.  As described in detail earlier, the United States had reached a 
point where a massive industrial army could be conscripted, trained, and sent to fight, but 
it took time, and no Americans had any experience raising an army under the present 
circumstances.  Neither the military nor industry was large enough to fight at the onset of 
U.S. participation.  As esteemed military historian Allan Millett argues, creating a 
modern army and placing it on the moonscapes of the Western Front where it would face 
off directly against the Prussian military tradition of the German Army was no small task: 
“[American President Woodrow] Wilson and his advisers did not misunderstand the 
implications of this commitment: the United States would have to form a mass army 
virtually from scratch and send it into a type of warfare breathtaking in its complexity 
and scope.”55 
In the form that it eventually took, with General Enoch Crowder as the Director of 
the Selective Service and four thousand draft boards administering policy at the local 
level, the Selective Service Act of 1917 registered 23.9 million men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five.  Of those registered, 2.8 million found themselves wearing a 
military uniform by the end of the war.  All told, the U.S. Army of 3.5 million soldiers 
that went to the Western Front in Europe had seventy-five percent of its numbers 
conscripted.  However, the Selective Service Act allowed for a number of deferments.  
Men who held important jobs in industry or agriculture could be exempted from service.  
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Another group that could be exempted, though their position was much more tenuous, 
was conscientious objectors.  Under the provisions of the draft, about 64,700 men 
claimed to be COs, though nowhere near that many actually received the status.56  One of 
the overarching themes throughout all of this was fear in the federal government of the 
perceived inequity of conscription.  Even the perception of certain groups being favored 
could produce a fair amount of backlash among the general public.  For that reason, the 
eventual exemption for COs was initially limited to the Historic Peace Churches.57 
The Selective Service Act of 1917 did have a distinct clause that allowed for 
conscientious objection.  It read as follows:  
… nothing in this act contained shall be construed or compel any person to serve 
in any of the forces herein provided for, who is found to be a member of any well-
recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and 
whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any 
form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in 
accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations; but no 
person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the 
President shall declare to be non-combatant….58 
As it read, the CO provision in the Act was problematic for the peace churches.  By not 
allowing for any religious objector to serve in any role other than as a noncombatant 
(meaning support roles that did not carry weapons, such as medics), the federal 
government excluded and infuriated the absolutists.  The absolutists did not wish to serve 
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the government or military in any capacity, and noncombatantcy did not mesh with an 
absolutist belief structure.59 
What the wording of the Act meant was that COs would be subjected to military 
authority.  On April 12, 1917, Mennonite representatives went to Washington with the 
intent of trying to get COs completely exempted from military authority.  On that same 
day, Lilian Wald, Jane Addams, and Norman Thomas, three prominent pacifists, 
appealed to Secretary of War Newton Baker to allow for the absolutists to be exempt.  
Although Baker heard their appeals, their efforts were to no avail as Baker, President 
Woodrow Wilson, and members of Congress did not institute exemption or alternative 
service.  They only supported noncombatantcy.  On August 8, the government announced 
that all who had been drafted were required to report at the times established by their 
local draft board, and on August 11 it announced that COs had to report to the military 
camps, firmly establishing military authority over COs.60   
One of the many problems with the government’s policies towards COs was the 
ambiguous instruction the draft boards received pertaining to what constituted a Peace 
Church (referring to the “religious sect or organization” language).  Because of the lack 
of communication within that realm, local draft boards tended to be quite arbitrary in 
granting the CO status.  The Selective Service simply failed to inform the local draft 
boards at all in regards to the nature of the peace churches.61  Additionally, the fractured 
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nature of the peace church denominations made it very difficult for the draft boards.  
Take, for example, the Mennonites.  “Mennonite” is a denominational term that covers all 
of the various groups in the Mennonite tradition.  Yet, the number of groups involved 
could make a draft board member’s head spin.  Various names of Mennonite groups are 
the Evangelical Mennonite Conference, the Conservative Mennonite Conference, the 
Fellowship of Evangelical Bible Churches, the General Conference Mennonite Church, 
the Mennonite Church, the Old Order Mennonite Church, and the Church of God in 
Christ - Mennonite, which illustrates just how confusing denominations could be for a 
person sitting on a draft board who may or may not have been familiar with the term 
“Mennonite.” 
Another problem faced by COs was the lack of alternative service or specific 
definitions of noncombatantcy.  Many months went by before Wilson addressed the 
issue.  About twenty thousand COs who had already received their official CO 
classification had been inducted and reported to training camps in the interim, until the 
government decided what it should do with the objectors.62  While the men were not 
executed for refusing to serve, the placing of COs in military camps turned out to be one 
of the worst things the government could have done. 
As historian David Kennedy writes, placing COs into military camps “was 
undoubtedly the most callous feature of the government’s policy.”  The government 
ordered that COs be separated from the rest of the camp’s population and advised in the 
importance of serving in the armed forces, hoping they would cease their objection to 
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government authority and military service.  From the point of view of the government, 
this policy was successful, as only four thousand COs refused to take up arms throughout 
American participation in the war.  The War Department ordered that officers give the 
COs “kindly consideration” in their attempts to get COs to change their mind, but in 
practice that consideration did not always happen.  Many of the objectors were the 
subject of taunting, teasing, public humiliation, and hazing in the hope that they would 
take up arms to fight for the flag.63   
However, the treatment of the COs in the camps varied from base to base.  At 
Camp Upton, New York, Major General J. Franklin Bell was somewhat liberal in his 
treatment of the COs under his command.  He did, though, convince a large majority of 
the men to renounce their objection and take up arms.  The case was not the same at 
Camp Funston, Kansas, under the command of Major General Leonard Wood, who went 
on record as saying that conscientious objectors were “… enemies of the Republic, 
fakers, and active agents of the enemy….”  His observations and temperament towards 
COs undoubtedly led to the deplorable conditions at Camp Funston, in which upwards of 
seventeen COs died as a result of their treatment.64 
It is not difficult to see the inherent problems in placing the objectors in military 
camps.  Aside from the desire of the COs not to be there, their separation immediately 
labeled them as “different,” and once other conscripts learned just who those separated 
men were, the COs were the subject of much anger and ridicule at the hands of many 
                                                 
63Ibid.  
64Chambers, To Raise an Army, 216.  Wood is quoted in Chambers.  
 88 
enlisted men.  Simply stated, conscientious objection was definitely not popular, and 
placing the objectors in the camps only exacerbated tension with those who had to pick 
up a rifle and fight.  Although Secretary Baker eventually redefined the CO exemption to 
allow for non-religious conscientious objection, he did not allow for alternative service, 
which would have avoided headaches for the government in dealing with those who 
refused to serve at all based on religious principles.65 
It was not until March 1918 that President Wilson, after considerable lobbying by 
the Civil Liberties Bureau to the War Department, outlined the policy for noncombatant 
service that the Selective Service Act had called for almost a year earlier.  Under this 
policy, conscientious objectors could serve in the Medical, Quartermaster, or Engineering 
Corps instead of fighting.  However, those already inducted and in the camps had to face 
a federal Board of Inquiry that determined the validity of their beliefs.  Although that 
board was not sympathetic to the plight of the COs, and it ridiculed many men who stood 
before it, it did affirm the CO status of a large portion of those who still held firm to their 
beliefs.66  There was also a farm furlough plan implemented at about the same time for 
absolutists (who were to serve without pay), but it still fell under military control, making 
it problematic for the Peace Churches.67 
Although the federal government now had a policy that specifically defined the 
work COs could do under the aegis of noncombatantcy, a major problem still remained:  
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the absolutists.  The men who refused to submit to any governmental or military authority 
faced a court martial.  Before the 1918 reforms, forty objectors received a court martial 
much to the consternation of the Civil Liberties Bureau.  The court found almost all of 
the men guilty and sentenced them to federal prison in military penitentiaries, such as 
Alcatraz or Leavenworth.  Their treatment at these facilities was by no mean exemplary 
or compassionate.  Guards chained most of the COs to the bars or grates in their cells for 
eight hours a day.  At least one CO in Alcatraz died of pneumonia when he refused to 
wear a military uniform and was kept in solitary confinement until he reneged.  As a final 
insult, the army sent his body home to his family in military uniform.68 
The final numbers for the COs during World War I are as follows: sixty-four 
thousand, seven hundred men filed for CO status, and of those, the draft boards granted 
the status to 56,800 men.  Ultimately, the army drafted 20,873 of those COs, and 16,000 
renounced their objection and chose to take up arms.  Of the remaining objectors, 1,300 
chose noncombatant service, and another 1,300 managed to gain an off-base civilian 
work assignment in one form or another.  Nine hundred and forty COs remained in the 
camps for the rest of the war, and 450 went to federal prison for refusing to serve.69 
The main problem with the federal government’s policy towards conscientious 
objection during World War I was one of inexperience, though there were men like 
Leonard Wood who had no sympathy whatsoever for COs.  As Chambers and Millett 
both note, the United States did not need to raise an army of this size prior to the First 
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World War.  That meant the administrative bodies used trial-and-error methods, which 
led to a lengthy process for solving glaring problems.  Granted, some hostility toward 
COs and a lack of understanding existed, but the federal government had also never 
previously dealt with COs this extensively.  This is what makes Hershey and World War 
II so important.  Not only was he sympathetic to the CO, but he also sought to learn from 
and avoid the mistakes of World War II.  In particular, this meant keeping men who 
objected to military service out of the armed forces and providing them with an 
alternative form of fulfilling their obligation. 
The Historic Peace Churches’ experience during World War I also requires some 
explanation.  Keim and Stolzfus point to the lack of centralization within the churches, 
which contributed to the lack of a coordinated lobby from the churches themselves.  
Because of this, they did not really possess a comprehensive stance toward conscription 
as a unified body, preferring to approach the matter singularly and leave the choices up to 
the members who were eligible to be drafted.  The lack of a definitive code of behavior 
from the churches for the COs also led to much confusion and frustration.  A quote from 
one of the objectors stationed at Camp Funston illustrates this.  When asked by his 
superiors in the military what he could and could not do, he replied, “We don’t know how 
far to go because our church hasn’t defined our privilege.”70  Both the government and 
the Peace Churches failed in their efforts to provide adequate programs or present a clear 
stance on the issue.  A failure to communicate effectively and the lack of experience in 
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dealing with conscientious objection at the federal level are what led to the poor 
treatment of COs and the lack of explicit legal definitions for objectors during World War 
I. 
Because of a hostile Congress and an American public that rejected the idea of 
conscription, the military did not push for draft legislation between the wars until after 
World War II had begun in Europe.  Though not popular in the government or the 
American public, the army began to prepare for a draft administered by the Selective 
Service during the interwar period.  It drafted legislation to present to Congress when it 
would be feasible and trained a few hundred officers as “selective service specialists” to 
provide a draft infrastructure when the need arose.  This began with the creation of the 
Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, founded in 1926.  It was with this 
body that Lewis Hershey, then a major, became involved in matters of conscription and 
the American citizen when he received an appointment as the secretary of the Committee 
in 1936.71  
By 1940, it had become clear that the United States needed to bolster its armed 
services, given the events in East Asia and Europe.  Although the War Department did 
not support it, President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress believed that manpower 
mobilization was necessary to alert Americans that U.S. participation in a second global 
conflict was a distinct possibility.  The War Department did not support the idea because 
there were not enough regulars or equipment to mobilize on the scale envisioned.  Yet 
through the incorporation of 300,000 National Guardsmen and another 600,000 draftees 
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from the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, along with officers 
from the reserves and new volunteers, the U.S. Army’s manpower swelled to 1.2 million 
in mid-1941.72  War clouds were on the horizon, and the U.S. was preparing, though it 
would not be at nearly the level it needed to be when Japanese planes attacked the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor on December 7.  
A number of geographic and economic factors helped to shape how the United 
States fought World War II.  At the core of the American experience in the war was 
industrial production.  The United States was in a unique position.  It was far removed 
from the threats of invasion or strategic bombing.  This meant that American industry 
could produce war materiel without the threat of enemy bombing or attack (with the 
exception of the Battle of the Atlantic and shipping losses).  It also had a self-sufficient 
economy, meaning that everything needed for industrial production existed within U.S. 
borders.  Because of the its distance from the fighting and the capability to produce 
unparalleled amounts of war materiel, the United States could afford to expend machines 
rather than men.73 
 This industrial and geographical dynamic allowed for the United States Army to 
wage war with the “ninety division gamble.”  The army planners initially thought they 
needed two hundred divisions, but General George C. Marshall, Roosevelt, and his 
cabinet whittled this number down throughout the war until it shrank to a goal of one 
hundred, which was never reached.  The idea that a ninety-division army would defeat 
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Japan and Germany may have seemed shortsighted, but there were other circumstances 
that led the United States to field a smaller army.74  There was a general understanding 
between the Allies that the greatest asset of the United States was its capacity for 
industrial production.  During the war it became apparent that there was no way to get to 
two hundred divisions with the needs of U.S. industry and the other armed services and 
the need for support troops within the army.  All told, the U.S. ended up raising eighty-
nine army divisions.  Because of American air and sea power, coupled with the size and 
might of the Soviet Army that was pushing back Germany, the U.S. did not need a 
massive army, but its total still paled in comparison to the three-hundred-division 
German Army.  As it was, the American Army still could have used more men.  Part of 
the reason for the shortage was the desire to have the American soldier serve under 
relatively comfortable conditions.  As esteemed American military historian Russell 
Weigley writes, 
Making allowances for the proportionately lesser need for combat soldiers owing 
to mechanization, the conclusion seems inescapable that the effort to maintain an 
approximation of the American standard of living in the Army and even in the 
combat zones diverted an excessive amount of manpower away from the essential 
combat units of the Army.  On one hand, the War Department and the General 
Staff very nicely calculated and mobilized nearly the precise number of combat 
troops needed to win the war.  On the other hand, it might have been better – if a 
way could have been found – to pay more heed to the maxim that in war not 
economy but an excess of means is desirable.75 
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The army of World War II was not a lean and trim fighting force.  But the number of 
divisions also suffered from the needs of industry and agriculture on the home front, a 
dynamic to be discussed momentarily. 
 The three main allies in the war each played a distinct role in defeating the Axis 
powers.  Great Britain stood alone in late 1940 and early 1941, refusing to capitulate and 
later served as a staging area for the invasion of France.  The Soviet Union bore the brunt 
of ground combat and defeated the German Army.  Over all of this, the United States was 
the arsenal of the Allies.  To play this role effectively, the United States had to produce 
materiel on an unprecedented scale.  Not only did it produce massive numbers of planes, 
tanks, trucks, and amounts of fuel, it also manufactured medicine, communication 
devices, electronic countermeasure systems like radar and sonar, navigational equipment, 
and countless other items used to fight the war.  The geographic isolation of the United 
States also presented a problem.  Vast amounts of tonnage to ferry the goods across the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the theaters of combat were necessary.  If this was to be a 
war of machines, there needed to be a system in place that shipped the machinery of war.  
Until 1943, building a merchant marine and anti-submarine escorts was the highest 
priority for U.S. industry.  In response, the Kaiser shipyards on the west coast and Henry 
Kaiser’s methods of modular construction reduced by remarkable amounts the 
construction times for liberty ships and victory ships.76 
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Overall, this industrial dynamic required a large number of people to staff the 
factories that produced these goods.  The draft in World War II was not one of complete 
and total conscription, hence the term Selective Service.  One of the largest problems 
faced by the United States was balancing the manpower needs of industry with the 
manpower needs of the armed forces.  The Selective Service was to choose, or “select,” 
the men best suited to serve in the armed forces without disrupting industrial or 
agricultural production.  Its goal is apparent on the headlining banner of its monthly 
newsletter, Selective Service.  The artwork of the banner consists of a citizen plowing his 
fields, three men in military uniform bearing the flag, and a machinist at work.  
To defeat the massive industrialized might of Germany and fight Japan at the 
same time, the U.S. needed to strike a delicate balance between the number of men it 
could put in the field, at sea, and in the air while being able to ramp up industrial 
production to the levels it needed for itself and the other Allies.  However, at the 
beginning of 1941 it was becoming painfully apparent that the draft affected industrial 
production.  There was, of course, consideration given to the industrial situation, but in 
practice, the government was more concerned about not disrupting the American family 
more than the American factory.  The local draft boards did not want Washington 
interfering in their deferments for individuals, and from the industrial side, managers 
sought to protect their entire workforce, and organized labor did not support conscription.  
There were also threats of drafting workers who went out on strike, something supported 
by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. However, both Hershey and President Roosevelt 
disliked the idea of using the draft for industrial manpower management, though local 
draft boards continued to use the draft as a threat to striking workers throughout the 
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war.77  Therefore, the draft was not to be used as a dictatorial force for industrial control.  
Congress did not support a law that decreed national control of the economy through 
federal manpower planning, that is, having men drafted into specific jobs and being 
forced to work there.  Another reason that this did not happen was the rejection rate of the 
draft.  Overall, forty-seven percent of industrial workers received a IV-F classification 
and returned to their jobs without having to worry about military service.78 
Therefore, this was the dynamic at the feet of Hershey, the Selective Service, and 
the Peace Churches at the beginning of World War II.  The history of conscientious 
objection up to the Second World War reveals that there was no systematic precedent for 
dealing with COs at the national level.  It is for that reason that Hershey’s actions and 
support during World War II were so critical and represented such a watershed.  Hershey 
was sympathetic to the CO and wanted to avoid the mistakes of previous wars, 
particularly World War I.  Thus, the Second World War was really the pivotal point for 
the relationship of the CO to the state in American history.  It firmly established 
alternative service as the apparatus that provided for conscientious objection in the 
United States.  In doing so, it further defined the concept of the citizen soldier by 
outlining the duty of all eligible men to serve.  The recent history of World War I made it 
clear that alternative service was necessary to provide for conscience.  How that tale 
unfolded is the subject of the rest of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE EARLY AGENTS OF OBJECTION AND CONSCRIPTION: THE 
HISTORIC PEACE CHURCHES, THE INTERWAR YEARS, AND THE SELECTIVE 
TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940 
 
Prior to the passage of the Selective Service Act in September of 1940, the 
various entities involved in the provisions for conscientious objection began to mobilize 
for the possibility of conscription.  The efforts of the Historic Peace Churches were the 
most prevalent during this time as peace and nonresistance was a central feature of their 
doctrine and identity.  However, secular groups, such as Congress and the Joint Army 
Navy Selective Service Committee, operated in ways that affected conscientious 
objection once conscription became law in the United States.  Though the issue 
eventually ran through General Hershey, the legislation for conscientious objection in the 
Selective Service Act was the result of a multifaceted effort on the part of the Historic 
Peace Churches, the American Civil Liberties Union, Congress, and the War Department.  
During his congressional testimony as a member of JANSSC, Hershey revealed his 
tolerant attitude and once the federal government established the Selective Service, his 
belief structure had far-reaching consequences throughout the war.  It was at this time 
that Hershey began to stand in opposition to some members of the military and the 
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federal government as there were some who did not belief in providing legislation for 
conscientious objection.  In stark contrast to some of his colleagues, Hershey called for 
considerate provisions that protected conscience in the face of conscription, illustrating 
his sympathy for the plight of the sincere conscientious objector in American society. 
Due to the importance of the Historic Peace Churches in the development of CO 
legislation in 1940, this chapter requires a background of their experience and beliefs.  
First, because of the centrality of nonresistance to the doctrine of the Historic Peace 
Churches, a definition of the term along with how it is separate from pacifism is 
necessary.  Based on the biblical principle of separation from worldly evils, nonresistance 
holds that violent actions by Christians are prohibited.  It is based on numerous passages 
in the New Testament, particularly Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount.1  The idea of Christians 
separating from the world around them is an important facet of the Historic Peace 
Churches, mainly among the Mennonites and the Brethren.  The simplest way to describe 
it is that Christians should live in the world, but not be of the world.  The Society of 
Friends, on the other hand, has been much more socially active, operating in the world 
around them to achieve social and political change. 
There is a distinct difference between nonresistance and pacifism.  As a member 
of the church put it, pacifism is “a societal technique prudentially calculated to resolve 
conflict situations … it becomes a means of manipulating society.”  Nonresistance is 
more of an all-encompassing interpretation that, in the words of Brethren scholar Dale 
Stoffer, “refers more broadly to a lifestyle of defenseless love in the face of evil … rooted 
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in Jesus’ own teachings and example.”2  Christian pacifism, though, is more in tune with 
the Quaker peace witness throughout their history.  As described by religious scholar 
Myron Augsburger, Christian pacifism is an “evangelical and biblical” peace witness that 
promotes “… living by the way of love, a spirit of brotherhood and reverence for life.”  
As he writes, “Ours is to be an active penetration into society with the redeeming love of 
God.”  Christian pacifism, though similar to nonresistance, differs in that it calls for a 
more active participation in the world than do those who adhere to the strictest of 
nonresistant beliefs.3 
The oldest portion of the Historic Peace Churches has its roots in Anabaptism.  
According to church historian William R. Estep, Anabaptism originated in Zurich, 
Switzerland beginning in 1525 in reaction to Ulrich Zwingli’s Reformation in that 
canton.4  Anabaptism is best described as one of the largest parts of the Radical 
Reformation, with Martin Luther and John Calvin’s followers making up the larger 
mainstream Protestant Reformation.  In what became one of the core practices of the 
Anabaptists, disagreements over the rights of baptism began to emerge between Conrad 
Grebel and Zwingli from 1522 to 1525.  Grebel, a student of Zwingli with humanist 
leanings, did not agree with Zwingli concerning the nature of baptism in the Bible.  
Grebel claimed to find there was no scriptural basis for the baptism of infants.  The two 
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men came to disagree vehemently, and that split led to Grebel becoming the earliest 
Anabaptist leader.  Grebel’s importance to the early movement is undeniable due to what 
Anabaptist scholar Estep terms “a crusading zeal that knew no rest until his death.”5  His 
leadership was short-lived, though, as he died just a year and a half after performing his 
initial baptisms.6 
However, one of the distinguishing points of Anabaptism was its lack of a 
singular scholar or leader whom the entire movement followed.  Minor differences in 
biblical and theological interpretation marked Anabaptism and made it distinct from other 
groups in the Protestant Reformation.  Lutherans had Martin Luther and Calvinists had 
John Calvin, but early Anabaptists had no such singular, dynamic leader.  That came later 
with men whose sects organized under their leadership, such as Menno Simons, Jacob 
Ammann, and Jacob Hutter.  The closest person that the early Anabaptists had to a 
singular leader was probably Grebel.  However, there were a large number of other 
evangelizers, preachers, and writers whose work directly contributed to the growth and 
spread of Anabaptism throughout Europe.  An incomplete list includes Felix Manz, 
Michael Sattler, and Balthasar Hubmaier, all of whom died for their Anabaptist beliefs 
and actions, making them the earliest Anabaptist martyrs, of which there would be many 
more.7 
                                                 
5Ibid., 30. 
6Ibid., 13-21, 30-43.  
7Harold S. Bender, "Mennonite Origins and the Mennonites of Europe," in 
Mennonites and Their Heritage: A Handbook of Mennonite History and Beliefs 
(Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1942; reprint, 1973), 25-30; and Estep, passim.  
 101 
It bears mentioning that the Anabaptists are a difficult group to typify.  There 
were only a few points on which all Anabaptists agreed and. indeed, one of the 
identifying features of the movement was its splintered nature.  The central belief of the 
Anabaptists was that they sought to restore “the true church” of the New Testament, 
making them restorationists.    For them, the New Testament was the primary authority, 
and they believed that established state churches had lost their way, focusing too much on 
human doctrine and church hierarchy.  Instead, the scriptures and the teachings of Jesus 
should be the focal points and from these, they sought to build the true church.8 
Another unifying belief amongst the Anabaptists was the brotherhood of all 
believers.  That belief is tied to adult baptism.  Anabaptists viewed baptism as an adult 
choice to be made by those who wished to accept Christ as their savior.  In their minds, 
children were protected until they reached an age where they could choose to accept 
Christ and be baptized.  Baptism was the public act of acknowledging their faith and was 
an adult’s choice to make, not something to be done at an age when the person did not 
really understand what was happening.  This is where the term “Anabaptist” comes from, 
as their detractors called them this, drawing from Greek for the terms “to re-baptize” or 
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“re-baptizers.”9  This believer’s baptism was the clearest delineation between the 
Anabaptists and other reformers of the Protestant Reformation.10  
Because of their radical beliefs, Anabaptists bore the brunt of Protestant and 
Roman Catholic persecution in the sixteenth century.  The established state churches 
viewed Anabaptists as heretics and blasphemers because both Catholics and Protestants 
held that the church and state were inseparable.  When Anabaptists declared themselves 
as the people establishing the “true” church, they seemingly undermined the official 
state-sanctioned churches and thus broke the law.  To diverge from and offer an 
alternative to the state churches as the Anabaptists did was a treasonous and 
revolutionary act.  The result was the persecution, capture, and/or execution of most 
Anabaptists.  Methods used in attempting to eliminate the movement included 
imprisonment, ripping of flesh using red-hot tongs, drowning, execution by sword, being 
locked in a burning building, and burning at the stake.11  In the words of Radical 
Reformation scholar George H. Williams, Anabaptists were “… the gravest danger to an 
orderly and comprehensive reformation of Christendom….”12   
It was the experience of persecution and martyrdom that kept the Anabaptists 
from becoming a mass movement in Europe.  Granted, the faith did attract a large 
number of followers and spread throughout Europe, but it never enjoyed the large 
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following or the widespread acceptance of other churches. Anyone who dared to preach 
or practice the tenets of Anabaptism subjected himself or herself to unspeakable torture 
and certain death if captured.13   
Because of their major leadership efforts in the peace witness in the National 
Service Board for Religious Objectors during World War II, the Mennonites will be 
discussed at length here.  The Mennonites, under the leadership of Menno Simons, a 
Dutch Catholic priest who renounced his faith over the issues of infant baptism and 
transubstantiation, became the most important group of the Anabaptists to emerge after 
the early actions and deaths of Grebel, Manz, and Sattler, among others.  There were two 
distinct groupings of Mennonites.  The first of these were the Dutch Mennonites, under 
Menno.  Emerging in the mid-1530s, Menno and his followers experienced severe 
persecution.  In addition to their focus on the New Testament as the authoritative work 
and their practice of adult baptism, Mennonites also adopted the doctrine of nonresistance 
because Jesus taught it in the New Testament.  Mennonites from the Low Countries 
(presently the Netherlands) eventually moved to the North German States, Prussia, and 
Russia to escape persecution and develop the land there at the invitation of state leaders.  
They eventually found a religious haven in North America when thousands emigrated 
from Russia in the 1870s to the Dakota Territory, Kansas, and parts of Canada. The 
largest Mennonite organizations to emerge from the Dutch tradition were the General 
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Conference Mennonites, the Mennonite Brethren Church of North America, and the 
Krimmer Mennonite Brethren. 14 
The other main group of Mennonites to emerge from Anabaptism was the Swiss 
Mennonites.  In contrast to the Low German dialects of their Dutch cousins, the Swiss 
Mennonites spoke High German and had differences in clothing and actions.  The largest 
groups to emerge from the Swiss Mennonites were the Mennonite Church and the Amish.  
The Amish, who organized under the leadership of Jacob Amman in the 1690s, had 
immigrated to the American colonies by the early eighteenth century.  Also emerging 
from the Swiss tradition was the General Conference, a cooperative organization formed 
in the mid-nineteenth century consisting of Mennonites from Pennsylvania, Ontario, and 
Iowa.  Many of the Dutch Mennonites who immigrated to the central United States 
affiliated with the General Conference, making it an amalgamation of both the Dutch and 
Swiss Mennonite heritages.15 
The Mennonite principle of nonresistance led to conscientious objection.  Mostly 
due to their emphasis on the New Testament, Mennonites focused on living their lives 
based on the teachings of Jesus.  That focus called for Christians to love their enemy and 
turn the other cheek in the face of violence.  Also factoring into the nonresistance of the 
Mennonites was the concept of the Two Kingdoms.  As described by Mennonite historian 
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James Juhnke, Anabaptism held that, “Both the state and the state churches belonged to 
the evil kingdom; the new community of regenerated believers was part of the kingdom 
of Christ.”  The state, though it provided order, must never supersede the kingdom of 
Christ.  For Anabaptists, and eventually Mennonites, this restriction on a Christian’s 
allegiance to the state meant no participation in war, no state administered oaths, and no 
holding of political office.16  Upon this belief structure, the Mennonites built their 
principle of nonresistance. 
Nonresistance was a central feature of Anabaptist/Mennonite doctrine from its 
earliest days.  As Conrad Grebel stated in 1524, “True Christians use neither the worldly 
sword nor engage in war, since among them taking human life has ceased entirely, for we 
are no longer under the Old Covenant….  The Gospel and those who accept it are not to 
be protected with the sword, neither should they thus protect themselves.”  Menno 
Simons echoed Grebel’s sentiments by writing, “The regenerated do not go to war, nor 
engage in strife.  They are the children of peace who have beaten their swords into 
plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks, and know of no war….  Spears and 
Swords of iron we leave to those who, alas, consider human blood and swine’s blood of 
well-nigh equal value.”17  The words of Grebel and Simons reveal more than a call to 
renounce war among the believers.  They also emphasize a regeneration of spirit and 
implore their followers to restore the Christian church of the New Testament. 
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The next group to establish itself was the Society of Friends, or Quakers as they 
are commonly known.  The Friends grew out of what religious historian Sydney 
Ahlstrom describes as “left-wing Puritanism,” which meant moving away from the 
hierarchy and structure of the Christianity of the Church of England.18  The sect began in 
1652 with George Fox and his followers in England, who emphasized a personal 
relationship with Jesus Christ.  Out of that emphasis came the central defining feature of 
the Quakers, the Inner Light, a concept to be discussed momentarily.  The Society of 
Friends in England were religious social levelers and activists.  They were egalitarian and 
did not recognize status based on social class or gender, even going so far as to refuse to 
remove their hats to nobility or government authorities.  Their social activism in England 
included calls for humane treatment of prisoners and the mentally ill.  In the United 
States, they were among the first abolitionists.  They pressed for freedom of assembly, 
worship, and speech.  They refused to take court oaths, objected to state appointed clergy, 
taxes, war, and the idea that a person must attend church, seeking instead to emphasize 
the personal relationship with Christ.  Because of their egalitarian actions (and other 
unpopular practices), English authorities viewed them as a threat to the stability and 
strength of society and the state.  As a result, the Friends experienced severe persecution 
and began to emigrate to the American colonies in the 1650s.19 
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After experiencing resistance to settlement at the hands of the Puritans in 
Massachusetts, the Friends found a home in religiously tolerant Rhode Island.  However, 
it was not until William Penn gained his royal charter for Pennsylvania in 1781 that they 
truly found a haven (as did the Mennonites and Brethren).  Pennsylvania came to be 
controlled by the Friends, but the colony became diverse ethnically and religiously due to 
the open-minded ideas central to its establishment.20 
As stated briefly, the core of Quaker religious thought lies in a personal 
experience with Christ.  In emphasizing the personal experience, Quakers were non-
creedal, holding the idea that creeds can simply be repeated and become void of any real 
meaning.21  Also coming out of the importance of personal experience was the concept of 
the Inner Light, or the idea that God is manifest in every human being.  They drew this 
idea from the Gospel according to John, where John states in 1:9, “That was the true 
Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.” 22  The Inner Light is an all-
encompassing connection between Jesus and all of humanity.  Friends scholar D. Elton 
Trueblood explains it best when he says, “The Light which strives to reach every man is 
not some vague general light, but the present continuation of the Light which shone in 
Jesus as he called men by the Sea of Galilee.”23 
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The Society of Friends also has a long-standing tradition of social activism and 
service.  Their emphasis on this missionary impulse comes from their interpretation of the 
New Testament and the purpose of the early Christian Church.  According to Trueblood, 
“The more carefully we read the New Testament, the more we come to realize that the 
Christian Church, in its first phase, was essentially a missionary movement.”24  As stated 
earlier, Quakers were advocates of freedom of speech, worship, and assembly in England.  
Also, though there were divisions that emerged over how to confront the issue, they were 
directly in the middle of the anti-slavery effort in the United States before the American 
Civil War.  In the early twentieth century, they consolidated their service efforts and 
peace witness with the founding of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
during World War I in 1917.  The AFSC’s efforts included war relief and rehabilitation, 
peace studies and education, and justice and reconciliation.25  The AFSC was successful 
in many of its endeavors, winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947 for their international 
relief and rehabilitation work.26 
Though they have long been identified as pacifists, the centrality of the Quaker 
peace testimony in their early years has recently come under closer scrutiny.  For 
example, in the early days of the movement, there were Quaker soldiers alongside 
pacifists amongst the group, suggesting that the peace witness was not all-encompassing 
in the initial phases of the Quakers.  Pacifism became firmly established from 1660-1661 
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when Fox made a number of firm public statements that a true Christian must be 
nonviolent and love his or her enemies.27  In 1661, Fox and Richard Hubberthorne issued 
a declaration to the English king, Charles II, which firmly established the Quaker pacifist 
stance.  The most important part read, “All bloody principles and practices as we to our 
own particular do utterly deny, with all outward wars and strife and fightings with 
outward weapons for any end or under any pretense whatsoever; and this is our testimony 
to the whole world.”28  For the Quakers, “… war is intrinsically wrong and evil,” in the 
words of Trueblood.29  By following the teachings of Jesus, Quakers turned to social 
activism rather than killing as a means of resolving conflict and achieving justice in the 
world around them.30 
The Brethren were the final major peace group to establish, beginning with 
baptisms in a river near Schwarzenau, Germany.  It was there in 1708 that a group of five 
men and three women, led by Alexander Mack, Sr., baptized each other with a threefold 
immersion, thus initiating three centuries of a community of believers that outsiders 
referred to as a “peculiar people.”  The Brethren grew out of the convergence of three 
European religious movements: Reformed Protestantism, Radical Pietism, and 
Evangelical Baptism.  Most of the original Brethren came from the mainline German 
Reformed Church, a group with a Calvinist heritage. This background in the German 
Reformed Church explains the Brethren’s acceptance of many traditional Protestant 
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beliefs, as discussed below.  The Brethren numbers in Europe never became particularly 
large due to intolerance and persecution.  Within twenty-five years, they began to 
immigrate to Pennsylvania, searching for religious tolerance. 31 
However, it was Pietism, along with the Anabaptists, that influenced the Brethren 
most of all.  Today, the Brethren are classified as a Pietist denomination.  Pietism was a 
religious movement within Protestantism during the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Because it was a convoluted and widespread movement, Pietism had many 
different tenets and was nuanced from group to group, but some distinct beliefs and 
actions did emerge.  One was the effort to restore “the True Church” as outlined in the 
New Testament.  Another was the reemphasis on the Bible (particularly the New 
Testament) as the authoritative work.  Most of all, Pietism attempted to combat 
nominalism, or spiritual deadness, in the churches.  It sought to reinvigorate religious 
fervor and spiritual belief.32 
Out of Pietism arose a distinct branch of radicals who sought to break away and 
form their own groups rather than reinvigorate their churches from within.  They are 
referred to in the scholarship, not surprisingly, as Radical Pietists.  It was from this milieu 
that the Brethren emerged.  Radical Pietism combined elements of mysticism, universal 
restoration, noncreedalism, communalism, and, in some cases, celibacy.  Overall, there 
was a distinct emphasis on experiencing God on a personal level.  The experience of the 
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Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) also helped to gain a foothold for pacifism or 
nonresistance within Pietism, because the extreme destruction and loss of life from that 
war had a long-lasting impact on Europeans.33  The influence of Pietism is indeed 
apparent throughout the theology and practices of the Brethren.   
In North America the Brethren began to expand and establish communities along 
the eastern seaboard.  The first settlement centered around Germantown, Pennsylvania, 
and within a few years, they began to spread into the south-central parts of that colony.  
During these years, the first split among the Brethren occurred with the formation of the 
Ephrata Cloister under the leadership of Conrad Beissel.  Beissel was a German 
immigrant who came to the colonies with a desire to break out on his own, doing so in 
1728, when he and followers formed the Protestant monastery named Ephrata.  This split 
from the mainstream Brethren would not be the last time the group fractured, creating 
new churches.34 
The largest split, and the division with the furthest-reaching effects, occurred 
among the Brethren between 1881-1883.  Growing out of the modernization of the 
United States and the introduction of modern society into portions of their members, the 
Brethren split along three major lines: the Old Orders, who wished to preserve the 
traditional Brethren ways: the Progressives, who wished to move forward quickly with 
modern ideas: and the Conservatives, who fell in between the other two groups.  Over 
those three years, acrimonious debates and tensions emerged over such things as Sunday 
                                                 
33Brown, 24-25, 18-19.  
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Schools, education, mission work, ministerial pay, and style of clothing.  However the 
biggest controversies came over the place of the Brethren in modern society, where 
authority in the church would lie, and the manner of gaining new membership.  It was 
over these matters that the Old Orders broke away and called themselves the Old Order 
German Baptists.  The Progressives chose to form the Brethren Church and the 
Conservatives that remained called themselves the German Baptists, eventually changing 
their name in 1908 to the Church of the Brethren.  Over time, there would be other, 
smaller divisions in the church, but this was the by far the largest in its history.35 
For the most part, the beliefs of the Church of the Brethren fall in line with much 
of mainstream historic Protestantism, meaning a belief in the Holy Trinity and an 
emphasis on the priesthood of all believers.  The latter point is of particular importance to 
the Brethren, as there is a distinct emphasis on the church as a community of believers, 
and with that comes a sense of kinship and identity with one another.  Drawing from 
Anabaptist tradition, members of the church addressed one another as “brother” or 
“sister,” stressing the relationship of believers to one another (hence the term Brethren).  
Also of profound importance to the Brethren is the emphasis on personal spirituality and 
an individual relationship with God, though not to the extent of the Friends.  According 
to Brethren scholar Dale R. Stoffer, the emphasis on personal spirituality came from 
Pietism, as did the stance against creeds.  The Brethren sought to move away from papal 
dogma and creedal restraints to develop a more individualized interpretation of scripture.  
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In the words of Stoffer, the Brethren thought that the personal elucidation allowed “… 
the Holy Spirit [to] be free to shed new light upon God’s word.”36  
The best-known defining feature (and for the purposes of this work, the most 
important) of the Brethren belief structure is the emphasis on nonresistance.  Many times, 
the Brethren are mistakenly labeled as a pacifist church.  While they do refer to 
themselves as a Historic Peace Church, that term did not come into use until 1935, and 
only then was it used to describe its relation to the Mennonites and the Friends.  The 
emphasis on nonresistance came from a literal interpretation of the teachings of Jesus in 
the New Testament, coupled with the belief that individuals are accountable to God 
above all else (nonconformity).  Nonconformity and a literal interpretation of the 
teachings of Jesus led the Brethren to adopt a nonresistant stance, which was similar to 
that of the Mennonites.37 
These three groups – Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren – led the way in 
preparing for conscientious objection when conscription became law in the United States 
in 1940.  As Hershey said then, no person in the Federal Government had given much 
thought to the issue.  Though Hershey was the person in charge of conscientious 
objection and did the most to shape alternative service, he relied heavily on input from 
the Historic Peace Churches because of their long-standing traditions of nonresistance or 
Christian pacifism.  Conscientious objection was a part of their identity, and they began 
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to discuss the issue in real-world terms between the world wars well before a public 
discussion on conscription was an issue. 
An increasing spirit of ecumenism and cooperation between the Historic Peace 
Churches marked the years for them between the two world wars.  The first incarnation 
of this collaboration was in the early days of U.S. participation in World War I in May 
1917, when representatives of the Brethren, Mennonites, and Society of Friends met, 
though little of substance actually came out of the gathering.  The first major Peace 
Church conference came after the war in 1922 at Bluffton College, a General Conference 
Mennonite school in Ohio.  Given the awkward and lengthy title of National Conference 
of Religious Bodies Who Hold That Peace between Nations Can Be Maintained by 
Following the Teachings of Jesus, it outlined its purpose as follows, 
A number of these groups have been sadly misunderstood during the past six 
years.  Because of their isolation they have frequently had no knowledge of what 
other like-minded groups were doing.  Not infrequently one or the other of these 
groups or individual members of them have suffered more or less persecution….  
The thought of their inability to prevent war or even utter an effective protest 
against it, was so overwhelming that they either compromised or suffered in 
isolated silence.  Under these conditions these groups have not been able to 
effectively demonstrate that love, as it was revealed in Christ Jesus, is capable of 
meeting such situations as arose in 1914 and 1917. 38 
The conference sought to bring together groups that had the peace witness as a major part 
of their beliefs in order to discuss ways to spread the message beyond the denominations 
represented.39 
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 A positive reaction among the participants meant that the conferences continued 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.  There were nine conferences from 1922 to 1932 
(counting the meeting at Bluffton), each with varying levels of attendance, discussing 
ways for the Peace Churches to explore the peace witness in the modern world.  
However, the economic abyss of the Great Depression meant that the Peace Churches did 
not meet again until 1935.40 
 In 1935, the most significant of any conference during the interwar years took 
place in Newton, Kansas.  This conference, called by Henry P. Krehbiel, a prominent 
Mennonite in the area, continued the recent themes of seeking to develop plans for a 
more effective peace witness amongst the Peace Churches in the modern world.  The 
largest differences between this conference and the earlier series were that the Peace 
Churches made more substantive agreements at the meeting, and their efforts in Newton 
helped shape their strategy for approaching Washington when conscription came in 1940.  
The conference lasted for three days and did much to chip away at some barriers between 
the liberal peace sects and some of their conservative counterparts.41  For example, the 
conservative Mennonite Church never supported the term “pacifism.”  For them, it was of 
the modern world and it belonged with modern liberal thought, not the Mennonite peace 
witness.  So, to compromise and attract as many peace sects as possible, Krehbiel coined 
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the term “Historic Peace Churches” rather than use the term pacifist, and it is used to this 
day to describe collectively the Brethren, Mennonites and Society of Friends.42 
 One of the important decisions reached at the Newton Conference was the 
issuance of a formal statement, codifying the beliefs of the Historic Peace Churches.  It 
read, 
1.  Our peace principles are rooted in Christ and his Word. 
2.  Through Jesus Christ, who lived among men as the incarnation of the God of 
love, we become partakers of the spirit and character of our Lord, and thereby are 
constrained to love all men, even our enemies. 
3.  Christ has led us to see the value of human life and personalities, and the 
possibilities in all men, who by spiritual rebirth from above may become sons of 
God. 
4.  The spirit of sacrificial service, love, and goodwill promotes the highest well-
being and development of men and society, whereas the spirit of hatred, ill will, 
and fear destroys, as has been demonstrated repeatedly in human experience. 
5.  Since good alone can overcome evil, the use of violence must be abandoned. 
6.  War is sin.  It is the complete denial of the Christian spirit of love and all that 
Christ stands for.  It is wrong in spirit and method, and destructive in results.  
Therefore, we cannot support or engage in any war or conflict between nations, 
classes, or groups. 
7.  Our supreme allegiance is to God.  We cannot violate it by a lesser loyalty, but 
we are determined to follow Christ in all things.  In this determination we believe 
we are serving the interests of our country, and are truly loyal to our nation. 
8.  Under God we commit ourselves to set forth in the true way of life this 
statement of position and assume the obligations and sacrifices attending its 
practice.43 
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These tenets outlined the ethos and doctrine of the Historic Peace Churches in regard to 
their peace stance.   
However, as revealed earlier, the stance of the Selective Service was much 
different, and, ultimately, it was Hershey and his organization’s view that won out.  The 
biggest difference was over the issue of allegiance.  For Hershey and the Selective 
Service, every citizen, regardless of religious creed, owed a duty of service to the state in 
the time of national emergency.  There were to be no exceptions.  The loyalty of the 
Historic Peace Churches ultimately lay with the Kingdom of God.  The compromise 
between the two in 1940 was alternative service, which avoided violence for the Peace 
Churches and fulfilled a citizen’s duty for Hershey and the Selective Service.  Alternative 
service, though, did not come until conscription became law in 1940. 
 The Peace Church conference in Newton did much more than establish a codified 
peace stance for the Historic Peace Churches.  Of utmost importance was the decision 
between the churches to establish an ongoing cooperative relationship for matters of 
peace and conscientious objection in dealing with the federal government.  The official 
documentation from the conference suggested that a joint committee formed from 
representatives of the American Friends Service Committee, the Mennonite Central 
Committee, and the Peace Committee of the Church of the Brethren should be 
responsible for planning a course of action in regard to peace activities.  The AFSC 
would be responsible for calling the first meeting.  In case of war, the conference adopted 
a plan to present a united voice for conscientious objectors to the federal government.  
The platform called for a reinstruction of the membership on the Historic Peace 
Churches’ traditional stance toward war, pressuring the membership to resist service to 
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the military or anything controlled by or contributing to it, providing counseling in 
matters of peace to those members who may be wavering, rejecting funding the war, and 
providing a support network (both financial and spiritual) for conscientious objectors 
affected by the draft, among other things.  The conference unanimously adopted these 
provisions.44 
 The decision to form a joint committee proved to be insightful and productive.  
Recall that one of the major problems during World War I was the lack of a united voice 
from the Historic Peace Churches for conscientious objectors.  To rectify that mistake 
and be prepared in case of another war or draft, creating a united front was important to 
the leadership at the conference.  Indirectly, the cooperation between the Peace Churches 
led to the creation of the National Service Board for Religious Objectors.  Created at the 
behest of Hershey, NSBRO was the primary voice for conscientious objectors during 
World War II and beyond (it still exists today as the Center for Conscience and War).  It 
was the body that dealt with Hershey on matters of CO policy, draft status appeals, and 
other varied issues that arose throughout the war.  NSBRO was the main Historic Peace 
Church voice in World War II, and its roots are in the 1935 Conference of Historic Peace 
Churches in Newton.  Though the Peace Churches created NSBRO at the urging of 
Hershey in 1940 (to be explored in the next chapter), this increase in Peace Church 
cooperation between the world wars led to a situation that allowed for a more seamless 
creation of a cross-sect representative body. 
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 After the 1935 Conference, but before the passage of the Selective Service Act of 
1940, the Historic Peace Churches remained proactive in making their views known and 
attempting to secure exemptions for conscience in case of another war of conscription.  
Members of the Historic Peace Churches cooperated with one another in communicating 
their stance towards war and conscription with President Franklin Roosevelt.  They met 
with Roosevelt in 1937 and again in 1940.  Their second meeting with Roosevelt, on 
January 10, 1940, outlined their beliefs and their purposes, revealing many of the central 
issues that the Peace Churches attempted to gain throughout the development of CPS and 
many of the arguments they had with Hershey and Kosch over the matter.   In case of 
conscription, they wished for three main provisions for conscientious objection.  They 
asked for a civilian board appointed by the president and serving under a member of the 
Cabinet to determine CO sincerity, classification, and assignment to civilian projects.  
They wanted draft boards to send all conscientious objectors to this civilian CO board, 
making sure that civilian control remained in place for COs at all times.  Finally, they 
called for the Peace Churches to set up and administer work projects to which the COs 
could be assigned, such as war relief and reconstruction (along with domestic relief and 
reconstruction), refugee resettlement, land reclamation or forestry work, farm labor, and 
health services.  They closed their statement to Roosevelt by saying that while they 
represented the Historic Peace Churches, they hoped their arguments would be 
considered for all individuals who conscientiously opposed conscription.45 
                                                 
45The Historic Peace Churches to Franklin Roosevelt, January 10, 1940, Lewis B. 
Hershey Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.   
 120 
 What is apparent in the Peace Church meetings with Roosevelt is that they wished 
to retain civilian control over the matters of conscientious objection, and they lobbied 
hard for it in the debates over conscription during the summer of 1940.  Though they 
would be unsuccessful in their efforts, their attitudes toward civilian control were thus 
firmly established well before the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 
Not long after the Historic Peace Churches’ second meeting with Roosevelt, the 
draft became a reality.  The first peacetime conscription act in the history of the United 
States came about in response to the events in Europe, culminating with Germany’s 
invasion of Poland in September 1939.  Conscription was still a contentious issue in the 
United States, and nobody proposed legislation in Congress until the middle of 1940, as 
there was still a strong anti-interventionist sentiment in the United States even after Adolf 
Hitler’s aggressive action during the first year of the war.  The German invasions led 
lawmakers to increase the strength of the regular army, which had a measly 188,000 
soldiers in its ranks, along with about 200,000 in the National Guard.  Not only was the 
army low on numbers, but the soldiers had a woeful lack of training and obsolete 
equipment as well.  The poor level of preparedness and the events of Europe from 1939-
1940 led to increases in the American military, but for those pushing for increased 
preparedness, it was occurring at an alarmingly slow rate.46 
It was becomingly increasingly clear that the possibility of confronting the 
German war machine required many more men than would probably volunteer, yet 
President Roosevelt, General George Marshall, and members of the Joint Army Navy 
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Selective Service Committee (of which Hershey was the executive secretary) did not 
think a draft was feasible until a declaration of war came about.  What helped get the ball 
rolling for the draft was Grenville Clark and his Plattsburg cronies in the Military 
Training Camps Association.  Clark was a Wall Street lawyer with a history of elite 
influence and an ardent supporter of military service and interventionism.  The Plattsburg 
Movement, occurring just prior to World War I, called for military preparedness and 
believed military service was a duty shared by all male citizens.  It established training 
camps for officers (from elite backgrounds) during the war.  The Plattsburgers believed 
that English civilization needed saving from the “barbarous” Germans, an idea that 
harkened back to the days of Woodrow Wilson during the First World War.  The best 
way to help the English, in their minds, was to raise a prepared force through 
conscription.  They lobbied hard through many different channels, supported the 
nomination of such pro-conscription officials as Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and 
worked to spread favorable press and garner support throughout the United States.  
Through their efforts, they eventually convinced Senator Edward R. Burke (D-NE) and 
Representative James W. Wadsworth (R-NY) to sponsor their bill.47 
The push Clark and his elite, non-elected compatriots was a bothersome situation 
for some people.  Initially, Hershey viewed them as “usurpers,” and Marshall was very 
apprehensive about the negative publicity that could arise were word to get out that the 
War Department approved of the plans put forth by Clark’s group.48  Marshall and his 
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staff had been working on the idea of conscription through JANSSC since the 1920s.  
Led by Hershey, in 1939 JANSSC published its plans for conscription should war break 
out for the United States.  Its publication, American Selective Service, provides a 
historical overview of manpower and their vision of how conscription should unfold if 
hostilities arose.  Of particular interest to this study are the ideas of service presented.  
The statements put forth read as if Hershey spoke them himself.  For example, prior to 
the First World War, manpower procurement was, in JANSSC’s words, “wasteful and 
unsatisfactory.”  Though there is no discussion of conscientious objection, the concept of 
service that shaped conscientious objection and alternative service is definitely apparent.  
As it wrote,  
The conception [of a World War I draft] rested upon three propositions.  One of 
these, as old as mankind, is that every citizen is obligated to join in the common 
defense.  The second, not readily agreed upon in the early days of the republic, is 
that in a National emergency the authority of the National Government over its 
armed forces is paramount and exclusive.  The third proposition is that local self-
government is the fundamental basis of American democracy.49   
The ideas, prevalent among the planners at this time, and most definitely with Hershey, 
meant that all had to serve in some capacity, the federal government’s word was supreme, 
and local control of the draft would be preserved. 
When conscription appeared to be coming closer to actualization, Marshall 
wanted to coordinate the War Department’s efforts with the ideas of Clark’s group.  Led 
by Hershey, the War Department limited the age of service to 21-45, restricted training to 
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twelve months, standardized pay, and declared that the draft law would issue no blanket 
deferments but would rely on case-by-case assessments.50 
Burke proposed selective training and service in the Senate on June 20, 1940, and 
Wadsworth put forth concurrent legislation the next day in the House of 
Representatives.51  For conscientious objectors, the initial wording of the CO provision in 
the bill was problematic.  It provoked considerable consternation because it bore a 
striking resemblance to its World War I predecessor.  It read, 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require or compel any person 
to be subject to training or service in a combatant capacity in the land and naval 
forces of the United States who is found to be a member of any well recognized 
religious sect whose creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in 
any form, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such persona shall be 
established under such regulations as the President may prescribe; but no such 
person shall be relieved from training or service in such capacity as the president 
may declare to be noncombatant.52 
The convoluted wording in the second half of the provision aside, the most problematic 
phrase in the section as worded was “member of any well recognized religious sect.”  
This portion of the bill aroused much debate and testimony from numerous groups on the 
floor of both the House and the Senate. 
 Drawing on that problem, one of the largest issues during the hearings for the bill 
was expanding CO provisions beyond the members of Historic Peace Churches.  Other 
problems became apparent as well.  The method of classification was one issue.  
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Legislating alternative service was another.  Because the 1917 Act did not legislate for 
alternative service, government programs came too late, only after many COs suffered 
mistreatment in army camps and military prisons.  As a result, legislators eventually 
wrote alternative service provisions into the 1940 Act.  Finally, there was the question of 
civilian control over conscientious objectors.  This was a major issue amongst the 
Historic Peace Churches when they addressed the issue with President Roosevelt in 1937 
and again in early 1940, well before the introduction of the Burkc-Wadsworth Bill.53   
 Hearings began on July 3 in the Senate and July 10 in the House.  They continued 
through the middle of August, with final passage of the bill coming in September.  Most 
of the testimony concerning conscientious objection came from representatives of pacifist 
groups such as the War Resisters League and The Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom, minority rights advocates such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the Historic Peace Churches, and other Christian denominations.  Lewis Hershey, 
then a major, gave significant testimony on conscription before both the House and the 
Senate, but he discussed conscientious objection only briefly when prompted before the 
House Committee on Military Affairs.  Appearing before the Senate as the chief 
executive of the Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee, Hershey commented on 
the need for men, even in peacetime.  He gave an overview of the efforts of JANSSC and 
discussed what the Selective Service would look like and how it would operate.  He 
pointed out that there were other models of conscription used by other countries that 
influenced the committee’s plans.  Hershey also emphasized civilian control of 
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conscription through the use of local draft boards, an early public manifestation of his 
long-standing belief in that dynamic.54 
 In his testimony to the House, Hershey reiterated many of the statements he had 
made to the Senate and provided a relatively extensive discussion of registration along 
with elaborating on deferments for workers in defense industries and education.  During 
his House testimony he publicly spoke about conscientious objection.  Congressman John 
Sparkman (D-AL) asked if the bill should be changed to allow for an individual’s 
conscience, removing the restriction of “peace sect” membership.  Hershey responded, 
“You are speaking of something that I have a great deal of sympathy with, but I have not 
arrived at, perhaps, the best solution.  Unquestionably if we could find the man and know 
that he is, in fact, whether he belongs to a creed or whether he does not, a conscientious 
objector, we should try to the utmost to do something about it.”  He stated that if they 
were indeed sincere, they should be accommodated and that the COs he had met were 
“honest about it.”  Hershey also said that the problem in his mind was COs who were 
insincere, people who were not truly religious objectors but were just looking for a way 
to avoid the draft.  He acknowledged that this was a difficult problem, but it was a 
problem that needed a solution.55 
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 That was the moment when Hershey publicly established his sympathy for the 
CO.  While some other men called for restrictive or coercive methods, Hershey stated 
that if a man was indeed a sincere objector, then they should be accommodated.  This was 
a belief structure that Hershey held throughout his work in the Selective Service during 
World War II and, indeed, for the rest of his career.  Hershey was in no way hostile to 
conscientious objectors as long as they were sincere and honest about their objection.  
What really galled him were objectors who simply did not want to serve or if their 
objection was not based on a religious worldview.   
 Hershey’s viewpoint concerning the CO stood in stark contrast to some of his 
military colleagues.   In testimony before the Senate, Major General William N. Haskell, 
commander of the New York National Guard, believed that all eligible men should serve 
in the military, with conscientious objectors receiving an exemption from combat service 
and nothing more.  When asked by Senator Robert R. Reynolds (D-NC) to clarify about 
an exemption from combat service, Haskell replied, “And that is all.  They should be 
required to do anything that the War Department or the President decides is not combat 
service….  We had a lot of trouble with conscientious objectors in the last war and it was 
a racket, to a great extent.”56 
 Amos A. Fries, a retired major general in the army, was even more hostile to the 
CO and made this clear to the Senate committee.  He stated  
“…I do not believe in making any exemptions for any purposes, whether they be 
conscientious objectors or what not.  I think everyone should take the whole 
course in military training.  I think he should take his full chances in war.  If he 
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does not want to shoulder a gun, pull the trigger of a machine gun, all right; but he 
should go to the front the same as others.  He can drive a truck up there; he can 
drive a tank, he can work on roads; but he should take his chances in being killed 
as well as the other men.  In fact, I think no man should be a citizen who is not 
willing to defend the country in time of war.”57 
While there were plenty of viewpoints from a number of different individuals, ranging 
from peace organizations to the War Department to the ACLU, the statements by Haskell 
an Fries support the notion that there were individuals of high rank in the military who 
did not support conscientious objection or alternative service outside of the armed forces.  
Hershey’s answer before the House reveals a sympathetic stance that contrasted with 
some of his military brethren.   
Hershey’s testimony before the House and Senate in mid-1940 also reflects 
another important point.  His primary role as the executive of the Joint Army Navy 
Selective Service Committee, and the Assistant Director, and eventually Director, of the 
Selective Service was not to deal with conscientious objectors but to administer the 
registration procedures, draft calls, and induction of men eligible for conscription.  That 
does not, however, belittle his importance to conscientious objection.  In the development 
of policy concerning conscientious objection within the larger context of World War II 
and conscription, Hershey’s importance is undeniable, particularly after being tasked with 
defining “work of national importance” through Roosevelt’s executive order, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
 We must note that Hershey was not particularly instrumental in securing 
legislation for it in the Selective Service Act of 1940.  He voiced his support for the 
                                                 
57Ibid., 305  
 128 
sincere objectors, but his real importance came after the enactment of the draft, when 
most of the important decisions shifted to him.  Hershey’s testimony before the House 
and Senate was as a member of the General Staff and an expert in the process of 
manpower procurement.  The passages concerning conscientious objection in the 1940 
draft bill were largely crafted through the efforts of Howard Beale of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and Paul Comly French and Raymond Wilson of the Society of 
Friends.  Others spoke in support, but these men represented the central thrust to provide 
for conscientious objection. 
 Harold Evans was the first to speak for the Society of Friends.  On July 10, he 
outlined the beliefs of the Quakers and why they objected to military service.  He said, 
“They have believed that lasting good can be accomplished not by war and violence but 
only by service and an appeal to the divine spark in the life of everyman.”58  Evans 
continued to outline the position of the Society of Friends, comparing the idea of 
conscription and warfare to the first steps toward dictatorship in the United States, a line 
of reasoning that brought forth much questioning from Senator Henry Schwartz (D-WY).  
When Burke stepped in an asked a more pointed question about the Society of Friends’ 
views on the adequacy of CO provisions in the bill, Evans responded that “democracy 
cannot be preserved by coercion; that modern war annihilates democracy; and that 
freedom can be maintained only by self-discipline, by contagious enthusiasm for service, 
by devotion to a great cause.”  He affirmed that the Society of Friends wished for 
conscientious objection to be preserved in the bill.  He believed that it merely mirrored 
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the 1917 Act and wished for something similar to the British model of conscription.  He 
asked for four main provisions: civilian oversight of CO’s, national registration of COs, 
absolutist exemption for those who objected to all forms of coerced service, and equal 
treatment for all religious denominations.59 
 Immediately following Evans’ testimony, Paul French took the stand.  French 
presented a signed statement from the Friends General Conference in Philadelphia.  The 
statement argued that the bill as worded was  
a negation of the right of conscience, and a denial of religious freedom.  It is a 
violation of the fundamental concepts of democracy.  It tends to a system of life 
and type of government in which the individual becomes subservient to the State.   
We appreciate the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, especially in these 
times, and are eager to perform constructive service for the community, but are 
unwilling to grant the right of the State to conscript its citizens for services which 
they hold to be morally wrong.60 
French effectively summed up the general beliefs of the Society of Friends to the 
committee, emphasizing that their objection was not over an unwillingness to die, but an 
unwillingness to kill.  He said, “We are not unwilling to die for America if it will serve 
any real purpose, but we refuse to kill for any reason because we are convinced that each 
human being contains a spark of the Divine Spirit and we are not willing to kill the divine 
in a fellow human being.”61  Furthermore, this statement from French typifies the 
Friends’ belief in the Inner Light concerning warfare. 
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 Beale, a historian from the University of North Carolina, spent the summer of 
1940 laboring to secure legislation for conscientious objectors at the behest of the 
national director of the ACLU, Roger Baldwin.  Beale had written numerous times on 
issues of academic freedom, had been a member of the ACLU since the early 1930s, and 
had a close relationship with Baldwin.  Beale, with support from Baldwin, chose to focus 
the ACLU’s efforts on protecting conscientious objection rather than opposing 
conscription as a whole.  Though both of them had a disdain for conscription, they both 
knew that fighting the entire institution of conscription was a battle they were probably 
not going to win.  J. Garry Clifford and Samuel Spencer, in The First Peacetime Draft, 
point to Beale as the most important person in securing provisions for conscientious 
objectors.  While their argument is slightly misguided (the Historic Peace Churches were 
instrumental as well), they do offer an insightful comment from Beale, who authored 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power.  An ardent nationalist and 
militarist like Theodore Roosevelt would have had a supreme disdain for the idea.  Beale 
said, “I shudder to think what Theodore would think of me if he knew what had taken his 
biographer’s attention from TR himself.  How he would denounce me!”62  
 Beale’s testimony was not the first on behalf of conscientious objectors, but his 
was the most detailed and cogent.  In his remarks to the Senate, he pointed out that he 
was not there to oppose conscription but instead to protect “the fundamental rights of 
liberty of conscience.”  He argued that the CO provisions in the bill as they stood were 
“too vague” and they resembled too closely the tenets of the 1917 legislation making the 
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criteria for objection much too narrow.  Instead, he asked the committee to expand the 
wording to allow for COs of all religious denominations and those who were members of 
established antiwar organizations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation.  This was a 
call for a program for conscientious objectors along the British model.  Through Beale, 
the ACLU asked for three classes of objectors: the absolutists who accepted no form of 
service or control and would not be required to serve in any capacity, civilian servants 
who accepted a civilian-controlled service program, and noncombatants who could serve 
in the military but not bear arms.63 
 Beale also attempted to reassure the legislators about the possible misuse of CO 
status by urging Congress to use tribunals to examine the sincerity of objectors, in which 
the COs could call witnesses to vouch for their beliefs.  He continued by pointing out that 
exempted COs were not desirable in the army but could provide much needed labor in 
certain sectors.  He concluded, “Gentlemen, does anyone think that men fighting in 
violation of their consciences and in repudiation of their God as they have honestly 
conceived Him and believed in Him will make good soldiers?  They will make wretched 
soldiers.  At civilian jobs serving their country with the high degree of devotion that the 
ones I have known among these people have, they are capable of great usefulness to their 
Nation.”64 
 Two weeks later, on July 25, Beale and the Quaker contingent (along with others) 
appeared before the House Committee on Military Affairs.  He offered several comments 
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and proposals.  Beale called for extending the provisions for COs to all who objected to 
military service, not just the Historic Peace Church members.  He proposed that Peace 
Church membership should be enough to prove sincerity.  He also urged civilian control 
of conscientious objection, called for a National Civilian Board of Appeal for COs, and 
acceptance of all three levels of objector (absolutist, civilian servant, and noncombatant).  
He also reaffirmed that objectors were not anti-American, but they were good people who 
were following their conscience.65 
 After testimony from Amos Horst of the Mennonites, French took the stand to 
provide his most significant testimony yet.  Through the words of French, conscientious 
objectors were able to firmly establish exactly what they wished to have in CO 
legislation.  Coming from a member of a firmly established peace sect with long-standing 
historical roots in the United States, French was definitely an expert on the subject.  
However, he had another advantage.  He had met with the War Department the day 
before to outline plans for conscientious objection and the War Department agreed with 
the Quaker contingent.  After meeting with Colonel Victor O’Kelliher from the Joint 
Army Navy Selective Service Committee, French testified the Quakers wanted the 
Department of Justice (therefore, civilian control) to examine those who registered as 
conscientious objectors and then report to the local draft boards on their authenticity.  
The Quakers and the War Department agreed that COs should be able to serve as 
noncombatants, in civilian work of national importance, or they should be sent back to 
the army if found to be insincere in their convictions.  The problem of absolutists, though, 
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still remained.  The War Department did not support exempting absolutists from all forms 
of service, but French still asked the House Committee to consider the issue.  Raymond 
Wilson, a fellow Quaker, followed French and immediately reaffirmed the desire for 
civilian control of conscientious objection.66 
 While the House continued hearings through August 14, the Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs retreated to discuss the matter among themselves and issued a report on 
August 5.  In their report, the majority opinion sided with the CO lobby in that they 
agreed to provide for a national registry of conscientious objectors, Department of Justice 
(civilian) control and hearings for classification, and noncombatancy or civilian service 
for those who were found to be sincere in their objection.  Where they differed with the 
representatives of the Peace Churches and the ACLU was on the matter of absolutist 
objectors.  The committee decided not to provide for those objectors who refused service 
of any kind.67  The House committee produced similar sentiments in their report of 
August 29, providing the same measure of protection and methods as the Senate for 
conscientious objection.68 
 By the end of August, it seemed that those who sought measures of protection for 
conscientious objectors had gotten mostly what they wanted, with the exception of 
protection for absolutist objectors.  However, the final bill passed in September placed 
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authority in the hands of the local draft boards, not the Department of Justice.  This was a 
huge disappointment for the Peace Churches and the ACLU, particularly after they had 
worked so hard to attain complete civilian control over the issue.  So what had happened?  
It seemed as though the Senate and House were in agreement by the end of August and 
things would be well for the most part, that is, until the bill passed.  It was on the floor of 
the House and in conference committees that things changed. 
 On September 6, during debate in the House on the Compulsory Military Training 
and Service bill, Francis Walter (D-PA) called for changes to the provisions for 
conscientious objectors in the bill.  The biggest change he advocated was eliminating the 
role of the Department of Justice and turning classification control entirely over to the 
hands of the local draft boards, and in turn, the Selective Service.  Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), 
who supported COs and even contemplated calling for a bill that provided for voluntary 
national service, vehemently protested on the floor, but the chair ignored him.  Chairman 
Lindsay Warren (D-NC) replied, “I did not hear your objection,” a response that was a 
blatant falsehood.  Despite the dissent from Voorhis and the previous efforts of the Peace 
Churches and the ACLU, the measure passed, placing the authority for CO classification 
in the hands of the Selective Service and its local draft boards.”69 
 This change represented a significant departure from the direction that the bill 
seemed to have been going for conscientious objectors.  The sudden change seemed to 
come from a desire in the Department of Justice to avoid becoming overburdened.  
According to Neal Wherry’s official Selective Service history of conscientious objection 
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in World War II, “This amendment in the House apparently arose from a feeling that 
referring the conscientious objector case to the Department of Justice made for an 
involved and unnecessary procedure.”70  French echoed this viewpoint.  According to 
him, the Department of Justice simply thought it would be too much work.  This left 
French and the CO lobby worried about the local draft boards being inconsistent, a fear 
that proved to be well founded throughout World War II.  French continued to appeal to 
several members of the House Committee on Military Affairs, many of whom did not 
support the amendments made on the House floor and wanted to get the Senate wording 
reinstituted into the final bill.71 
 However, once the conference committee met to iron out the discrepancies 
between the House and the Senate, the reinstitution of Department of Justice control did 
not materialize.  The conference put forth their recommendation, and the House measures 
from the floor debate won out.  French responded negatively.  “… [I]t seems to me it is a 
legislative compromise of the worst sort.”  He was clearly disappointed (as other CO 
lobbyists most certainly were), especially when he made statements such as, “It is curious 
how a few minutes can undo the work of a month or more.”72 
 However disappointed the Peace Churches or the ACLU may have been in losing 
the authority for conscientious objection from the Department of Justice and true civilian 
control, it actually turned out to be a blessing in disguise in many ways.  Eventually, 
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President Roosevelt, through an executive order, placed the authority for dealing with 
matters of conscientious objection in the hands of the Director of the Selective Service.  
Furthermore, by mid-1941, the new Director of the Selective Service would be Lewis B. 
Hershey.  As already mentioned, Hershey, though an army officer, had a distinct point of 
view that was sympathetic to conscientious objectors, something he established in his 
earlier congressional testimony.  He was also not shy in voicing his support to the Peace 
Churches (or the ACLU).  In discussing the matter with Beale and French, Hershey 
reassured them that if he became the Director of the Selective Service, the mistakes of the 
last war would be avoided and no CO would end up in prison.73 
The passage of the Selective Training and Service Act in 1940 meant that 
peacetime conscription was now law in the United States.  This presented a dilemma for 
the Historic Peace Churches and any individual who opposed military service.  
Fortunately for those who objected based on religious grounds, the provisions for 
conscientious objection in the 1940 Act were much more liberal than those put forth 
during World War I.  As previously stated, to be recognized as a CO in World War I, an 
objector had to be a member of an acknowledged religious sect that objected to war as a 
central tenet of its faith.  This meant that the Act in 1917 excluded more popular 
denominations such as Lutherans or Methodists.  The Act in 1940 was much more liberal 
than 1917, providing CO status to any person who objected to war or military service 
based on religious grounds.  Section 5(g) in the 1940 Act outlined the provision for 
conscientious objection: 
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Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require any person to be 
subject to combatant training and service in the land and naval forces of the 
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously 
opposed to war in any form.74 
The Act also outlined the ways in which COs could fulfill their service to the state.  One 
method was to serve as a noncombatant, to be “defined by the President.”  If a CO 
objected to military service of any kind, then his only outlet was to “be assigned to work 
of national importance under civilian direction.”75 
 The last option proved to be one of the most problematic for the relationship 
between the Historic Peace Churches and the federal government throughout the war.  
The fact that the Selective Service administered the camps made it appear that “civilian 
control” of CPS was a farce.  Furthermore, the many COs believed that soil conservation 
and forestry service was little more than “make work” and did not utilize their labor 
effectively.  The problems with civilian direction, work of national importance, and the 
resulting tension between the Peace Churches and the government is a major part of this 
dissertation, and it will be explored in the following chapters. 
 Because of the long-standing tradition of nonresistance among the Brethren and 
Mennonites and Christian pacifism in the Society of Friends, much of the early efforts in 
providing for conscientious objectors came from the ranks of the Historic Peace 
Churches.  Furthermore, legislating for conscience in the Selective Service Act of 1940 
was a multifaceted effort on the part of the Historic Peace Churches, Congress, the War 
Department, the ACLU, and the Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee.  That 
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being said, Hershey’s tolerant attitude that guided him in dealing with COs throughout 
World War II began to manifest itself publicly, standing in sharp contrast to some of his 
professional colleagues.  Though he was front and center in the discussion of conscription 
in the House and Senate, he was not yet the central figure in conscientious objection.  
That role came quite soon, however.   
What was definitely apparent from the summer of 1940 was that the entities 
involved in creating conscription law were redefining service and the citizen soldier.  No 
man was totally exempt from service, but the government allowed for a man to perform 
his service through alternate means if his religious beliefs called him to a peaceful 
vocation.  By providing for conscience through legislation, the federal government 
embarked on a new direction in matters of service and conscience.  What eventually 
came to cement the relationship between service and conscience was a tolerant attitude 
and a well-developed sense of service from a former artillery officer who became the 
Director of Selective Service just a short time after the passage of the bill.   
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CHAPTER 6 – HERSHEY AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION DURING THE 
PEACETIME DRAFT, SEPTEMBER 1940 – DECEMBER 1941 
 
Though the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 provided legislation that 
established alternative service for the conscientious objector, there were still more 
questions than answers about the form alternative service should take.  Lewis Hershey, 
serving as the Acting Director, Deputy Director, and then Director of Selective Service, 
did much during the crucial years of 1940-1941 to develop, administer, and shape the 
direction of conscientious objection and alternative service.  There are many instances 
during these years of Hershey making decisions, suggestions, or appointments with 
lasting effects on conscientious objection.  As he began to exert his authority, his 
personal ideology concerning alternative service shaped the entire dynamic that 
continued throughout the war.  His suggestion for better organization from the Historic 
Peace Churches, the establishment of Selective Service’s Camp Operations Division, and 
his ongoing negotiations with the churches were but some of the many efforts of 
Hershey, both small and large, as the central figure in conscientious objection during 
World War II. 
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Hershey was not always at the forefront in these years, though.  Seeking to 
maintain civilian control over the Selective Service, President Roosevelt named Clarence 
Dykstra as Director of Selective Service in October.  Though Hershey was not technically 
the head of the Selective Service, he was definitely the foremost expert on manpower 
procurement for the military in the United States, and, for all intents and purposes, he 
served as the director even during Dykstra’s short tenure.  That said, there was one 
significant instance when Dykstra negotiated with Roosevelt over what exactly COs 
should be doing.  Hershey still worked on the issue with Dykstra, and when Hershey took 
over for Dykstra, it was completely his show to run in all matters.  What unfolds in the 
following pages is exactly how Hershey managed to do this and what his beliefs were 
considering the nature of Civilian Public Service. 
Prior to the Selective Service Act of 1940, interwar planners did not see much of a 
need to change the wording of the law or the provisions set forth from the First World 
War in regards to conscientious objection.  However, the deliberations over the issue 
during the summer of 1940 and the testimony of many supporters of conscientious 
objection made people realize that something needed to be done.  What emerged from the 
1940 law was legislated civilian control and an alternative form of service in the arena of 
“national importance.”  Though the Act was much more liberal than its World War I 
counterpart, it was not without its faults.  For instance, the Act did not direct who (or 
what) was to be responsible for administration.1  Nor did it provide a means of funding or 
determine where the boundaries of jurisdiction and control existed.  The Act was not 
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clear on how far civilian control went.  There was also a question of just how “civilian” 
the Selective Service really was, as the Selective Service was equal parts civilian 
bureaucracy and military institution. 
As conscientious objection was a multifaceted issue, there were a number of 
problems that needed to be addressed.  One group of COs, the absolutist objectors who 
objected to any form of government service, presented special problems, but the 
provisions in the Selective Service Act neglected to address them.  There were precedents 
overseas for dealing with absolutists, such as the British system of conscription, which 
provided for them, but the United States did not have such a mechanism in place.2  It was 
Hershey’s belief that all must serve in some capacity, so he contended that the absolutist 
either had to serve in CPS or go to prison.  Furthermore, the National Service Board for 
Religious Objectors (who dealt directly with Hershey and is a major focus of this study) 
saw the absolutists as outside of their realm.  As M. R. Zigler, Chairman of NSBRO and 
member of the Church of the Brethren said, “We did not feel that it was our responsibility 
to work for that group.  However, we did not work against them on their position.  We 
felt they should organize themselves, as we were, and if the government granted them 
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privilege, okay.”3  Though there would be a few discussions of the absolutists, the 
overwhelming concern was with civilian servant objectors in Civilian Public Service. 
Of the three groups of conscientious objectors, noncombatants had the simplest 
means of gaining recognition.  An executive order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt 
on December 6, 1940 thoroughly defined noncombatancy and what jobs in the army fell 
under those parameters.   Roosevelt defined noncombatant service as, 
(1) Service in any unit which is unarmed at all times 
(2) Service in the medical department wherever performed 
(3) Service in any unit or installation the primary function of which does not 
require the use of arms in combat, provided the individual’s assignment 
within such unit or installation does not require him to bear arms or to be 
trained in their use4 
He further clarified the issue by stating that noncombatant training was to mirror 
regular military training with the notable exceptions of “marksmanship, combat firing, 
target practices, and those subjects relating to the employment of weapons.”5   In practice, 
this meant that noncombatant COs labored in the quartermaster corps, decontamination 
units, the signal corps, or engineering units until Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
declared in January 1943 that all noncombatant COs were to serve in the medical corps.6  
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Roosevelt’s executive order took care of the noncombatant CO, but there was still 
much work to be done for the civilian servant.  Indeed, much had been going in for 
months prior to the noncombatant executive order.  Planning for a program of civilian 
alternative service began almost immediately following passage of the Selective Service 
Act.  On September 17, Harold Evans, Clarence Pickett, Ray Wilson, Ross Murphy, and 
Paul French of the Friends War Problems Committee visited Hershey and Frederick 
Osborne (of President Roosevelt’s advisory board).  Hershey made it clear that he would 
like to establish an advisory board to deal with conscientious objectors and leave all CO 
matters to it.  There were also discussions among the Friends War Problems Committee 
about the specifics of an alternative service program, ranging from questions on pay to 
registration.7  At this point in time there appeared to be more questions than answers, and 
it was only through cooperative efforts could anything be solved. 
Clearly, there were problems to fix and they needed to be remedied quickly.  A 
memorandum dated September 24, 1940 circulated around the National Headquarters of 
the Selective Service calling for an “informal conference” of a number of “national 
agencies” such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC), and the Public Health Service to outline plans for administering COs in 
their national service.  The earliest planning for alternative service occurred in the 
Manpower Division of the Selective Service.  The Manpower Division decided quickly 
that the best way to implement programs in the shortest amount of time was to use 
agencies and projects that already had infrastructure in place.  The most obvious 
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candidate was the Civilian Conservation Corps from the New Deal, with its soil 
conservation and forestry programs.  In outlining their plans, there was much cooperation 
between the CCC, the War Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the 
Department of the Interior, among others.8 
Most of the initiative for institutional development and direction came from 
Hershey, particularly in his early personal meetings with Paul French, representing the 
Society of Friends.  On September 30, Hershey asked French if it was possible for the 
Peace Churches to oversee all the civilian servant conscientious objectors.  Two weeks 
later, on October 15, Hershey posed the question again, outlining his view more precisely 
as he added that “… no one in the Government service had given much thought to this 
problem [civilian servant COs] ” and he believed that it was the churches’ place “to make 
concrete and specific suggestions along this line.”9  Hershey also initiated a discussion 
that led to greater organization among the Peace Churches. 
The Selective Service realized that the differing opinions of the Peace Churches 
involved created even more confusion and difficulties.10  The first to suggest a more 
streamlined approach for the Peace Churches was Hershey.  The idea for what eventually 
became the National Service Board for Religious Objectors emerged from a meeting 
between Hershey and Paul French.   
                                                 
8Conscientious Objection, 158-159.  
9Gingerich, 56; and Sibley and Jacob, 116.  
10Conscientious Objection, 160.  
 145 
Representing the Society of Friends, French came to Hershey’s office to discuss 
administrative matters concerning COs, including guidelines for the state directors. 
Hershey asked French if he spoke for all COs or if Hershey had to deal with each 
individual church or sect.  French’s reply was that he “probably represented the feeling of 
all the religious groups” on the issues of registration invalidation and state director 
information.  Hershey was interested in setting up a civilian board for the explicit purpose 
of dealing with conscientious objection, but he made it clear that he was unwilling 
proceed in that direction until President Roosevelt had appointed the head of the 
Selective Service.  French readdressed the point that many of the COs chafed under the 
idea of government control and suggested that a civilian organization such as the 
American Friends Service Committee needed to be involved.11 
It was Hershey’s next idea in the meeting that really got things rolling.  Hershey 
put forth the idea that the AFSC administer the CO programs and asked how much 
money the Friends would from the government to finance this.  French responded that the 
Friends probably would not accept funds from the federal government, but he could not 
speak for everyone on that point.  Hershey and French went on to discuss the nature of 
religion and asked French exactly what the Peace Churches wanted for civilian service.  
Hershey reassured the churches about his sympathy for matters of conscience and 
                                                 
11French Diary, October 2, 1940.  At this point in time, Hershey was the Acting 
Director of the Selective Service as President Roosevelt had not yet filled the position 
permanently.   
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religious liberty, saying that “if he [Hershey] was named director [the Peace Churches] 
would have no difficulty in working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement.”12 
French returned to his colleagues with the message that the Mennonites, Brethren, 
and Society of Friends needed to cooperate under the leadership of the American Friends 
Service Committee.  The Brethren and Mennonites, however, felt that a more cooperative 
and equal relationship was in order.13  On October 5, representatives from the Historic 
Peace Churches voted in favor of  
recommendations prepared by the committee of Friends, Mennonites and 
Brethren in Washington and presented by Ray Newton regarding a possible 
continuing set-up in Washington, D.C., to work on behalf of the religious 
conscientious objector.  It is understood that the organization will be composed of 
the Friends, Mennonites and Brethren, and this organizing committee will 
determine the policy governing issuance of invitations to other organizations….14 
Those recommendations constituted a two-fold approach to conscientious objection.  The 
organization’s mission was to keep the church constituency informed and to serve as a 
unified voice on behalf of conscientious objectors to the federal government.  Other 
religious denominations, churches, and sects could be members, but the organization 
limited membership to religious groups (keeping in line with the wording of the Selective 
Service Act, no less).  The Historic Peace Churches had the representatives on the general 
committee and covered the expenses.15 
                                                 
12French Diary, October 2, 1940.  
13Gingerich, 54-55 (quote printed in Gingerich).  
14Ibid., 55.  Quote is the wording of the Mennonite Central Peace Committee, 
appearing in Gingerich.  
15Ibid.  
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 Thus, the Peace Churches established the National Council for Religious 
Conscientious Objectors on October 11, and after merging with the Peace Churches’ 
Civilian Service Board on November 26, they changed the name to its World War II title 
of the National Service Board for Religious Objectors.  The Executive Board of NSBRO 
was made up of representatives from the Brethren Service Committee, the Mennonite 
Central Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee. 16  
 The establishment of NSBRO was incredibly significant, and Hershey’s role in its 
formation was pivotal.  NSBRO was the unified voice for COs in Washington, and for 
the duration of the war, any changes in policy or camp operations involved NSBRO in 
some way.  Although the Historic Peace Churches were more cooperative with one 
another than in World War I because of the interwar conferences, Hershey’s suggestion 
that they present a single voice to him spurned them to establish and interdenominational 
organization devoted solely to matters of the conscientious objector. 
 Those working with the Selective Service had a variety of stances towards the 
concepts of service and toward administration of alternative service.  Ideas came in from 
all parts of the spectrum.  Some favored service “on an individual basis,” with COs 
working as a singular entity, not in work camps with supervision.  Others wanted much 
sterner “Government operated and strictly disciplined camps.”  A significant and 
convoluted problem was the individual CO’s stance towards service.  Because of the 
varied nature of individual beliefs, the Selective Service faced a problem in trying to 
account for all individual variances, clearly an impossible task.  Some COs were willing 
                                                 
16Conscientious Objection, 160; and Gingerich, 55.  
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to labor in defense work as long as they did not have to serve in the military.  Others went 
so far as to refuse to plant a single seed or harvest a single grain if its use was to feed the 
army.  It became clear that most COs would not work in defense industries, so the 
Selective Service shied away from war work as much as possible.  Further compounding 
dissatisfaction in the earliest stages was that a system for alternative service was taking 
longer than anticipated. 
The Peace Churches were leery of anything that smacked of government control.  
To compromise, the government eventually took over old CCC projects and used the 
existing infrastructure, working with the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service 
under the Department of Agriculture.17  Furthermore, Hershey’s belief in decentralization 
of the draft led to more leeway in matters of individual conscience, leaving classification 
in the hands of the local draft boards. 
 From the passage of the Selective Service and Training Act until October, 
Hershey was in charge of the Selective Service as the acting director.  President 
Roosevelt had not yet appointed anyone permanently to that position.  Hershey had much 
support throughout the government, but the President wanted to illustrate civilian control 
of the draft as much as possible, even though most of the men working in the Selective 
Service National Headquarters were military personnel.  So, instead of appointing 
Hershey to the post, Roosevelt named University of Wisconsin-Madison President 
Clarence Dykstra the Director of the Selective Service on October 12.  At the behest of 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Roosevelt named Hershey Deputy Director, and he 
                                                 
17Conscientious Objection, 160-161.  
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received a promotion to Brigadier General.  When Dykstra arrived in Washington, he 
recognized Hershey’s expertise and granted him wide latitude in administrative and 
executive decisions.  Though the decision to appoint Dykstra over him surely 
disappointed Hershey, the two men worked together adequately.18  
 By the middle of October, there was still no alternative service program in place 
and Hershey reiterated to French that the Historic Peace Churches needed to present him 
with a plan.  The question of specific types of projects, administration, and funding still 
loomed.  There was discussion between Hershey and French of medical students working 
in depressed urban sections of large cities or “sharecropper areas,” an idea that Hershey 
supported.  Hershey reiterated that the Peace Churches needed to state clearly what they 
were willing to do, how many units were necessary, and how much money they needed to 
fund the program.  Hershey also recognized that not much more could be done until the 
Peace Churches presented him with more specific information.  He told French, “You 
fellows want to make up your minds as to what you want to do and how it ought to be 
done and we are in a position to talk intelligently about it.”  He also stated there needed 
to be a discussion of responsibility for the men.  Specifically, would responsibility lie 
with the Federal Government or the Peace Churches, or would the two share the 
responsibility?19 
 Finally, on November 12, the National Council for Religious Conscientious 
Objectors presented its initial plan to Hershey and the Selective Service.  A product of 
                                                 
18Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 75; and Flynn, The Draft, 23.  
19French Diary, October 15, 1940.  
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negotiations among the Council, Dykstra, Hershey, and a Major Guiton Morgan of the 
Selective Service, the plan outlined three possible avenues of service for the CO.  The 
first type of work was working directly with the federal government.  These men would 
be paid, but not more than what their equivalent in the military would receive.  The 
government would directly supervise them, and the camps would receive full government 
financing.  The second type was in camps working for the agencies of the government 
(such as the Forestry or Soil Conservation Service), but the Brethren Service Committee, 
the American Friends Service Committee, or the Mennonite Central Committee would 
administer the camps.  Under this plan, the government would pay for the facilities, and 
the churches would pay for administration and support.  This also gave the CO the choice 
to work for free or they could receive pay from the government, again at the military 
scale.  The final option was complete control by the Peace Churches, with additional 
agencies to be approved by the Director of Selective Service.  This part of the plan 
provided complete autonomous control over finance and administration for the churches.  
Furthermore, the Peace Churches already had locations in service ready as alternative 
service camps for COs.20 
However, from the point of view of the Selective Service, a number of questions 
remained.  One of the largest was who was responsible for financing.  The Peace Church 
plan called for dual control, but that did not necessarily assure civilian control if there 
was government money involved.  There were other questions, such as the legality of the 
                                                 
20French Diary, November 14, 1940; and Memorandum from National Council 
for Religious Conscientious Objectors to Selective Service.  Printed in Conscientious 
Objection, 162. 
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entire plan, what specific types of work would be done, where the programs would be 
located, how many COs would perform alternative service, how the local boards would 
report those filing for CO status to National Headquarters of the Selective Service, what 
their status would be after one year, and the possibility of parole to civilian service camps 
for those incarcerated for draft law violations.21 
A letter from Hershey to French on November 28 reflected these many 
uncertainties. “In line with our conversation of recent date,” he wrote, “it appears that it is 
not possible at this time to make any definite statements regarding the final plans for a 
program of work of national importance to which conscientious objectors may be 
assigned.”  Hershey spoke for all of the Selective Service when he outlined some of their 
thoughts on the types of camps, which were not altogether different from those of the 
Peace Churches.  They considered four types of camps: camps run completely by the 
government, camps working for government agencies but financed and administered by 
“some religious or private agency,” camps financed and administered completely by 
religious groups, and camps run by state and local governments.  However, Hershey 
reiterated that all of these ideas were tentative and subject to government approval, just as 
were the proposals of the Peace Churches.22 
By early December 1940, there was finally some consensus within the Selective 
Service on some matters.  Those involved decided that it was time for President 
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22Lewis B. Hershey to Paul French, November 28, 1940, Center for Conscience 
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Roosevelt to firmly define “work of national importance.”  They also urged that authority 
over an alternative service program needed to be in the hands of the Director of the 
Selective Service.  Furthermore, the Selective Service wanted the Director to coordinate 
the efforts of the various entities to secure funding, issue regulations and steer the 
direction of the programs, and establish administration for alternative service.23  
By late November, at the same time the Selective Service was beginning to come 
to a consensus on the matters mentioned above, the Historic Peace Churches and the 
Selective Service were ready to submit a program for alternative service to President 
Roosevelt.  This was the point at which alternative service hit a major roadblock.  
Roosevelt rejected the plan during a meeting with Dykstra on November 29.  Roosevelt 
was quite vehement in his opposition to the proposal.  Dykstra told French that the 
president had “expressed instant and aggressive opposition to the plan.”  Roosevelt 
believed that working in soil conservation in the CCC was “too easy for them.”  
Furthermore, he believed that COs needed to be drilled by a military officer, apparently 
having learned nothing from the embarrassments of the First World War.24  Dykstra knew 
that an alternative service program needed to go in a different direction.  He began to 
discuss matters with one of Roosevelt’s personal assistants, Lowell Mellett, and changed 
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some of the particulars of the alternative service plan.  In a December 5th meeting with 
officers of the Selective Service, Mellett, and members of the Peace Churches, Dykstra 
asked if the Peace Churches were willing to pay for CPS.  As it stood, Dykstra did not 
think they could get government funds without going through Congress and that probably 
meant there would be no service under Peace Church administration.  Furthermore, 
Roosevelt’s opposition to the initial plans meant that paying men in CPS was out of the 
question.  Therefore, the Peace Churches decided that if there was to be an alternative 
service plan under them, they would have to pay for it.  They decided the Peace Churches 
would assume financial responsibility until the end of the Federal Government’s fiscal 
year, but only on a trial basis.25 
Roosevelt’s view here is both intriguing and perplexing.  On one hand, he was a 
religious man whose views shaped his actions towards the poor and he had a concern for 
humanity.  On the other, he had somewhat of a military background with his cabinet post 
during the First World War. That being said, Roosevelt’s role in conscientious objection 
was a small one at best, and his significance was more as a delegator than as an active 
participant.  His eventual appointment of General Hershey as the supreme figure in all 
CO matters was of profound significance.  In certain instances on the matter of 
conscientious objection (such as his rejection of the initial plan), Roosevelt made his 
voice heard.  His background was definitely not one that was sympathetic to 
conscientious objection.  Roosevelt was born into a life of extreme wealth and privilege 
and gained his education at the some of the best American schools: Groton boarding 
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school, Harvard, and Columbia Law.  Roosevelt was a lifelong politician, beginning with 
his election to the New York state senate in 1911.  He had something of a military 
background with his position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, 
during the Woodrow Wilson presidency.  Though he lost the 1920 election as vice 
president under James M. Cox, he had a bright future in front of him until poliomyelitis 
or Guillian-Barré syndrome (sources differ) paralyzed him from the waist down.  
Undeterred, Roosevelt won the election for governor of New York in 1928.  Once the 
economic abyss of the Great Depression set in, the popularity of President Herbert 
Hoover plummeted, and Roosevelt won the election of 1932 in a landslide.  Until the 
years of World War II, Roosevelt’s name was synonymous with attempted economic 
recovery in the form of the New Deal.26 
 Though a man of wealth and privilege, Roosevelt possessed a distinct sense of 
compassion for those less fortunate.  It is in his personal beliefs that a few glimmers of 
Roosevelt’s conceptualization of conscientious objection appear.  Roosevelt was a 
religious man.  In the words of one author, “… he held religion – his own and that of 
others – to be a highly personal and sacred matter.  People around him of all faiths (and 
of none) were impressed by his religious sincerity and simplicity.”27  His belief in 
Christianity and the teachings of Jesus Christ influenced his concern for humanity, and he 
saw problems in the government and society as problems of morality.  He had a particular 
                                                 
26Jean Edward Smith, FDR (New York: Random House, 2007), 19-29, 47, 92-95, 
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27Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of 
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disdain for interdenominational and sectarian disagreements on religion.  For him, “It 
[was] between belief and unbelief.”28 
Yet his actions when presented a plan for alternative service do not really reflect 
that religious sincerity.  There is little scholarship on Roosevelt’s views toward 
conscientious objection.  The most recent biography of FDR by Jean Edward Smith does 
not mention the issue at all.  David Kennedy briefly mentions conscientious objectors in 
his landmark work Freedom From Fear, but again, there is no discussion of Roosevelt’s 
views on the issue.  Though Roosevelt was a religious man and professed a belief in the 
teachings of Jesus Christ, that belief did not progress into a true sympathetic attitude or a 
blanket deferment for COs.   According to Keim, Roosevelt’s attitude towards the matter 
was “prickly.”29 
On December 19, Roosevelt agreed to allow for the alternative service plan, with 
NSBRO and the Peace Churches responsible for administration and finance for the 
camps.  On December 28, NSBRO decided to call the program Civilian Public Service.30  
Once Historic Peace Churches and the Selective Service worked out CPS’s particulars, 
Roosevelt officially approved the program with an executive order on February 6, 1941.  
The order placed the power for establishing alternative service in the hands of the 
Director of Selective Service.31  Once Hershey became the Director of Selective Service, 
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his authority was usually the determining factor for resolving issues.  Roosevelt’s 
executive order of February 6 firmly established this power.  It read, 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940 (Pub. No. 783, 76th Cong.), it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. The Director of Selective Service, hereinafter called the Director, is 
authorized to establish, designate, or determine work of national importance 
under civilian direction to which may be assigned personas found under 
section 5(g) of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 to be 
conscientiously opposed to participation in combatant and noncombatant 
training and service in the land and naval forces of the United States. 
2. The Director shall make the necessary assignments to such work, shall 
determine the agencies, organizations, or individuals that may provide civilian 
direction thereof, and shall have general supervision and control over such 
work. 
3. To the extent that he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
order, the Director may utilize the services of the Departments, officers, and 
agents of the United States: accept the services of officers and agents of the 
several states, territories, and the District of Columbia, and the subdivisions 
thereof; and accept voluntary services of private organizations and 
individuals; and may obtain, by purchase, loan or gift, equipments and 
supplies from Federal and other public agencies and private organizations and 
individuals, with or without advertising or formal contract. 
4. The Director is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this order.32 
Roosevelt’s manner of leadership was one of delegation, and this order was no exception.  
Now, all matters of conscientious objection came to the desk of the Director of the 
Selective Service.  The director could decide on the matter or delegate the decision to 
some other agency, depending on his own interpretation.  Thus, once Hershey assumed 
the director’s position later that summer, he had the explicit authority to determine the 
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course of conscientious objection.33  So it was that the beliefs and philosophy of Lewis 
Hershey came to shape conscientious objection in World War II and establish precedents 
that influenced the rest of the twentieth century. 
 In late January, just a couple of weeks prior to Roosevelt’s executive order, 
Hershey, Dykstra, and French went to Philadelphia for a dinner meeting with other 
Quaker leaders hoping to discuss CPS.  On the train back to Washington, a revealing 
discussion developed between Hershey, French, and Dykstra.  Hershey’s Army War 
College thesis covered fear as a factor in leadership, and he began to discuss a report he 
had prepared for the General Staff concerning how fear affects soldiers.  According to 
French,  
[Hershey] had developed the fact that human beings are incapable for a long 
period of time of participating in modern warfare without cracking their nervous 
systems.  His study finished with the suggestion that the real solution of the 
problem of fear in soldiers was to end war.  It was a perfectly fascinating point of 
view from an Army officer. 
Hershey felt that if modern war was continued the result would be that only 
morons would survive and that all persons of intelligence would rapidly and 
quietly go insane.34 
 Dykstra was so enamored of Hershey’s arguments that he raptly listened to Hershey the 
entire trip back.35  This is an excellent example of Hershey’s complexities as a military 
officer.  He despised war but championed service.  He believed in the universal duty for 
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35Ibid.  
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all eligible men to serve, but strongly defended their right to object.  He was a 
complicated man with a well-reasoned view of the world around him. 
 It was March 1941 before the Selective Service formally declared that there were 
five camps ready for “immediate use.”  That did not translate into immediate action, nor 
finalized organization, though.  They still had to work out projects for conscientious 
objectors in the camps.  In a meeting with French, Hershey reiterated that the Peace 
Churches needed to take the initiative in looking for projects that interested them and 
submit them to the Selective Service for approval.  He reminded French that the director 
(Dykstra) had ultimate authority, but Hershey instructed the Manpower Division to work 
with NSBRO on the issue.  He also wished to be flexible in searching for projects, not 
wanting to be bound to any one particular government agency.  He told French to keep 
looking for new projects, because if they did not, CPS men could be stuck working in soil 
conservation until 1945.  He also supported COs working in an urban setting, but he 
believed this had to be handled in a careful and deliberate manner so as not to rile public 
opinion against COs or the Selective Service.  Hershey also desired to appoint a man 
reporting to him on the operation of the individual camps.  Though Hershey hated 
inspections in the army (keeping in line with his distinct unmilitary bearing), and wanted 
to avoid that sort of activity with the COs in the camps, he believed that in a relationship 
requiring cooperation between the Selective Service and the Peace Churches, him needed 
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someone close to him to make sure the churches did not have any problems with the 
agencies for whom they worked.36 
 In April, a change occurred at the top of the Selective Service that remained in 
place for the next twenty-nine years.  Clarence Dysktra, fighting poor health and 
problems back at the University of Wisconsin, resigned as the Director of Selective 
Service, leaving Hershey as Acting Director once again.  Hershey served in that capacity 
until July 31, when Roosevelt accepted the obvious and made Hershey the Director of 
Selective Service.37  With Roosevelt’s executive order and Hershey’s official position as 
Director, Hershey’s ability to shape the direction of conscientious objection was law.  It 
remained so throughout the war. 
On May 8, Hershey made another pivotal decision by establishing the Camp 
Operations Division within Selective Service.  Camp Operations was responsible for all 
administrative and executive procurement for the alternative service camps.38  Although 
the churches were going to pay for the camps and essentially run them, it was only going 
to be through the oversight of the Selective Service.  To head the Camp Operations 
Division, Hershey chose one of his oldest friends from his National Guard days, Lewis 
Kosch.  Kosch had served with Hershey in Mexico, France, and they remained in contact 
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between the two wars.39  It was Hershey’s desire to have someone he trusted that brought 
Lewis Kosch to the head of the Camp Operations Division.  According to French, 
Hershey told him that  
he planned to bring a personal friend into Selective Service to act in this capacity 
for him and that he hoped that he and his new appointee could personally get to 
know each of the camp directors and camp staffs so there would be a common 
understanding by Selective Service of the program and an understanding by our 
directors of what limitations Selective Service labored under.  He expressed the 
hope that after he got to know the camp directors they would find out he didn’t 
have a tail and horns.40  
The ascendancy of Kosch to the head of Camp Operations in Selective Service proved to 
be a stressful experience for conscientious objectors.  Kosch eventually proved that he 
was not as sympathetic as Hershey, but he was not oppressive in he negotiations with 
NSBRO, either.  While Kosch may not have been the first choice of many in the Historic 
Peace Churches, by the end of the war, he proved to be a capable man in this 
administrative position.  
Aside from his desire to enlist an old army buddy in a position of authority, 
Hershey also displayed a well-reasoned understanding of the new direction the military, 
the government, and religious groups were heading with the establishment of Civilian 
Public Service.  He thought the Peace Churches and the Selective Service should work 
closely together “because we were both stepping out in a new path and we would need 
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each other,” according to French.  Hershey believed that more government control could 
benefit the camps, as it might be possible for the government to procure items quicker 
than the Peace Churches.  French expressed the emerging sentiment throughout the Peace 
Churches towards Hershey’s efforts regarding conscientious objection when he wrote, 
“His whole attitude at this point was excellent and I think we have nothing to fear here.”41 
 There were still problems getting men into the CPS camps in April.  Speaking for 
the Peace Churches through NSBRO, French suggested to Hershey that the churches 
were willing to assume the responsibility of “day-by-day discussions with the various 
technical agencies of the government in regard to work programs and with the army 
people on inspections and equipment,” hoping to expedite the process.  French made it 
clear they were not criticizing Camp Operations, but the churches believed they could do 
a better job.42  Hershey’s replied that Camp Operations appreciated any help that the 
churches offered, but he and the Selective Service wanted Camp Operations to serve as 
the main liaison among COs, the Peace Churches, NSBRO, and the various government 
agencies under whom the projects occurred.43  One can see that some of the stresses 
between the Peace Churches and the Selective Service, particularly Camp Operations, 
began to bloom, however slightly, in the spring of 1941. 
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The first CPS men reported to camp in Patapsco State Park, Maryland, on May 
15, 1941.   There were fifty men representing fifteen different denominations.  COs who 
reported to Patapsco faced a large contingent of reporters and other officials.  In the 
public comments he made for the opening, Hershey described CPS as more than just a 
simple alternative service program and he sincerely hoped it would be successful.   
It is an experiment, an experiment such as no nation has ever made before.  
Through these camps for conscientious objectors we are going to find out whether 
our democracy is big enough to preserve minority rights in a time of national 
emergency.  I don’t know whether the experiment will work or not, but I hope and 
pray that it will.44   
Hershey’s comments again reflect his well-reasoned approach to the issue, recognizing 
the new concept of service to the government he, the Selective Service, and the Historic 
Peace Churches had developed. 
 There were still a number of questions confronting Hershey and the Selective 
Service as they chose the work projects and the camp sites during the rest of 1941.  
Selective projects for alternative service was a much more complex decision than simply 
selecting a form of work that fit the definition of “work of national importance.”  First, 
the project had to be important to the Federal Government, and it had to continue to be so 
through the foreseeable future.  Second, the COs had to be willing to do the work, which 
could not conflict with the CO stance.  Another criterion, and one that reflects the role of 
public opinion, was whether or not civilians near the camps would tolerate COs.  It was 
possible that local civilians could hassle the COs to the point that the projects in a given 
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camp would fizzle.  Furthermore, the Selective Service wanted to avoid displacing any 
established labor and did not want to arouse any “political controversy.”  For those 
reasons, the Selective Service limited the first camps to those under the Department of 
Agriculture’s Forest Service and Soil Conservation Service, along with the Department of 
the Interior’s National Park Service.45 
 Working with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior 
showed great foresight, at least in the early stages.  At this time, NSBRO saw the 
programs in the camps important, though that stance eventually changed.  Also, both 
agencies (Agriculture and Interior) had experts in positions of authority, and that made 
the transition for COs into the camps somewhat smoother.  Plus those two agencies were 
willing to use CO labor, a fact not lost on the Selective Service.  That willingness proved 
to be helpful because, as Hershey later said when discussing the creation of CPS, “We 
went begging to find places to put them.”46 
 CO registration for the draft was the same as for those who did not object; it was 
only when appearing in front of the local board that things changed a bit.  A man wishing 
to claim conscientious objector status filled out DSS Form 47, which outlined his 
background, education, and beliefs concerning peace, violence, and the use of force.  The 
board then made its decision to classify the man according to the criteria.  A man willing 
to serve in the military but not carry weapons received a I-A-O classification, while a 
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man unwilling to serve in the military received a IV-E classification and went in to 
Civilian Public Service.  The local board could classify a man fit available for military 
service if it found the objector to be insincere or possessing a renunciation of war based 
on secular reasoning.  Though the board’s decision was usually final, there was an appeal 
process in place through the Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice held a 
hearing on the objector’s sincerity, which became the basis for a recommendation to an 
appeal board.  The decision of the appeal board was the final word on a man’s 
classification.  Though the objector’s appeal had to go through the Department of Justice, 
the appeal board was not bound by its recommendations.  Through December 7, 1941, 
there were 1,960 appeals, of which 206 received a IV-E classification, 93 were I-A-O, 
and 240 cases were rejected.  The rest of the appeals did not meet the Department of 
Justice criteria because the objectors had not yet received their local board classification.  
Of all of the reclassifications, the appeal board did not concur with the Department of 
Justice in only 48 cases.  The Selective Service structured an appeal process in this 
manner because there was a belief that local boards might be somewhat unsympathetic 
toward conscientious objectors.47 
 As director, Hershey wanted all the appeal cases sent to NSBRO to be referred to 
him.  He was not able to read all of them (that job fell to one of his assistant directors, 
Colonel John Langston), but he did read a fair amount.  He sometimes would override the 
decision of his appeal board, but mostly he wanted to form a general idea of what was 
happening in the appeals process.  He even said he was willing to review personally all 
                                                 
47Selective Service in Peacetime, 194-195.  
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appeal cases turned down by a hearing officer in New York when there were concerns 
over that officer’s fairness.  He also made it clear that there were no absolutes in 
classifying conscientious objectors.  There was no way to satisfy everyone, and 
sometimes an objector received an incorrect classification (such as a sincere objector 
receiving no I-A-O or IV-E classification).  As French presented Hershey’s attitude on 
the subject in a NSBRO bulletin, “He [Hershey] pointed out, however, that we must 
realize that while we are all seeking absolute justice we are likely to fall short of the goal, 
as no judicial system has yet been devised to assure complete justice in every case.”  
French pointed out to his constituents, though, that Hershey was making a strong effort to 
be as fair as possible and uphold the legal provisions for conscientious objectors.48  
Hershey’s approach on this matter reflects his pragmatic attitude towards the CPS 
experiment.  There was no way that the program was going to be perfect, and he sought 
to provide for COs in the best way that he saw possible.  However, he also recognized 
that there were limitations to the system. 
Some trepidation existed within the Selective Service over extending the privilege 
of conscience to individuals from other religions and denominations besides the Historic 
Peace Churches, largely because of the pressure this put on the local draft boards.  For 
example, draft boards with veterans or members who did not fully understand the stance 
of the Peace Churches may not have been sympathetic. From Hershey’s point of view, 
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though, “…the Selective Service [did] a fair, conscientious, and understanding job with 
the conscientious objectors.” 49  Eventually, some unhappy objectors or Peace Church 
administrators came to say that the Selective Service was not “fair, conscientious, and 
understanding,” but there are two problems with that point of view.  First, Hershey did 
the best he could in helping to shape a much more liberal policy towards conscientious 
objectors.  There was almost no precedent for alternative service, and Civilian Public 
Service represented the best compromise possible at the time.  Second, the situation could 
have been much worse, particularly if the Director of the Selective Service had been 
someone with little tolerance for religious liberty or conscientious objection (such as 
General Leonard Wood during the First World War). 
The length of service in CPS was initially one year, exactly the same as for those 
men drafted into the armed services.  When Congress extended the term of service to 
eighteen months, the length of service for CPS men grew to eighteen months as well, 
though, just like the armed forces, the government released men over the age of twenty-
eight.50  Any CPS man discharged after the age of twenty-eight remained in a reserve to 
be recalled if the same thing happened in the military.51  Therefore, the terms of service in 
CPS mirrored those in the armed forces.  This was truly service to one’s country in an 
alternative matter just as Lewis Hershey had envisioned.  He saw a parallel between those 
                                                 
49Selective Service in Peacetime, 193-194.  
50Ibid., 200.  
51National Service Board for Religious Objectors, “Bulletin #114,” October 17, 
1941, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA.  
 167 
serving in the CPS camps and the draftees in military uniform.  To him, they were to be 
treated similarly, whether armed or unarmed.52 
It needs to be remembered that throughout 1941, the Peace Churches, Hershey, 
and the Selective Service still thought of CPS as an experimental program.  As such, 
there was the possibility of going in a different direction.  However, Hershey truly 
wanted CPS to work, had said as much publicly, and his desire for success to NSBRO as 
well.53  The government’s treatment of COs during the First World War was also on his 
mind during this formative time.  Hershey’s ideas on the subject came out in public 
statements, personal letters, and in his meetings (both formal and informal).  For 
example, he, Kosch, and French traveled to Lancaster, Pennsylvania in August to meet 
with a local Amish leader.  After a meal at the man’s house, Hershey sat on the back 
fence and mused on the problems of conscience and service for two hours.  After the 
meeting, Hershey and those accompanying him met with three Lancaster County draft 
boards.  Hershey explained to the board members that he wanted to make sure that the 
matters of conscience were being dealt with in an intelligent and discrete matter to avoid 
the problems of World War I.54   
Negative public reactions from certain quarters were also a concern for Hershey.  
Hershey said at a CPS conference at Winona Lake, Indiana in early September that a 
majority of Americans supported the idea of alternative service but that ninety-eight 
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percent probably did not agree with the stance of the Peace Churches.  He said there was 
no way of knowing if support for CPS would last, especially given public opinion.  He 
believed that the CPS projects needed to be carefully thought out to avoid arousing 
negative publicity.  However, he reiterated that he thoroughly believed in the mission of 
CPS and those administering it.55  This was not the only occasion Hershey spoke on 
public opinion as he gently reminded the Quakers that they could expect tolerance, but 
not understanding from the American public.56 
By October of 1941, it appeared that the experiment in alternative service was not 
working as planned.  To the Selective Service, the biggest problem was the lack of 
discipline and order in the camps.57  A distinct lack of regulation and organization in the 
Quaker camps troubled Kosch, who had been traveling to various camps to observe.  The 
issue troubled Hershey, too, but Kosch was quite concerned.  However, Kosch also 
tended to be much more reactionary and intemperate compared to Hershey’s calm and 
pragmatic demeanor.  Kosch’s response to the situation was to threaten to take complete 
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not limited to the Quaker camps, but Hershey and Kosch did express a fair amount of 
frustration toward the AFSC in this regard.  Some of what the Selective Service 
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Hershey (and the law) was clear about the religious dimensions of objection, some 
secular objectors slipped through the system and many of them caused a fair amount of 
trouble in the camps.  See Sibley and Jacob, 271-278 and Conscientious Objection, 233, 
235. 
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control of the Quaker camps in a month to six weeks.  Hershey agreed something needed 
to be done, but he was not as threatening and appeared much calmer than Kosch.  French 
and Clarence Pickett, though, agreed to make some administrative changes to improve 
camp cleanliness and the punctuality of work details (with some help from Hershey when 
he met with other Quaker leaders along with French on November 5). 58  Though the issue 
did not appear again in 1941, the discipline in the Friends’ camps was an issue at times 
throughout the rest of the war. 
One of the major disagreements between the Historic Peace Churches and the 
Selective Service during the years of CPS was the confusing issue of administration.  
Many Peace Church representatives did not care for what they perceived as an increasing 
dictatorial relationship from the Selective Service.  This issue became a flash point during 
the latter part of 1943, but one sees examples of it beginning to emerge in the early days 
of CPS.  For example, during a trip to inspect a CPS camp in Indiana with Thomas Jones, 
the first director of Friends Civilian Public Service, Kosch listened to Jones muse about 
the vision he had for the future of CPS.  According to Jones, Kosch became increasingly 
irritated and finally exclaimed, “Who in the hell do you think you are?  Don’t you know 
that I am in charge of these camps under Selective Service?”  Jones replied that he did 
not realize that and he thought the Peace Churches were free to administer CPS as they 
chose.  Kosch laughed and said, “My dear man, the draft is under the United States 
Government operation.  Conscientious objectors are draftees just as soldiers are.  Their 
activities are responsible to the Government.  The peace churches are only camp 
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managers.  Do you understand that?”59  Though Hershey believed similarly as Kosch, that 
CPS was under Selective Service jurisdiction, he likely would have been much more 
diplomatic in his language.  That said, these misunderstandings would lead to more 
heated negotiations later during the war. 
By the late fall of 1941, Hershey was growing increasingly unhappy with Kosch 
as the Director of Camp Operations.  He did not think the program was working as well 
as it could be, and he toyed with the idea of making some changes in the Camp 
Operations division of Selective Service.  Hershey sought input from French on replacing 
Kosch and another officer with French himself.  French disagreed, thinking it might be 
better to have a military man like Kosch in the position because he could be “our best 
defense when emotionalism and hysteria develop….”  Though no changes were made at 
that point in time (Kosch remained Director of Camp Operations for the rest of the war), 
Hershey had made it clear to French that he was willing to replace Kosch if it would help 
the administration of CPS.60  Though Hershey sometimes succumbed to cronyism, he was 
not above making a change if it became necessary.  This incident also shows Hershey’s 
respect for the Peace Churches, since he was willing to appoint a Quaker, and 
Washington representative for all COs, to a post directly by his side as the Director of 
Camp Operations. 
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In September, the Peace Churches decided to extend the experimental CPS 
program to January 1, 1942 as long as Selective Service agreed to take over payment for 
the improvement of camps.  The churches were also willing to extend the program even 
longer, possibly to 1943 or 1944, if the government extended funding further and 
permitted more options for alternative service, such as work in mental hospitals, on 
farms, and overseas relief and rehabilitation efforts in Mexico, South America, Great 
Britain, and China.61 
In late November, the Peace Churches officially decided to extend the program to 
at least 1943.  Clarence Pickett of the Society of Friends, M. R. Zigler of the Brethren, 
Orie Miller of the Mennonites, and French met with Hershey on November 26, informing 
him of the Peace Churches’ decision. 62  Hershey accepted the suggestions of the Peace 
Churches for extending the program and agreed to pay for “maintenance and repair of 
camps with the exception of camps owned or leased by church organizations.”  He also 
said the government would pay for shipping and handling of CPS camp orders and that 
the Selective Service was willing to examine new projects.  Hershey was adamant, 
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though, that this was not a “blanket approval to any projects other than those 
established.”63 
The final few months of 1940 and all of 1941 were crucial years for the 
development and direction of conscientious objection under the Selective Service and 
Training Act of 1940.  These years saw the creation of the National Service Board for 
Religious Objectors, Civilian Public Service, and the Camp Operations Division in the 
Selective Service, and General Lewis B. Hershey was involved in all of it.  He was the 
most public figure on the issue from the federal government and was a staunch supporter 
of CPS both publicly and privately during these years.  Though there were a few months 
with Clarence Dykstra serving as Director of Selective Service, Hershey was still the 
most important individual in the institution.  He was the expert and had infinitely more 
experience and knowledge than Dykstra could ever hope to have.  Clearly, Hershey, 
serving as the Acting Director, Deputy Director, then Director of Selective Service, did 
much during the crucial years of 1940-1941 in helping to develop, administer, and shape 
the direction of conscientious objection and alternative service during World War II.  
Guided by his belief in religious liberty and the duty of service, he began to build a 
program that reflected those values. 
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CHAPTER 7 – HERSHEY AND CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE TIME OF 
WAR, 1941 – 1944 
 
The Japanese Navy’s surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7 shocked 
millions in the United States and thrust the nation firmly into the war as a combatant.  
The attack on Pearl Harbor shifted the focus of Hershey and the Selective Service from 
drafting men for training to drafting men for fighting a war.  In terms of conscientious 
objection, little changed in practical terms beyond a minor modification in Hershey’s 
attitude towards overseas service and an increase in the number of men assigned to CPS 
camps.  What changed in a larger sense was that Civilian Public Service was now the 
alternative service program for a nation at war, rather than a nation enacting peacetime 
conscription.  In the years that followed, COs served in mental hospitals, worked on 
farms, labored on sanitation projects in the American South, and volunteered as scientific 
test subjects.  As with the creation of Civilian Public Service, Hershey’s role in 
conscientious objection and alternative service during direct U.S. involvement in World 
War II was pivotal.  The most obvious impact he had was in the power of approval for 
any change or special project desired by the Peace Churches.  During the war years, 
Hershey’s beliefs, attitudes, and actions again came to light when shaping alternative 
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service, particularly concerning major policy changes and his relationship with the Peace 
Churches.  Furthermore, it was during this time that certain Peace Church representatives 
expressed their gratitude to Hershey.  Though tensions emerged later in the war, the a 
genuine appreciation of Hershey’s efforts marked the early days. 
An explanatory note about this chapter is necessary.  The discourse that follows of 
Hershey’s role in securing farm labor projects, mental hospital units, and the overall 
relationship of Hershey to the Historic Peace Churches and NSBRO.  CPS was a much 
larger program than just forestry, soil conservation, farms, and mental health.  That said, 
Hershey’s role in the daily administration and specific development of some of the 
smaller projects was minimal.  For example, the Guinea Pig Units, which involved men 
volunteering as test subjects for scientific projects was one of the more famous parts of 
CPS.  However, aside from Hershey’s final approval, little evidence appears that suggests 
Hershey helped to shape the specifics of the program.  In comparison, Hershey’s actions 
played a significant role in shaping the direction of the farm labor projects.  Therefore, 
the agricultural efforts of COs and Hershey’s role in shaping the program are pertinent 
while the Guinea Pig Units are not.  A different dynamic holds true for the CPS Training 
Corps, a proposed effort by the Peace Churches to implement training for assignees 
hoping to engage in relief and rehabilitation of the war-ravaged areas.  Hershey played a 
significant role in developing the CPS Training Corps, but much of the story of that 
particular program involves Congress, so its discussion appears in the next chapter 
dealing with Hershey, Congress, and alternative service. 
Pearl Harbor had only a limited effect on Hershey’s work.  If anything, Hershey 
seemed to become even more supportive of COs.  Hershey was adamant that both he and 
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Kosch would continue to defend the rights of COs, even if it brought criticism.  Hershey 
would remain on their side in the grand scheme of things, though he foresaw there might 
be pressures exerted on him by others.  For instance, the patriotic fervor that arose in 
response to Pearl Harbor made retributions upon conscientious objectors entirely 
possible.  If anything, Pearl Harbor made Hershey more accommodating toward COs, at 
least in the early stages.1 
One result of Pearl Harbor was that Hershey became more supportive of the idea 
of sending COs overseas to aid relief efforts in Britain and China.  Hershey seemed to 
like the idea of overseas relief efforts from conscientious objectors, but he had hesitated 
because of his uncertainties over the legality of sending men under government 
supervision to nations embroiled in war when the United States was officially neutral.  
Now that the United States was a belligerent, his reservations melted.  That said, his 
influence there was limited, as he left the matter to the state agencies to determine 
whether or not to allow the assignees to go overseas.  But Hershey was agreeable to the 
idea and made it known to the Peace Churches.2 
The largest change for Hershey and the Selective Service was the increase in draft 
calls and inductions.  The United States’ active participation in the war meant that the 
military was going to expand.  Likewise, CPS was going to expand as well.  Hershey told 
the Peace Churches that they could expect an increase of one thousand to twelve hundred 
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2French Diary, November 26 and December 11, 1941.  
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men in camps by June 1942, a direct result of the increase in draft calls he expected by 
that time.3  Hershey instructed all of the draft boards that war meant deferments for 
industry, agriculture, or any other vital trade must be reexamined and that men might 
need to be reclassified.4   
 Another change for Hershey and the Selective Service was heightened concern 
about public opinion towards conscientious objection and Civilian Public Service.  One 
of Hershey’s goals was to make the experience and sacrifice as equitable as possible 
between the CPS assignees and men drafted into the armed services.  By late January 
1942, there was some vexation within Selective Service over some of the privileges the 
men in CPS camps enjoyed.  Kosch, speaking to the Peace Churches at a meeting in 
which Hershey was present, told French and the Executive Camp Directors that Pearl 
Harbor had definitely changed public opinion.  There were negative feelings towards 
COs and CPS because the assignees had more weekend furloughs and they were allowed 
personal vehicles in camp. Kosch suggested that the churches needed to try and limit 
these practices so as not to arouse public ire.  Kosch made it clear to the Peace Churches 
that the two sides (the Peace Churches and the Selective Service) approached the 
situation from different positions.  In French’s words, “At one point [Kosch] said we 
were seeking to preserve a philosophy of life, and he was attempting to do a difficult job 
which has been assigned to him.”  However, Kosch was adamant that although there was 
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pressure on Hershey from certain quarters to change things, Hershey’s commitment to 
protect conscientious objectors was not wavering.5  
The CPS experience in World War II was a tale of an expanding program.  What 
began as an alternative service model based on the Civilian Conservation Corps in soil 
conservation and forestry units expanded to include a vast array of projects ranging from 
COs laboring in agriculture to working as mental hospital attendants and serving as 
scientific test subjects.  As with other issues involving conscientious objection and 
alternative service, Hershey’s importance to the development of new projects was 
undeniable.  While Lewis Kosch handled most of the day-to-day activities and 
negotiations between the Peace Churches and the Selective Service, Hershey’s vision was 
the ultimate trump card.  If something was not up to Hershey’s standard, it did not get 
approved.  Kosch’s role is significant in this part of the story as well.  Because Hershey 
appointed Kosch, anything done by Kosch ultimately reflected on Hershey.  In their early 
negotiations, members of the Peace Churches, particularly Paul French, had admired 
Kosch, though it was pale in comparison to their appreciation of Hershey.   
The prospect of CPS branching into other areas of service began to be discussed 
at least as early as September 1941, well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  On 
November 18, 1941, at a meeting of CPS’ Executive Camp Directors in Hershey, 
Pennsylvania, the executives decided that any special projects should fall under the 
jurisdiction of NSBRO for administration, selecting assignees, and seeking project 
approval from the Selective Service.  They also determined French was to be responsible 
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for appointing the directors of the projects.  The next day, French met with Kosch to 
discuss service outside the realm of the camps, and Kosch liked the idea as long as the 
nearest CPS camp served as the central base of operations.  Kosch talked of this plan as 
though he was the driving force behind it, though French brought the matter to his 
attention about two months prior to their meeting.6 
There were numerous programs set up under the auspices of Civilian Public 
Service.  A number of authors have recently cited the significance of conscientious 
objectors in changing the way American mental hospitals operated and how the Guinea 
Pig Units provided scientists and doctors with knowledge for improving the quality of 
life in the United States.7  It is not the purpose of this work to go into exact detail of each 
program and flesh out the creation of it.  Instead, the projects that best illustrate the 
influence of General Hershey will be examined. 
One of the projects in which Hershey played a distinct role in creating was the 
farm labor project.   There were a number of reasons that the Selective Service and 
Hershey considered farm labor to be a legitimate means of satisfying the “national 
importance” clause for alternative service.  In terms of the legality and feasibility of the 
programs, there was minor precedent for farm labor.  During World War I, some COs had 
received furloughs to work on farms.  The Selective Service also believed that the rural 
background of many of the COs provided an opportunity for experienced men to work in 
a project for which they already possessed the proper training.  Furthermore, there was a 
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distinct desire among the COs in the camps to do something more meaningful than 
digging irrigation ditches or maintaining the timber in national parks.8 
The most effective impetus, beyond a desire to look for other projects than just 
the forestry or soil conservation camps, was the distinct farm labor shortage that had 
emerged by the fall of 1941.  One of the earliest remedies to the shortage tried by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture was CO labor.9  Hershey was fully cognizant of the farm 
labor shortage.  His first response was to tell local draft boards that they needed to be 
careful in drafting farm laborers into the armed forces.  He argued that modern 
agriculture required much more specialization and mechanical knowledge than in the 
past, which could only be gained through years of experience on the farm.  Another 
reason for the shortage, Hershey reasoned, was that industrial jobs in the cities paid better 
and offered shorter hours than life on the farm.10  The farm labor shortage created a 
window for more work of national importance for the conscientious objector. 
Hershey discussed farm labor as a form of alternative service with French about 
one month after French’s initial meeting with Kosch on the subject of detached programs.  
Delegating some of his authority, Hershey told French that NSBRO should discuss the 
matter with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), making sure to keep 
Kosch informed.  On January 3, 1942, French proposed to Kosch fully separate 
agricultural units of COs, though small, for maintaining dairy cattle to aid in European 
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relief after the war.  For the interim, the milk produced from these dairy units would 
instead go underprivileged schoolchildren so as not to directly compete with local dairy 
farmers.  Kosch, however, was lukewarm to the idea.  He preferred an individual 
furlough for each CO, keeping the men tied to their camp administration.  He did agree 
with French, though, that farm labor might present a public relations problem if COs 
gained a monetary profit from their work.11 
The meetings that followed involved the Selective Service, NSBRO, the United 
States Employment Service (USES), and the USDA.  Points of discussion included 
prioritizing the areas that suffered from the most distinct labor shortages, outlining how 
men in CPS would be chosen for service in farm labor, the mechanics of supervision, 
method of payment, or if COs were to be paid at all.12  From these discussions, four 
distinct plans emerged.  First, if a shortage became bad enough in a particular area within 
fifteen miles of a CPS camp, men could work on that farm, but they would remain under 
the control of their particular camp.  This was to be done only as a last resort to solve 
local labor shortages.  Second, men could be sent to work on dairy farms approved by the 
USDA and the Employment Service.  Third, men could also conduct dairy testing (testing 
and recording the quality of milk at dairies) in areas where the labor shortages directly 
caused the cessation of testing programs.  Finally, men could also work at agricultural 
                                                 
11French Diary, January 3, 1942.  
12Selective Service in Wartime: Second Report of the Director of Selective 
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experiment stations and agricultural colleges were labor shortages were disrupting food 
production.13 
A few days later, French and Kosch met with executives from Agriculture 
Defense Relations, a part of USES.  An agreement emerged from this meeting for an 
experimental farm service program for COs, with the USDA and the USES identifying 
the counties most in need of agricultural labor.   The next day, the executives of NSBRO 
agreed to conduct the farm labor program as a service detached from the forestry and soil 
conservation camps.  The men were to receive no pay beyond their basic expenses, and 
the leftover money was to go into a separate fund.  The other executives also instructed 
French to draw up a memo for Hershey that outlined their plans. Kosch liked this idea, 
but the money issue made him uneasy, so he wanted to wait to discuss the matter 
privately with Hershey.  On January 27, Kosch told French to move forward on the farm 
labor program unless significant public relations problems emerged. 14 
Throughout the negotiations, though, there were bureaucratic problems with the 
USDA and the USES.  To French, it seemed as though the USDA and the USES were 
more concerned with why the program would not work rather than looking for solutions 
to use COs on American farms.  On February 6, a meeting between the USDA, USES, 
French, and Kosch degenerated into a stalemate.  French finally had enough and 
suggested that they take the matter directly to Hershey.  The meeting moved to Hershey’s 
office, where the USDA and USES representatives laid out their objections to the 
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NSBRO and Selective Service proposal, including the contentious issue of pay for the 
COs.  French maintained that if “…we forget the lawyers for a few minutes…we would 
probably be underway in a week.”  Hershey simply asked Kosch if he wanted to cut 
through the red tape.  When Kosch answered in the affirmative, Hershey approved the 
plan, completely sidestepping the roadblocks of the USES and USDA.  Hershey also 
made it clear that he wanted the leftover funds to be administered by NSBRO, rather than 
another private agency such as the Red Cross.  French later wrote in his diary, “The more 
I see of Hershey, the more I am convinced that he is really a big man.”15 
The various entities involved reached an agreement in June for the first 
agricultural units in CPS, when the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. 
Employment Service, the Selective Service System, and NSBRO produced a memo 
outlining their plan for CO work in agriculture.  They explained, “Dairy farms have been 
selected because of the importance of dairy production for national welfare and the 
shortage of labor for these farms.”16  Lewis Hershey’s approval of the memorandum 
placed him at the forefront of CPS development.  This was the first step in taking COs 
out of the camps and placing them on farms, further defining “work of national 
importance” and, in turn, further defining what wartime service to the nation meant.  
                                                 
15French Diary, February 6, 1942.  
16“Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of 
Agriculture, the United States Employment Service, the Selective Service System, and 
the National Service Board for Religious Objectors Relative to the Assignment of 
Conscienitous Objectors to Farm Engaged in Vital Agricultural Production, General 
Hershey’s Staybacks, 1942, Box 3, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
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Now men objecting to military service could serve their nation in a time of war beyond 
laboring in conservation or forestry camps. 
This memorandum firmly established the farm program, and it served as the 
beginning of an important series of programs that grew extensively in 1943-1944.  The 
areas that saw the most growth were the dairy testing, experiment stations, and dairy farm 
labor.  After three months in a CPS camp, men could volunteer to serve in one of these 
detached units.17  
One of the most contentious issues to emerge out of the farm labor programs in 
CPS concerned wages.  COs received no pay for their labor.  Instead, the farmer paid the 
average rural wage of the county to NSBRO, who used the money to administer the farm 
labor program and provide a small subsistence stipend to the COs.  NSBRO then 
forwarded the remaining balance to the U.S. Treasury, where the Treasury set it aside in a 
special account not to be used for war programs.  As a further guard against war 
spending, the money, known as the CPS Frozen Fund, could not be touched until after the 
war. 18  A Memorandum of Understanding between the Peace Churches and the Selective 
Service specified that the money would be used for postwar relief efforts.   
In July 1942, Hershey wrote to the Comptroller General of the United States, 
Lindsay Warren, outlining plans for the CPS agriculture plans.  Warren noted that 
Hershey had the authority to approve these programs, but Warren did not support the 
                                                 
17Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns: Third Report of the Director of 
Selective Service, 1943-1944,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), 
184-185.  
18Conscientious Objection, 170; Selective Service in Wartime: Second Report of 
the Director of Selective Service, 1941-1942, 269; and Sibley and Jacob, 132.  
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plans for CO wages going to war rehabilitation.  Hershey then asked Warren if NSBRO 
could use the money for general CPS administration, but Warren replied that he believed 
the entire payment structure for farm labor had no legal basis.  The issue was never 
resolved.  Decades later, NSBRO had not seen any of the money from the Frozen Fund, 
the total value of which was about 1.4 million dollars in 1945.19 
Another problem within the camps was the refusal of some men work at assigned 
jobs that violated their conscience.  This problem irritated both Hershey and Kosch to no 
end.  Most of the problems came from the camps operated by the American Friends 
Service Committee, as those camps had the widest variety of denominations and COs 
questionable religious sincerity.  However, the problem was not confined to the Friends’ 
camps.  Camp discipline greatly affected Hershey’s attitudes toward alternative service 
during the war and will be explored later in this chapter. 
Another project area for CPS was in mental hospitals.  During the early part of 
1942, a number of requests from hospitals for CO labor arrived at the Selective Service.  
The requests came from general care hospitals, hospitals for the care of tuberculosis, and 
mental institutions.  Because of the wartime labor drain, the mental hospitals were 
severely short of labor. The labor shortage was so acute that many institutions dropped 
the level of patient care “to a custodial level,” though there were reductions in care 
                                                 
19Steve Nolt, "The CPS Frozen Fund: The Beginning of Peace-Time Interaction 
between Historic Peace Churches and the United States Government," The Mennonite 
Quarterly Review 67, no. 4 (April 1993): 203-205.  As of the publication of Nolt’s article 
in 1993, the issue of money from the World War II CO labor had not been resolved.  
Much of this article examines the efforts of the Historic Peace Churches and NSBRO 
(though the name changed a number of times) throughout the remainder of the twentieth 
century to rectify this problem.  
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beyond that point.  Thus began one of the most successful programs within Civilian 
Public Service, detached units in mental hospitals. Like the agricultural programs, there 
was a small precedent from the First World War, with COs working at a mental hospital 
in Virginia.  This was why the first mental hospital unit in World War II was in Virginia, 
according to Hershey’s 1943 report.  By 1943, there were seventeen mental hospitals in 
ten states using CO labor.  The men working in the hospitals assisted in the general care 
of patients or helped to maintain the facility or hospital grounds.  The COs provided a 
much needed solution to a severe labor shortage in these institutions. As Hershey’s 
second Selective Service report stated, “While the number of assignees available cannot 
begin to solve the problem of labor supply, they can be of considerable assistance.”20 
The hospital program was largely created in meetings between Paul French and 
Lewis Kosch.  However, as was the case in most other instances, Hershey’s influence is 
undeniable.  Hershey approved this program, but public opinion that emerged again as a 
thorn in the side of Hershey, Kosch, and Peace Churches.  Furthermore, there were 
instances of COs in hospitals refusing to work.  In early 1942, as plans were emerging to 
set the program in motion, interference from the American Legion threatened to prevent 
its implementation.  Kosch came away from meetings with veterans groups feeling that 
the hospital program might provoke a visceral public relations backlash.  In Elgin, Illinois 
(headquarters of the Church of the Brethren, no less), the American Legion publicly 
decried the use of conscientious objectors in mental hospitals.  Their interference 
prevented COs from using the state hospital at Elgin, but it did not subvert the entire 
                                                 
20Conscientious Objection, 169; Selective Service in Wartime: Second Report of 
the Director of Selective Service, 1941-1942, 269-270; and Sibley and Jacob, 134-135.  
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program.21  This would not be the last time the Selective Service had to deal with the 
American Legion’s anti-CO stance.  The issue emerged again in Congress, where some 
suggested that the provision for conscientious objection in the Selective Service Act be 
eliminated entirely.  That will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Hershey does not appear to have been involved as much in the mental hospital 
program as he was in the agricultural program, but he did play a part nonetheless.  Part of 
the reason for his lesser role was that the mental hospital units did not operate in 
conjunction with federal agencies the way that that agricultural programs did.  The 
Selective Service and NSBRO worked with state mental hospitals on a case-by-case basis 
to find places in need of CO labor.  Hershey fielded letters on the subject from hospital 
directors, city mayors, and other various officials.  There were definitely many 
opportunities to work in hospitals across the nation, but Hershey and his subordinates 
believed that the need in mental hospitals was the most acute.  As Hershey said to New 
York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia,  
It will thus be seen that the number of conscientious objectors required for such 
hospitals [state mental institutions] will preclude the consideration of other type 
institutions.  We have had hundreds of requests from various municipal, county 
and state hospitals, as well as those privately operated, but we have given all of 
them the same answer, namely, we feel that the need for labor in state mental 
institutions over-shadows their needs, serious as we admit them to be.22   
Therefore, in Hershey’s mind, the need for labor in mental hospitals was more pressing 
than in other areas of health care.  Hershey also made it clear to others that there was also 
                                                 
21French Diary, January 21, 27, 1942.  
22Lewis B. Hershey to Fiorello LaGuardia, November 21, 1942, General 
Hershey’s Staybacks, 1942, Box 1, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
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a limited supply of conscientious objectors, providing another reason for limiting their 
service to mental hospitals.23 
 Hershey wanted to avoid public relations problems, such as the Elgin hospital 
debacle, and this continued throughout the war.  Such was the case in New York.  When 
asked by Governor Thomas Dewey about conscientious objector labor in New York state 
mental hospitals, Hershey answered that Selective Service did set up experimental mental 
hospital units, but the public reaction in Utica caused them to reexamine the situation.  
Hershey wrote, 
After approval of the project at Utica…and upon publication in the New York 
papers, opposition was registered by the Utica Post of the American Legion, by 
the Ogdensburg Post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, by the Hospital employees 
and by the Association of the State Civil Service Employees.  In view of these 
protests, we did not think it advisable to proceed further with the project and so 
advised all concerned.  At the same time, however, we did inform them we would 
reconsider at any time that it appeared the objections could be overcome.24 
Though Hershey was a strong-willed man with a thick skin, even he was not immune to 
public opinion, and he understood that a potential hot button issue like conscientious 
objection needed to be out of the public eye as much as possible.  His response to 
negative publicity was to move the men away from the problem. 
As with many bureaucracies, the Civilian Public Service had a habit of taking too 
much time to get the administrative machinery up and running to get COs out of the 
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camps and into the detached services.  By mid-October, 1942, that slowness was evident 
to Hershey, and he made it clear to the parties involved that things needed to move at a 
faster pace.  After avoiding some of the problems with the veterans groups, Hershey was 
finally able to fight through many of the administrative roadblocks and approve the 
hospital units.  However, the problems did not cease.  The slowness in assigning men to 
the hospitals and finding suitable locations irritated him, and he believed it was due to 
inefficient administration on the part of NSBRO.  The slowness in assigning men to 
positions began to disillusion many of the assignees, who threatened to quit CPS.  During 
a meeting with French in mid-October 1942, when told of men wanting to leave CPS 
over this issue, Hershey lost his temper.  He told French he was fine with letting them 
walk, apparently wanting to let the Department of Justice deal with insubordinate 
assignees.  Hershey had simply had enough of insubordinate men in CPS camps.  
According to French, Hershey said, 
That we were not talking in terms of alternate service now but of special privilege 
for c.o.s.  Said he had sent four million men to the army during the past two years 
and that none of them had any choice about where they went or what they did.  He 
expressed the opinion in rather strong language that it was about time that we stop 
babying the men and let them take their own raps. 
Said he was sick and tired of the idea they should be permitted to do just about 
what they please and that he did not expect to continue that way much longer.25 
Hershey’s attitude towards the mental hospital situation and the discipline 
problems among CPS men reveal a number of themes in his thought toward COs.  First, 
this is further proof of Hershey’s desire to make alternative service an equitable sacrifice 
for assignees, just as men in the armed service were making sacrifices in their service.  
                                                 
25French Diary, October 13, 14, 1942.   
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Second, Hershey emphasized service above all else.  As he told French, the emphasis in 
CPS was on service, not “special privilege.”  He firmly believed in the value of service to 
one’s country, and in his mind Civilian Public Service was no different.  Third, Hershey’s 
stance here also highlights his career as a military officer.  Though he was more than 
accommodating to COs, he was first and foremost a military officer charged with raising 
an army for wartime.  That he believed in bureaucratic control and firm discipline was no 
fluke.  It was a part of professional training and work ethic. 
One fascinating dynamic during the war was Hershey’s relationship with the 
Peace Churches.  He worked closely with them throughout that time.  No single man 
could ever be entirely responsible for a program as complicated and difficult to manage 
as Civilian Public Service, so it was imperative that Hershey and the representatives of 
the Historic Peace Churches, particularly NSBRO, had a strong and respectful working 
relationship, which they did. 
Early in the war, the Peace Churches went out of their way to let Hershey know 
that they truly appreciated his efforts.  After Hershey’s promotion to Major General in 
1942, Paul Furnas, Secretary of the AFSC Civilian Public Service administration, wrote 
to him congratulating him on his new rank.  Furnas wrote, “I want to express to you my 
hearty congratulations for the recognition which is represented in the title of Major 
General which I understand has come to you….”  He continued, “That a Quaker of my 
conviction should feel so pleased about the conferring of a military title, possibly 
indicates how deep is our appreciation for the wise, efficient, and humane administration 
which you have given to a large and difficult task.”  Furnas enclosed a draft of a memo to 
the AFSC’s CPS Executive Committee that summarized Hershey’s beliefs about religious 
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training and conviction.  Furnas had written in the memo, “We feel that it is an occasion 
for profound thankfulness on our part that the Director of Selective Service should be a 
man of such spiritual discernment.”26 
M. R. Zigler, Chairman of the United Staff of the Church of the Brethren, 
Executive Secretary of the Church of the Brethren’s General Ministerial Board, and 
Chairman of NSBRO, wrote on behalf of the Brethren expressing their thanks as well.  
He wrote,  
The ministers of the Church of the Brethren, at our General Conference … wish 
hereby to assure you of our very great appreciation for your service to us.  Words 
cannot adequately express our thanks to you.  We feel that you have had a 
sympathetic understanding of our faith; and you have untiringly striven that we 
should have our rights under the law of the land.  You have given most valuable 
insight and advice.”27   
A large number of Church of the Brethren ministers signed their names in an attachment, 
expressing their gratitude.28  Signifying Hershey’s appreciation of a stable relationship, he 
replied, “I wish that I could somehow or other tell you and all of the others whose names 
I now read the satisfaction that I experience when I realize what your group has done to 
make my task easier.”29 
Apparently, the Selective Service wanted to make it known how much the Peace 
Churches appreciated the efforts of Hershey.  In a letter sent little more than a week 
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before Pearl Harbor and published in Hershey’s first report, Zigler, Clarence Pickett of 
the AFSC, and Orie Miller of the Mennonite Central Committee wrote, “We wish you to 
know that we appreciate the sympathy and understanding with which your have faced 
this problem during the past year of more and assure you that we are hopeful that the 
same relationships can continue during the coming year so that jointly we can 
demonstrate the ability of a democracy to respect minority religious groups.”30  By 
placing this letter in Hershey’s first report, Hershey and the Selective Service made an 
attempt to produce evidence for posterity of the Peace Churches’ appreciation of Hershey 
and the Selective Service’s efforts to implement alternative service in a tolerant and 
sympathetic manner. 
Perhaps no better example than Paul French and his negotiations on behalf of 
NSBRO better illustrates the working relationship between Hershey and the Peace 
Churches in the early days of the war.  During the creation of CPS, the early days of the 
war, and the first full year of the war, the meetings between Hershey and French were 
usually cordial and respectful, and a true understanding between the two men began to 
develop.  French’s comments at the end of his countless meetings with Hershey contained 
a number of illuminating observations.  He expressed how lucky the Peace Churches 
were to have a man like Hershey, with his sympathy for men of conscience, holding the 
position of Director of Selective Service.  He also mentioned how friendly Hershey was, 
how many times Hershey seemed glad to see French, and his amazement that a man with 
the duties of Hershey could find the time to meet frequently with men representing such a 
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small portion of the population.  Often in French’s diary during the first full year of the 
war Hershey is described as “a big man,” meaning that he did not resort to petty 
squabbles or seek to be vindictive in dealing with conscientious objectors.  Instead, he 
remained open to discussion and sought to fight for their rights when necessary, whether 
it in public or behind closed doors in Washington.31 
That the Peace Churches were grateful to Hershey for his efforts in securing 
projects for conscientious objectors and supporting them in their efforts to practice their 
ideology was not unsubstantiated political hyperbole.  The frustrating experience in the 
First World War for conscientious objectors had shown them just how bad things could 
be.  To have a person in charge with the sympathetic stance of Hershey, a military man 
no less, was of great help to the Peace Churches, and its significance was not lost on 
them.  Their comments to Hershey were not embellished exaggeration, but heartfelt 
gratitude. 
The relationship between Hershey and the Historic Peace Churches was not 
always friendly and jovial, though.  Indeed, their relationship deteriorated somewhat 
during the war.  It was clear during 1942 that some strain on the relationship existed, and 
it had worsened by 1943.  One of the big issues was camp discipline.  Both Hershey and 
Kosch pointed this out to French and other representatives during the latter part of 1941, 
but the problems continued into 1942.  Kosch believed that the Quakers were dragging 
                                                 
31There is no specific citation here beyond Paul French’s diary.  In representing 
conscientious objectors and the Historic Peace Churches, no man met with Hershey on a 
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their feet in trying to solve to the discipline problems in their camps, which consisted of 
men refusing to work or keep the camp in good working order.  Kosch believed that the 
government should take over the camps if things did not improve.  Hershey’s annoyance 
toward the lax discipline in the Quaker camps is definitely apparent in some of the 
writings of French.  According to French, Hershey told him that “our philosophy 
undoubtedly worked well in a summer volunteer work camp but that we must recognize 
that this was a different situation and that men were there because of a conscription 
law.”32 
Though the problems with Quaker discipline in the camps continued, it became 
less of an issue, and little more about the matter came up in the meetings between 
NSBRO and Hershey during 1942.  The relationship between Hershey and NSBRO 
remained in good standing, but there were other groups that became annoyed with him 
due to his reluctance to approve government-administered camps.  This began to come to 
the forefront in 1942.  Many of the CPS men, particularly those not of the Historic Peace 
Church tradition, did not like serving under a denominational agency different from their 
own faith.  The Fellowship of Reconciliation, War Resisters League, and the Federal 
Council of Churches supported this objection some of the CPS men.  Hershey’s reasoning 
for his reluctance to institute government-administrated camps was legitimate.  One 
reason was that he thought it could become too convoluted and complicated for the 
Selective Service to run alternative service camps.  Second, he was afraid that 
Congressional disapproval ran the risk of threatening the entire structure of Civilian 
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Public Service, bringing it to a halt.  Government-administrated camps needed 
Congressional approval to receive additional funding for administration, something not in 
the existing budget for Selective Service.33 
On June 8, 1942, Hershey met with representatives of the Federal Council of 
Churches and the Lutherans to discuss the matter of government camps.  At this point 
Hershey agreed to look into the matter by surveying the CPS assignees to attempt to 
glean their position on government-administered camps.  In a questionnaire sent to the 
men, the Selective Service outlined their position and the government’s rules for camp 
administration.  It also made it clear that “no distinction would be made between defense 
and non defense work assigned.”34  This lack of delineation meant that assignees in the 
government camps were required to work in whatever job assigned to them, regardless of 
their personal convictions.  French also attached a two-page letter, stating his own 
personal views, which echoed Hershey’s stance, and noting that it would be tough to get 
out of a government camp once assigned and that refusal to work could incur prosecution 
by the Department of Justice.35 
This survey, which appeared to be loaded against the use of government camps, 
provoked a three-way fight among the Selective Service, NSBRO, and other 
denominations with interests in the CO question.  Only upon NSBRO’s recommendation 
did Hershey finally approve the government camps on April 16, 1943.  NSBRO’s 
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recommendation was to pay the men, stay away from defense projects, and try to limit 
what the men viewed as mind-numbing manual labor.  Hershey agreed to these 
provisions, except for paying the COs.  Once Hershey agreed, the first government-
administered camp (without CO pay) began on July 1 at Mancos, Colorado, with two 
other camps to start later in the war.36 
 The negotiations for CPS camps administered by the Selective Service reveal two 
important tenets of Hershey’s position on alternative service.  The first point is that 
Hershey wanted to deal solely with NSBRO on matters of CPS.  Recall that it was his 
recommendation that led directly to the formation of NSBRO in 1940, when he expressed 
his desire to deal with one organization covering all of the different groups.  Doing so 
made his job much easier and streamlined the process considerably.  The government 
camp issue revealed, through the disagreements among the groups, that if more people 
and agencies got involved, the entire program could become gridlocked.  Second, 
Hershey continuously rejected proposals to pay COs, not out of malice, but out of a 
concern for public opinion.  Ever concerned about the possibility of Congress taking 
away CO provisions or public opinion raising trouble, Hershey’s motive here was to 
avoid problems before they began.  Though the men of CPS were doubtlessly unhappy 
about it, Hershey’s stance remained constant throughout the war. 
 The year 1943 marked further disintegration of the friendly relationship between 
Hershey and the Peace Churches.  Much of the tension came from the Chicago 
Conference on Social Action, called by a committee of CPS assignees to discuss some of 
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the COs complaints.  According to Mulford Sibley and Philip Jacob, “The 
conference…was an attempt to initiate direct negotiations between the assignees and 
those who exercised authority over them.”  Included in their invitations were Hershey and 
other government and religious officials.  Hershey, however, balked at attending the 
Chicago Conference and decreed that no CPS assignee was to attend either.  Hershey 
believed that the meeting could elicit pressure on CPS from Congress or other 
government agencies, something he definitely wanted to avoid.  He though those 
attending a conference might try to garner publicity for their situation, which could be 
political poison for a program already unpopular in some sectors of the federal 
government.  He felt that if any meeting should be organized, the Peace Church agencies 
should do it, not the men in the camps.  Kosch echoed this sentiment.37  Recall both 
Hershey and Kosch’s distaste for lax discipline and insubordination in the camps.  From 
their point of view, little was different in this case.  Kosch told French that both he and 
Hershey believed that the biggest problem the men organizing without the approval of the 
Selective Service.  To Kosch and Hershey, there was a massive difference between 
organizing among the men and promoting a conference organized by the church 
administrative agencies.38  
 Many groups, including the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters 
League, denounced Hershey’s action.  They argued that Hershey was violating the men’s 
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civil rights.39  Although Hershey cancelled furloughs for those hoping attend the 
conference, it went on as planned, though few attended.  The Selective Service refused to 
allow men who attended conference to go into the detached services.  This prompted a 
showdown between NSBRO and the Selective Service.  Because the assignment of men 
into these programs was the job of NSBRO, it believed that the Selective Service 
overstepped its bounds when it refused to allow the assignment of men to the detached 
services.  Both the Peace Church agencies and NSBRO were quite unhappy with the 
situation.40  Paul Furnas believed that if a compromise on the relationship between the 
Selective Service and the Peace Churches could not be reached, then the AFSC should 
withdraw from the program.  French felt that Hershey and the Selective Service were 
now ordering around NSBRO rather than negotiating with it.41 
 Hershey began to believe even more firmly that NSBRO and the Peace Churches 
were failing in their administration of CPS.  When French asked Hershey if NSBRO 
could receive more administrative control, particularly in the area of mental hospital 
assignments, Hershey refused on the grounds that they had not been successful in what he 
already granted them.  Hershey was particularly upset with Clarence Pickett, who went 
directly to President Roosevelt to voice his displeasure over the CPS arrangement.  
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Hershey preferred to keep the problems in house and not have any internal misgivings or 
problems paraded throughout the government.42 
 On October 14, 1943, Hershey and Kosch met the Executive Board of NSBRO 
for dinner to repair the relationship between the Peace Churches and the Selective 
Service.  NSBRO presented a memorandum to Hershey outlining their grievances.  Some 
of the issues they presented included pay for the men (which included the dependents of 
the assignees), establishment of “reception centers” for the assignees so they could best 
determine where and under which agency they wanted to serve, and the approval of 
projects more in line with the individual desires of the assignees.43  Hershey and Kosch 
listened to their grievances but did not alter their position.  The AFSC wanted more 
socially relevant programs, but Hershey did not see the need.  The Quakers argued that 
they were not the type to run a program that forced men into certain programs or made 
them work.  French recalled that Hershey testily responded “that he thought one of our 
troubles was that many of the men had not found their souls and that he felt it was 
possible that they might find them on the end of a shovel handle.”44 
 The Peace Churches again asked for pay for COs, and Hershey and Kosch again 
rejected the idea, citing the need for Congressional approval and the risk of the churches 
losing CPS over the matter.  On the matter of assignees’ dependents, Hershey appeared 
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deeply concerned and promised to look into it.  Pickett brought to Hershey’s attention the 
AFSC’s threat to withdraw from administration of the CPS camps if the Peace Churches’ 
pleas for better camp governance went unheeded.45  
 Though this meeting profoundly illustrates the evolving relationship between 
Hershey and the Peace Churches, few tangible changes came from it immediately.  For 
example, Hershey denied the churches’ request for additional projects in education and 
juvenile delinquency, but an important facet of Hershey’s belief structure emerged on this 
point.  Hershey completely rejected the doctrine of pacifism.  When the churches asked 
for a program helping juvenile delinquents, Hershey struck down their proposal, saying 
their pacifist stance was counterproductive.  He argued that one of the biggest reasons for 
the lack of preparation in the United States prior to World War II was that the pacifists’ 
activities in the 1920s and 1930s had made the United States complacent in world affairs.  
He claimed to have seen this complacency coming when he was at Ohio State.46  One 
matter that particularly bothered him was teaching pacifism to American youths.  In a 
letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, he expressed his reservations.  He wrote, “While the nation is 
engaged in an “all out” war effort it would appear inconsistent for a Government agency 
to assign [a] man to a position where he is given every opportunity to spread the doctrine 
of pacifism to our youth in its formative period.”  He continued, “It is felt that a man 
holding such convictions cannot help but impress them to a certain extent on his charges 
                                                 
45Ibid.  
46French Diary, October 17, 1943.  
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who are composed of youths in their formative period.”47  This letter makes it clear that 
while Hershey sympathized with COs, he did not believe that pacifism or nonresistance 
was a positive course of action for American society.  He emphasis was on service, and 
that emphasis played into his conception of CPS.  In his mind, CPS was an alternative 
service program, not a vehicle for COs to proselytize. 
 The October meeting was the last of Hershey’s direct dealings with 
representatives of the Peace Churches and NSBRO for more than a year.  He delegated 
even more authority to Kosch, and there were almost no changes in major policy until the 
end of the war. As always, it was his prerogative to approve any major changes in policy, 
but after the October meeting, he seldom met personally with French, other NSBRO 
members, or Peace Church representatives.  Most of the ongoing negotiations and 
program development stayed in Camp Operations Division under Kosch and his 
administrative staff.   
Hershey continued to be the face of the Selective Service and discussed 
conscientious objection in Congress on occasion, but his workings with CPS definitely 
lessened during 1944.  Though 1944 was a much slower year for Hershey and CPS, his 
influence remained intact.  Part of this was because the administrative framework was 
already established by 1944, and by that point things were not going to change much.  
The vision put forth by Hershey during the early part of the war continued through to the 
end of Civilian Public Service.  Some tension and unhappiness still existed between the 
                                                 
47Lewis B. Hershey to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 5, 1944, General 
Hershey’s Staybacks, 1945 part 1, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 
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Peace Churches and the Selective Service, particularly over pay and dependency, but 
little of substance actually changed.  The biggest shift came in 1945, when it became 
clear that the time to end CPS was approaching. 
The wartime experience of Lewis Hershey and the Historic Peace Churches in 
Civilian Public Service reveals a relationship that began on friendly terms but eventually 
became strained and frustrating for both sides.  Early in their relationship, certain 
members of the Peace Churches expressed their heartfelt gratitude for his efforts.  
However, as the war drew on Hershey’s commitment never faltered, but the Peace 
Churches and the CPS camps definitely tested his patience from time to time.  
Throughout the war, Hershey fought for CO rights and approved various different 
projects for them.  Many times, the negotiations for setting up the new programs dragged 
on for months, or even years.  Hershey did not approve all proposals set before him, nor 
was he central to every single program development in CPS.  That said, all programs 
required final approval from Hershey, as Roosevelt’s executive order giving Hershey the 
authority to define work of national importance had lasting influence.  During the war 
years, Hershey played a significant role in the direction of alternative service.  Even when 
he was not entirely in a discussion on a specific matter, one can see his philosophy and 
desires in the final product. 
There are a number of specific instances that illustrate the points made above.  
Hershey’s actions in securing farm labor definitely helped push the program though to 
implementation.  However the problems in setting up mental hospital units and the 
Chicago Conference irritated him a great deal.  He had absolutely no tolerance for lax 
discipline and poor administration in the CPS camps.  As a military officer to the core, 
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his stance is not particularly surprising.  He was not hostile to CPS and truly wanted it to 
succeed, but he believed that work stoppages and unapproved social action conferences 
threatened the program and aroused negativity from certain quarters.  Throughout the 
war, he worried about public opinion and sought to avoid troubles in this arena wherever 
he could, particularly when it came to veterans groups such as the American Legion or 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars.  By 1944, his direct influence lessened when he handed 
more authority to Lewis Kosch, but the wheels he set in motion continued to turn.  His 
belief in the duty of service continued to shape alternative service as CPS evolved.  
Because of the authority granted to him and the structure of his institution, the specter of 
General Hershey continued to loom over alternative service and conscientious objection 
throughout World War II. 
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CHAPTER 8 – HERSHEY AND CONGRESS EXAMINE CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION 
 
Though the Historic Peace Churches and the Selective Service handled most of 
the aspects of Civilian Public Service, there were times when Congress became involved 
and imposed its will on the situation.  During the war, Hershey appeared before Congress 
on numerous occasions, usually to testify about manpower, labor, and conscription, but a 
few times he came to Capitol Hill to discuss conscientious objection.  These occasions 
were linked with attempts to gain aid for CO dependents, workmen’s compensation, and 
a foreign relief and rehabilitation program, none of which were successful.  The Senate 
fleetingly tried to eliminate section 5(g) of the Selective Service Act (the section that 
provided for conscientious objection) in 1943, but nothing became of the bill.  Though 
some of Congress’s actions did have a direct impact on COs, the most significant reason 
for examining Hershey’s wartime relationship with Congress is that it further reveals the 
complex, nuanced views of conscientious objection held by Lewis Hershey.  During these 
hearings, Hershey went into detail on his views concerning pay for COs, public opinion, 
the nature of CO service, and his role as a military director of a civilian institution.  
Furthermore, he supported an attempt by the Peace Churches to establish a program for 
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overseas relief and rehabilitation, but Congress disallowed their efforts.  Hershey’s 
experience with Congress during World War II provides a number of insights into 
Hershey attitudes toward conscientious objection and alternative service.  He truly 
believed in the concepts behind alternative service and sought to protect the assignees 
from some of the problems in CPS.  He felt that negative public reactions would threaten 
the existence of CPS and made it clear that he sought to avoid controversy in that regard.  
Furthermore, he displayed a deft political touch in trying to avoid Congressional 
limitations on his authority over conscientious objection.  Though not always successful, 
Hershey’s dealing with Congress revealed both the limits of his power and his sympathy 
for the CO. 
Most historical analyses of Congress’ attitudes toward conscientious objection 
suggest that the CO had few, if any, friends in the legislature.  Mulford Sibley and Philip 
Jacob, in Conscription for Conscience, state that “Congress did nothing during the war to 
liberate the c.o.; instead, it imposed additional restraints.  It excluded foreign service for 
CPS men, denied financial assistance to their dependents, and stalled their final release 
from service.”  That said, it must be remembered that Sibley and Jacob are 
overwhelmingly sympathetic to conscientious objectors and they paint Hershey, the 
Selective Service, and Congress in a negative light.  There are three main areas in which 
Sibley and Jacob highlight Congress’s action concerning COs: the lack of aid to CO 
dependents, general workmen’s compensation to COs, and CO pay.  Sibley and Jacob 
place the responsibility for the lack of CO pay squarely on the shoulders of Hershey.  As 
illustrated below, Hershey’s reluctance to pay CPS assignees was a result of his desire to 
avoid public relations problems.  Sibley and Jacob note this motivation yet claim, “Later, 
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both Hershey and his staff outspokenly argued that the c.o.’s did not deserve pay.” Sibley 
and Jacob make that unflattering statement without offering evidence to support their 
assertion.1  Actually, in 1946 Hershey told Sibley and Jacob that he believed COs should 
be paid in the future, a far cry from stating that CO’s “did not deserve pay.”2 
Beyond Sibley and Jacob, the interpretations on Congress and conscientious 
objection are scant.  Melvin Gingerich and Leslie Eisan do not discuss much in Service 
for Peace and Pathways of Peace, respectively, but Albert Keim has given the matter 
some attention.  He and Grant Stolzfus contended, “Civilian Public Service had almost no 
friends in Congress during World War II.  In fact, it had many enemies.  Given the 
president’s thinly veiled hostility to the program, opening the matter for further 
examination might well have led to disaster.”3  Later, Keim revised his own thinking to 
label Congress as being no help whatsoever.  In “Mennonites and Selective Service in 
World War II: An Ambiguous Relationship,” he writes, “Given the total lack of support 
in Congress for conscientious objectors – there was not even one member who could be 
counted on for help … the options available to the peace churches were very limited.”4 
Most congressmen were, in fact, ignorant about conscientious objection and 
Civilian Public Service.  In his numerous hearings, Hershey explained the situation to 
                                                 
1Sibley and Jacob, 200, 216-217.  
2Memorandum on Conversation with General Hershey – Sibley and Jacob, July 
26, 1946, Center for Conscience and War, Series A, Correspondence with Lewis B. 
Hershey, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, 1  
3Keim and Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience, 123.  
4Albert Keim, "Mennonites and Selective Service in World War II: An 
Ambiguous Relationship," The Mennonite Quarterly Review 66, no. 4 (October 1992): 
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senators and representatives by equating their work in the camps with the Civilian 
Conservation Corps and praising their efforts in programs such as assistance in mental 
hospitals.  He contended that the work was not an invitation for “slackers” to avoid the 
draft.5 
Overall, using broad brushstrokes to discuss Congress and the conscientious 
objector is a futile exercise because it does not account for the individual efforts of 
senators or representatives whose efforts became overshadowed by congressional 
inaction or restriction.  To say there were no friends of the CO in Congress is a distortion 
of the truth, similar to saying that Hershey believed COs did not deserve pay.  Men like 
Jerry Voorhis, who supported COs during the hearings on the Selective Service Act in 
1940, and John Sparkman, who worked behind the scenes for them in 1943, were 
sympathetic.  To be fair, though, Voorhis and Sparkman were an almost invisible 
minority.  The best evidence we have from the Congressional experience with the 
conscientious objector is that it provides us with deeper insights into the beliefs of Lewis 
Hershey. 
Some of the matters that came before Congress during World War II included CO 
wages, payments to CO dependents, and compensation for COs killed or injured during 
their service.  While Hershey did not personally testify on all of these matters, the men 
who spoke to Congress either represented his views or spoke for him personally.  One of 
the earliest points of argumentation to come before Congress was workmen’s 
                                                 
5Congress Looks at the Conscientious Objector,  (Washington, D.C.: National 
Service Board for Religious Objectors, 1943), 34, 51-52.  This is a collection of primary 
records from congressional publications, such as hearings and the Congressional Record. 
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compensation for COS.  Representatives of the Selective Service discussed this before 
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs’ Subcommittee on August 19, 1942.  The bill, 
S. 2708, intended to amend the Selective Service Act by extending the provisions of the 
Employee’s Compensation Act of 1934 to men in CPS.  The bill called for forty-two 
dollars per month to be paid to the dependents of an assignee in the event of his death or 
disablement.6  The public reasoning for the bill was that it was a preemptive attempt to 
avoid claims on the Federal Government for COs injured or killed while in CPS.  
Hershey supported this measure, but could not attend the hearing in August.7  In a letter 
written to the President of the Senate, he pointed out that the men in CPS camps exposed 
themselves to the same types of dangers that confronted the men in the Civilian 
Conservation Corps.  It was perfectly within the realm of reason to predict that some 
injuries or deaths might occur in the course of camp operations.  He also stated that the 
figure of forty-two dollars came from the amount provided as compensation by the 
Civilian Conservation Corps.8 
Because Hershey could not attend the hearing, Kosch and Major J. T. Coatsworth 
represented his views.  Kosch discussed the rights of the conscientious objector and the 
                                                 
6Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, 
Conscientious Objectors’ Benefits: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Military Affairs, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., 19 August, 1942, 1.  
7Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Conscientious Objectors’ 
Benefits, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Rpt. 1583, 24 August, 1942, 2.  
8Conscientious Objectors’ Benefits, 19 August, 1942, 1-2.  It bears mentioning 
that the men still received no daily wage of any sort and the money accrued came from 
the total number of months a man worked in CPS in the event of death or disability.  This 
money was to go to their survivors/dependents, not to the men. 
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nature of the CPS camps.  He stated that the Selective Service supported the bill because 
it “…protect[ed] the government in future claims that might come up.”  He also outlined 
the duty of national service that Hershey had made clear countless times, both publicly 
and privately.  Kosch said, “It is not combat service, it is not service in the Army, but it is 
a service that is set up by the law of the country; so, we feel that the Government is 
responsible for them, as long as this law is in effect.”9 
Hershey and Kosch’s point of view concerning workmen’s compensation was not 
the only significant testimony given during this hearing.  Kosch and Coatsworth also 
discussed public opinion and COs, further revealing the views of their director, Lewis 
Hershey.  Hershey’s views on public opinion were a major factor in his actions 
concerning COs and they are discussed in the next section. 
At this hearing, Kosch also discussed pay for the CO (beyond compensation for 
death or disability).  Though Kosch’s statements echoed those of his friend and superior 
officer Hershey, they also reveal that Kosch was brusquer and did not have the political 
savvy of his boss.  Rather than discuss public opinion and avoiding negative publicity, 
Kosch outlined the lack of pay as a central feature of what defined conscientious 
objection.  He contended,  
We have been against payment due to the fact that we feel that the very fact that a 
man does not get paid is one means of sorting the conscientious objector from the 
slacker or the fellow who is just trying to hide behind the skirts of the religious 
objectors.10 
                                                 
9Ibid., 2-3.  
10Ibid., 6.  
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 In one of the few times that a chamber of Congress supported conscientious 
objectors through legislation, the Senate passed this bill, but the congressional session 
ended before the House acted on it, delaying the bill until 1943, when the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs heard testimony again in conjunction with a bill to end 
conscientious objection entirely.11  It was then that Hershey took a strong stand in support 
of extending compensation to CPS assignees and rejected wholesale the idea of 
eliminating the provisions for conscience in the Selective Service Act. 
Another one of the contentious issues Hershey discussed before Congress 
involved CO wages.  He repeatedly told the Peace Churches that Congress would not 
support pay for COs and that they risked losing the entire program over the issue, 
especially if it came to the public’s attention.  However, his testimony before Congress 
suggests that Hershey was more concerned about public opinion than he let on to the 
churches.  He even went so far as to suggest to Congress that a large percentage of the 
COs would not accept pay, which while not a lie, was not the complete truth either.  
Hershey argued that the lack of pay actually deterred men from declaring as a 
conscientious objector, because if paid, some might consider themselves noncombatants 
rather than civilian servants.12 
When Hershey testified against eliminating the provisions for conscientious 
objection in 1943, he personally discussed his own views on the matter of pay.  Hershey 
                                                 
11Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Amending the Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940, as Amended, so as to Extend the Benefits of the 
Employees Compensation Act to Conscientious Objectors, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Rpt. 73, 1 
March, 1943, 1.  
12Congress Looks at the Conscientious Objector, 34.  
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argued that he did not believe the men in the camps would accept pay.  He claimed that 
the conscientious objectors, much like him, did not want to bring public animosity down 
on themselves.  He explained that COs paid their way or the religious agencies covered 
their expenses.  The cost for each man was thirty-five dollars per month, and out of that 
thirty-five, each man received $2.50 for personal items such as toothpaste, shaving 
cream, and other toiletries.  However, there was no money in the system for labor wages.  
The men who worked in the forestry camps, soil conservation camps, and the mental 
hospitals did so for free.  The men working on the farms had their wages placed in the 
frozen fund.13   
 When Senator Monrad Wallgren (D-WA), heard that COs were working for no 
pay, he told Hershey, “You are treating these fellows worse than the Japs,” referring to 
the Japanese-Americans placed in concentration camps under Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Executive Order 9066.  Hershey replied, “Maybe so, but we have, in your State [sic], 
groups in two of your hospitals for insane, and there the food and so forth is furnished by 
the State of Washington in return for their services, and as to the $2.50, the State of 
Washington pays them for taking care of these various matters.”  In this case, Hershey 
implied that the public good from their work was more important than the lack of pay.  
Wallgren later pressed Hershey further, asking him outright, “Do you feel that they [COs 
in mental hospitals] should be paid?”  This time, Hershey answered fully,  
Definitely not.  It would destroy the best public relations.  The thing we have to 
consider is they have not received any pay so far, and I think I would be 
                                                 
13Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Conscientious Objectors’ 
Benefits: Hearing Before the Committee on Military Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 17 
February 1943, 17. 
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supported by 60 or 70 percent of these people, who consider that that is one of the 
contributions they are making to show that they are really conscientious objectors 
and conscientiously believe what they came to believe, and I know some that will 
not accept, under any circumstances, Government money.  I do not believe any of 
the Mennonite Church members, by and large, would accept any money.14 
On the surface, Hershey’s contradictions here are puzzling.  Since the earliest 
negotiations in 1940, the Peace Churches had been trying gain fair pay for men assigned 
to Civilian Public Service.  Hershey and Kosch were both major roadblocks in the Peace 
Churches’ attempts.  Hershey repeatedly stated that he did not support pay for COs.  He 
also told the Peace Churches that the federal government, particularly Congress, did not 
support paying COs and they risked losing all of CPS over the matter (something Dykstra 
also pointed out to them when negotiations with President Roosevelt stalled in late-1940).  
While Wallgren’s line of questioning suggests otherwise (though he was only one man), 
Hershey’s reasoning to the Peace Churches may very well have been the case, but hard 
evidence is scarce. 
Hershey also supported a stipend to be paid to the dependents of COs, yet, as was 
the case with workmen’s compensation, Hershey was unable to attend a hearing on the 
matter. In the fall of 1943, Paul French appeared before the House Committee on Military 
Affairs, hoping to gain an expansion of the Federal Government’s dependency allotment 
program for servicemen to cover CPS assignees.  This was an important measure for 
conscientious objectors as serving in CPS created significant financial burdens on 
everyone involved; the COs, their families, their churches, and NSBRO.  The efforts by 
French were part of a larger effort to revise some of the provisions for family allowances 
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for men in the armed services.  French’s testimony was a small, quick statement in a 
plethora of other government officials and lobbyists.  French made it clear that there were 
no provisions for the families of COs.  His idea was to take money from the CPS Frozen 
Fund in the U.S. Treasury and use that to help ease the financial burden on the families of 
CPS assignees.  French also told the committee that this idea found favor in the Selective 
Service, particularly from Kosch.  His proposed legislation provided for the money to go 
to NSBRO, where it would be properly redistributed to men beyond the previously 
defined terms of men in the armed services.15 
French’s measure, however, did not have enough support to be passed and made 
into law.  The issue did not completely die at that time, though.  The House Committee 
on Military Affairs recommended in May 1944 that a bill be passed to provide for the 
dependents of CPS assignees.  The plan called for the money set aside in the U.S. 
Treasury’s Frozen Fund to be released to the Selective Service for the purpose of 
providing for CO dependents.  The families were to receive the money based on need, but 
the amount could not exceed the funding for the family of a man in the armed services.  
According to the wording of the bill, the person responsible for determining need would 
be Hershey.16  Though supported by NSBRO, Hershey, and the House Committee on 
Military Affairs, three congressmen objected on the House floor and Congress adjourned 
                                                 
15Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Allowances and Allotments 
for Dependents of Military Personnel: Hearings Before the Committee on Military 
Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 29, 30 September and 1, 5 October 1943, 99-100.  
16Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Authorizing the Appropriation 
of Amounts Received from the Service of Conscientious Objectors for Expenditure by the 
Selective Service System, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Rpt. 1581, 31 May 1944, 1-2.  
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with no vote being taken, allowing the bill to die and it would never be resurrected.17 
Beyond the fact that Hershey’s support for dependency reveals that he was sympathetic 
to the CO, it also reveals the limits of his influence.  Congress did not extend coverage to 
COs and there was nothing Hershey could do about it. 
The most illuminating facet of Hershey’s testimony before Congress was his 
concern about public opinion.  Nowhere else was Hershey as frank and open about how 
he believed COs should best be handled to avoid negative public reaction.  Hershey 
believed that the best course of action for the CO was to stay out of the public eye.  This 
is a sentiment echoed by Albert Keim and draft historian John O’Sullivan.18  Hershey 
stated this bluntly to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in 1943:  
We have about 1,500 to 2,000 [CPS assignees] that are now acting as attendants 
in State [sic] hospitals for the insane.  We have got quite a few of them that are in 
different zones of forestry work.  Some of them are putting out fires up in the 
west coast of the country, but they must not be allowed to get too much credit for 
it.  It isn’t good for them.  I wouldn’t want the press to report this.19   
Though Hershey does not appear to be terribly enlightened in this instance, he was not 
talking duplicitously to Congress and the Historic Peace Churches.  If anything, Hershey 
was a master at playing the game of politics.  He knew that speaking in a celebratory 
manner before Congress might have dire consequences for Civilian Public Service and 
conscientious objection as a whole. Furthermore, he sympathized with the COs, 
                                                 
17Sibley and Jacob, 220-221.  
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understood their position, and sought to protect and help them, but he did not agree with 
their nonresistant stance.  As a part of the military establishment, he was a true advocate 
for the importance of military service and preparedness.  He believed that it was in the 
best interest of the CO to stay out of the public eye, and he did not heap large amounts of 
hyperbolic praise on CPS or the assignees.  Instead, he took a pragmatic approach, 
seeking to keep the negative reactions to a minimum.   
During the August 19, 1942 hearing that Hershey could not attend, Kosch 
presented some testimony that might as well have come directly from Hershey.  Kosch 
pointed out that Hershey and the Selective Service did not approve some of the larger 
social programs suggested by the Peace Churches because they did not want them to be 
publicized.  In his blunt manner, Kosch stated,  
We try to discourage that [‘missionary work’].  In other words, we are not setting 
up projects that puts [sic] them in a position where they can do, it [sic] like social-
welfare work, teaching in schools, and so forth.  We have had pressure put on us 
to put them in to teaching schools where they are short of funds, and so forth, but 
we have refused to do it, because we do not believe that the Government should 
be a party to helping these men spread their pacifist propaganda.  Around these 
camps you find there is a certain amount of it done due to the fact that if the 
churches invite the people in to talk we can’t say ‘no’ to it.  However, if the 
churches do not ask them in, there is no particular way they have of spreading 
their propaganda on these jobs, because they are work jobs; and, as I say, we are 
opposed to setting up any type of project which would lend itself to the spreading 
of their propaganda.20 
 Major Coatsworth also appeared before the committee, personally representing 
Hershey.  Mostly, his statements echoed those of Kosch, particularly in regards to support 
for the measure coming from a desire to protect the Government.  Coatsworth also 
pointed out that the men were not “slackers,” but their choice was a result of an 
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“isolated” lifestyle in which they came of age “under the influence of their church and 
elders….”21   
 The line of reasoning from Kosch and Coatsworth appears insensitive on the 
surface, but an examination of the larger dynamics at work helps explain things.  
Granted, Hershey did not believe in the message of the conscientious objector, but he did 
believe in the privilege to object, provided that the objector performed some sort of 
national service.  For Kosch and Coatsworth to say that the measure was simply for 
government protection was probably a political tactic to keep Congress from becoming 
overly hostile to CPS.  If Kosch, Coatsworth, or Hershey were to stand in front of the 
subcommittee and say, “I believe they should be compensated because it is the right thing 
to do and COs should be protected,” they would have opened Selective Service to the 
possibility of having all of the conscientious objector provisions called into question. 
In terms of his views on public opinion, Hershey’s most insightful and 
illuminating testimony before Congress during the war came in February 1943.  In a 
hearing before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hershey made official 
statements and answered questions concerning two bills.  One bill (S. 675) considered the 
extension of the aforementioned Employee’s Compensation Act to conscientious 
objectors.  The second bill, however, threatened to undermine the entire structure of 
conscientious objection in the United States.  Senator Elmer Thomas (D-OK) proposed a 
bill (S.315) that would likely eliminate both Civilian Public Service and noncombatant 
                                                 
21Ibid., 8.  
 217 
guarantees.  Thomas’s impetus for the legislation was from a resolution drafted by the 
Oklahoma American Legion and sent to Thomas.  It read,  
Be it further resolved, and we petition, That the national legislative committee of 
the American Legion petition the Congress of the United States of America, for a 
change in the Selective Service Act, so as to eliminate the classification of 
‘conscientious objectors,’ and amend the law, so as to provide that all men subject 
to the draft shall do service in the armed forces of the United States.22 
Thomas’s legislation was simple and straightforward.  He proposed, “That section 5 of 
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, is amended by striking out 
subsection (g) thereof.23  Besides the threat to the Selective Service for the entire structure 
of conscientious objection, the possible elimination of noncombatant guarantees was 
deeply troubling. 
On February 14, Hershey appeared before the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs to discuss both S.315 and S.675, speaking broadly on the controversial topics 
concerning COs.  In addition to his comments on the CO and public opinion, Hershey 
also mused on the relationship of the CO to the army, his concept of alternative service, 
and his own unique status.  He stated that he did not support S.315 because he believed it 
placed an undue burden on the army.  He said that striking out the option for 
noncombatant service was problematical.  Those who were noncombatants did not mind 
serving in the Medical Corps, but extending noncombatancy to other areas might cause 
dissension among those serving or planning on serving as medics. He truly believed in 
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the mission of CPS and he did not view it as an invitation to “slackers,” as Senator Joseph 
O’Mahoney (D-NY) called them.  Hershey assured the senators that he truly believed 
COs were completely sincere, reaffirming his earlier statements in 1940, in which he 
called for the protection of sincere objectors. 24   In sum, he said, 
The Selective Service System believes that the Selective Training and Service Act 
of 1940, as amended, has, as a practical matter, reasonably solved a distressing 
situation, as in all wars, that of what to do with those whose conscience prevents 
them from participating in full measure in the Army.25 
Second, Hershey did not support Thomas’s bill because he feared it would hurt 
army camp morale.  
…as a soldier – I should say former soldier – I may say that [the COs’] presence 
in those [army] camps is very unfortunate, because they will go to prison or 
anything, except that they will not serve, and some of them have the martyr 
complex, some are a little psychopathic, and as a rule, sometimes if they are left 
completely alone, they will come around, whereas, if you arouse opposition, you 
develop a martyr complex, and they would do anything rather than fight.  I would 
like to deprive the Army of having that problem to deal with.26 
Thus, if the government left the COs alone rather than coercing them into military 
service, some of the CPS assignees would be “salvaged” and eventually join the army.27  
Again, this is an example of his nuanced and complex view of conscientious objection.  
He did not believe in the message of the CO, but he respected the privilege of conscience 
in a democratic society, as long as the objector performed some form of national service. 
                                                 
24Ibid., 15.  
25Ibid., 14  
26Ibid., 15-16.  
27Ibid., 16.  
 219 
Hershey testified that he wanted to make the CO’s sacrifice equitable to a 
conscript in the armed forces.  He said, “I think by and large, the great majority agree that 
the thing, itself, [CPS] is a fine thing, and we have tried to parallel the army in the 
privileges and the withholding of privileges, and the granting of passes.  We have pretty 
much applied to them about what the Army does.  We do ship them away from their 
homes, we do not let them stay in their home territories.”  Keesling interjected that the 
Selective Service did not allow the assignees to stay on the land of relatives either, to 
which Hershey added, “That is a very bad public-relations problem right there.”  He 
pointed out that the Selective Service shipped inductees to entirely new locations, such as 
men from the East Coast serving on the West Coast, despite the high transportation 
costs.28 
Hershey again outlined his preferred method of dealing with conscientious 
objectors and the American public.  A. S. Imirie of Lewis Kosch’s Camp Operations 
Division informed the senators of the Guinea Pig Units, in which COs served as test 
subjects for the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Surgeon 
General’s Office of the United States Army.  Imirie noted that about seventy-five men 
were currently in the Guinea Pig Units.  Hershey explained that they constituted about 
one percent of the CPS assignees at that time.  Hershey said, “That is almost 1 percent, 
                                                 
28Ibid., 22.   
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not a very large figure, but I have opposed publicizing that sort of things because the 
conscientious objector, by my theory, is best handled if no one hears of him.”29  
Hershey also described to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs how he 
rationalized his appointment as director of alternative service when the law calls for a 
civilian director.  On that point, Senator John Chandler “Chan” Gurney (R-SD), said to 
Hershey, “You are not a civilian, as I see it.”  Many during and after the war have 
criticized the federal government on this point.  Hershey’s response was skillful.   “[The 
Selective Service Act of 1940] did not say, ‘under a civilian;’ it said ‘under civil 
direction.’  No one has ever challenged it and I truly believe I would say, with a little 
satisfaction to me that the groups mostly involved agree that I am a civilian, at least when 
I deal with them.”  Imirie noted that the individual camps all possessed civilian 
administrators, and Hershey made one final statement on the matter, saying, “The 
directors of these camps are hired, also, by the religious groups.  The Government does 
not pay them.”  Neither Gurney nor any other member of the committee pressed Hershey 
any further on the matter.30  Beyond answering to some of the criticism, this exchange 
illustrates how Hershey viewed himself.  Hershey did not believe he was just an army 
officer or just a civilian director, but a unique amalgam of the two.  He recognized that he 
dealt mainly with civilians and often appeared in public wearing civilian clothes.   
                                                 
29Ibid., 23; and Sibley and Jacob, 143.  The institutions responsible for the 
direction of these experiments come from the Sibley and Jacob citation.  Imirie only cited 
the “National Research Council.” 
30Conscientious Objectors’ Benefits, 17 February 1943, 17-18.  
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What one sees from Hershey’s testimony before Congress on public opinion and 
the nature of the CO is that Hershey thought the best course of action for IV-E COs was 
to keep them away from situation that could reflect poorly on the Selective Service and 
threaten CPS.  While he may or may not have been entirely correct, he firmly believed 
that keeping a tight lid on publicity was the best course of action.  In doing so, his belief 
structure regarding public opinion shaped the direction of CPS by keeping the camps and 
other projects out of the limelight. 
The denial of workmen’s compensation or dependency benefits was not the only 
measure supported by Hershey that failed to get through Congress.  Another example of 
Congress striking down a concept supported by Hershey was the CPS Training Corps.  
Developed during the latter part of 1942, the Training Corps’s purpose was for preparing 
CPS men in the peace church colleges for overseas relief efforts.  The Corps was the 
brainchild of Goshen College President Ernest Miller.  He wanted to establish a program 
that could provide a college education for those already enrolled when drafted and train 
them in relief efforts, in the same way that military draftees could remain in college to 
take classes to prepare them to be officers in the armed forces.31 
Orie Miller of the Mennonites and French met with Hershey on September 3 to 
discuss the Training Corps.  Hershey initial reaction to the Peace Churches’ proposal was 
supportive, but guarded.  He told Miller and French that he would consider relief training, 
but wanted some time to contemplate the program.  He had few reservations about 
sending men overseas as long as the Peace Churches obtained clearance from the State 
                                                 
31Gingerich, 306.  
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Department.  On September 7 during a follow-up meeting with French and Kosch, 
Hershey decided to approve the Corps once NSBRO submitted the specifics of the 
program.32  Tentative approval for the plan came in November 1942.33 
Though the churches had the support of Hershey, many of the NSBRO board 
members and representatives of the Peace Churches were apprehensive about the 
program’s chances for Congressional approval.  Miller pointed out the he was fearful of 
problems with the draft boards, which tended to be inconsistent and many were hostile to 
conscientious objectors and the concept of alternative service.  For that reason, the 
Selective Service did not issue any memoranda to the boards concerning the Training 
Corps and the churches instructed draftees not to mention the program in any way to the 
local boards, reflecting Hershey’s desire for CPS to keep a low profile.  Men would be 
chosen for the Corps after receiving their IV-E classification. 34  
There were some disagreements within NSBRO over the number of men inducted 
into the Corps, with the initial estimates of six hundred men becoming a point of 
contention.  Some NSBRO members wanted to induct as many as one thousand men.  
When French presented these numbers to Hershey, he listened to the suggestions, but he 
was only willing to approve two percent of the total number of men already in the camps 
for service in the Training Corps, which amounted to about 160 men.  According to 
                                                 
32French Diary, September 3 & 7, 1942.  
33Gingerich, 306.  
34E.E. Miller to Mennonite College Presidents and Local College Officers, 
December 17, 1942, P.S. Goertz Papers, Mennonite Library and Archives, North Newton, 
KS. 
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French, Hershey believed that he could not justify placing a large number of men in 
college when there was already a nationwide shortage of labor.  Some of the Executive 
Board members did not quite believe that, but they wanted this program so badly that 
they were willing to compromise even beyond the reduction in manpower.35  
Although the Training Corps had Hershey’s support and approval, it never came 
to fruition.  On July 1, 1943 Congress passed the Military Appropriations Act (H.R. 
2996) with a clause added by Alabama Representative Joe Starnes, Chair of the House 
Sub-Committee for Appropriations.  The Starnes Amendment ended the possibility of 
relief training in the colleges and relief aid overseas sponsored by CPS.  It read as 
follows: 
… [N]o appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for any expense 
pertaining to (1) the instruction, education, or training of class IV-E conscientious 
objectors in colleges, (2) the service of such conscientious objectors outside the 
United States, its territories, and possessions, (3) the transportation of such 
conscientious objectors to or from any college or any such service, or (4) the 
compensation of military or civilian personnel performing any services with 
respect to the matters set forth in (1), (2), or (3) above after the enactment of this 
Act, except any services which may be necessary promptly to terminate any such 
class IV-E conscientious objector college or foreign-service projects existing on 
the date of the enactment of this Act….36 
This legislation effectively killed any possibility for CPS to train its men in peace church 
colleges or to send them overseas under the auspices of CPS during the war.   
Starnes had expressed his disapproval of the Training Corps for about a month 
before the Military Appropriations Bill passed.  He stated in a hearing on June 10, “The 
country would not approve such a policy in my judgment—these people should be kept at 
                                                 
35French Diary, March 26, 1943. 
36Military Appropriations Act, Statutes at Large 57, 350 (1943). 
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home at constructive work.”. Furthermore, he particularly did not care for army 
transportation to move the men to the foreign areas in which they would be providing 
relief.  “The space used by these men should be used in transporting food, supplies and 
fighting men to China and our other allies.” 37  At least in a public sense, Starnes clearly 
sought to have the priorities of the United States be with winning the war and everything 
that entailed, rather than undertake attempts to rebuild while the war raged.  This was 
also the view presented by the House Committee on Appropriations, of which Starnes 
was the Chair.  In this instance, the committee considered it “incongruous … to use such 
funds upon persons possessing convictions or beliefs that relieve them from the foremost 
obligation of every citizen to his country.”38 
There were some less public reasons for Starnes’s rejection of the Training Corps 
in addition to his recorded statements.  These reasons included, most notably, a general 
aversion to the role of the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, in the federal government.  Mrs. 
Roosevelt did play a role in approving of the concept of the Training Corps, working with 
Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee.  Her role in government 
irritated many members of Congress and her efforts on the part of the Training Corps 
were no exception.  Knowledge of this came from various meetings by Paul French with 
                                                 
37Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment 
Appropriations Bill, 1944: Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 78th 
Cong., 1st sess., 10 June 1943, 584-585, 587. 
38Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment 
Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1944, 78th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rep. 566, Serial 10762, 
14.  
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Kosch, John Sparkman (a fellow Alabama Congressman with Starnes), and Starnes 
himself.39 
The various Executive Board members of NSBRO still held out some hope that 
portions of the Training Corps could be salvaged.   French and M. R. Zigler met with 
Hershey on July 1 to discuss alternatives.  As French recalled, Hershey was “sorry to see 
it go out.  Congress’s action dismayed Hershey, but he also realized that he was limited in 
what he could actually do.  French wrote, “[Hershey] was not inclined to evade a direct 
mandate of Congress through some administrative device.  He said that he believed in a 
government of laws and not of men and that one of his major criticisms of the 
administration was that administrators ignored Congress and made their own laws.”  
French then asked Hershey if appointing a civilian to Camp Operations in place of Kosch 
would help their cause.  Hershey replied that were it not for the clear desire of Congress 
to disallow the Training Corps, he might consider replacing Kosch for that purpose.  
Hershey said he would think about drawing his own salary as a civilian director, ending 
some of the ambiguities about military money and a civilian program.  However, as with 
Kosch and his Camp Operations position, Hershey knew that doing so would not 
circumvent the intent of Congress in this particular instance.40    
In August, Hershey wrote French, reiterating his stance toward the Training Corps 
and his desire to let congressional action stand.  “Since Congress has definitely expressed 
itself on this Project [sic], I do not feel that I can take any action contrary to their 
                                                 
39French Diary, June 25, 26, & 28, 1943.  
40French Diary, July 1, 1943.  
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expressed wish nor any action that would circumvent it.  Since this action was taken by 
the Congress as a whole, it is not felt that any one member can nullify it.”41  Hershey may 
have been dismayed at the churches’ loss of the Training Corps, but he was adamant that 
he was not going to personally undermine the intent of Congress. 
The experience of Hershey and Congress over the CPS Training Corps reveals a 
number of things.  First, Hershey believed in the value of CPS and thought this plan was 
a noble endeavor, as evidenced by his initial support and his disappointment over the 
Starnes Amendment.  Second, his meeting with French and Zigler to discuss alternatives 
provides further evidence that Hershey was indeed sympathetic to conscientious objectors 
and the desires of NSBRO to improve CPS.  He was not a man who actively sought to 
restrict and place hardships on COs.  He wanted the Training Corps to go through and 
when it did not, he felt sorry for the men who had invested much time and personal desire 
into the possibility of overseas relief, hoping to bring CPS closer to the “work of national 
importance” the legislation of 1940 called for.  Finally, and most significantly, 
Congress’s rejection of the Training Corps revealed the limits of Hershey’s power.  In a 
similar vein to the experience of dependency payments and workmen’s compensation, 
just because Hershey wanted a program to succeed or be passed, other portions of the 
federal government who disagreed could either set up roadblocks or overrule him.  
Hershey was not an all-powerful government bureaucrat.  He was a military director of a 
                                                 
41Lewis B. Hershey to Paul Comly French, August 23, 1943, General Hershey’s 
Staybacks, 1943, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and Education Center, 
Carlisle, PA.  
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civilian institution who wielded enormous power and influence, was sympathetic to the 
CO, and respected the balance of power in the federal government. 
Throughout his entire career, Lewis Hershey was a frequent visitor to the United 
States Congress, providing testimony on the multitude of subjects that were a part of 
national military manpower policy.  During World War II, this was no different and he 
even discussed conscientious objection a few times.  Congress’s relationship with the 
conscientious objector was not a friendly on, though there were some congressmen who 
could be counted on to at least listen with a sympathetic ear to what the Historic Peace 
Churches had to say.  The actions of Congress during the war were not supportive and it 
neglected to adopt any legislation that provided workmen’s compensation for COs or 
dependent stipends to CO families.  It also struck down the CPS Training Corps, and 
attempt to train COs for overseas relief and rehabilitation efforts.  During the hearings or 
negations into these matters, Hershey’s attitudes were quite clear during much of the 
testimony.  Though the actions of Congress are of importance to conscientious objection, 
the most important information to emerge from the various hearings and negotiations are 
the complex and nuanced views held by Lewis Hershey.  He openly and frankly 
discussed why he did not support pay for COs, relating to his belief that conscientious 
objection was an entity best left out of the public eye.  Providing COs with a wage could 
arouse a negative public reaction, something Hershey definitely did not want to do.  
Hershey supported a workmen’s compensation plan for CPS and payments to the 
dependents of CO families.  However, his support for those possibilities, much like his 
support for the CPS Training Corps, revealed that his power as the Director of Selective 
Service was not all encompassing.  Though he exerted enormous influence over 
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conscientious objection during World War II, his power was not limitless.  He also mused 
on the relationship of the CO to the federal government and his own status as a military 
man in a civilian agency.  Additionally, his support for the various failed suggestions and 
programs, though futile, further demonstrates that he was sympathetic to the COs’ desires 
and hardships they faced during World War II.   
Overall, Hershey’s willingness to defend before Congress both COs and his 
efforts in administering alternative service illustrates that he truly believed in the 
concepts he put forth.  If Hershey was indifferent to CPS, or simply did not care, he 
would not have made an effort to protect COs from congressional action or inaction.  
Though not always successful, his actions suggest that he believed he was doing what 
was best for COs and their relation to the American state and society. 
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CHAPTER 9 – HERSHEY AND THE END OF CIVILIAN PUBLIC SERVICE, 1945-
1946 
 
As 1944 turned to 1945, much had changed for the U.S. forces fighting in Europe 
and the Pacific.  After having staved off a last-ditch attempt for victory from the German 
army in the Ardennes Forest, the Allied forces advanced across the Rhine into Germany.  
The Pacific Theater saw the eventual recapture of the Philippines and the preparations for 
the invasion of Iwo Jima.  However, the gains overseas meant little for conscientious 
objectors except for the possibility of a quicker end to the war and the demobilization of 
Civilian Public Service.  Though General Hershey dealt with other issues surrounding 
conscientious objection, ending CPS in a streamlined fashion occupied much of his time 
for CO matters.  Demobilizing CPS turned out to be a thankless task for Hershey.  On 
one hand, COs and their Peace Church representatives wanted the quick and timely 
discharge of CPS assignees.  On the other hand, Congress, veterans groups, and the War 
Department wanted to make sure that COs did not receive an “easy way out” of their 
national service obligations before the fighting men returned home from their overseas 
mission.  Hershey was once again at the forefront of negotiations for matters concerning 
conscientious objection, and his beliefs and ideals towards the matter shaped his actions 
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in this phase, too.  Keeping with his vision of alternative service comparable to that in the 
armed forces, his plans for demobilizing CPS initially mirrored plans for military 
demobilization, including a point system.  However, resistance from Congress, veterans 
groups, and the War Department and Hershey’s fears of negative reaction from the public 
led him to compromise on plans for discharging CPS assignees.  The actual 
demobilization process, though wrought with controversy and frustration, worked and it 
stood as yet another example of Lewis Hershey’s importance to conscientious objection 
in World War II, demonstrating his deft touch with political negotiation and his attempts 
to protect his vision for alternative service. 
The discussions for demobilizing CPS did not begin until the European phase of 
the war ended with Germany’s unconditional surrender on May 7-8, 1945.  Hershey, 
Kosch, and the Historic Peace Churches worked together on a plan to end CPS and 
discharge the assignees in a timely fashion.  Recall that Hershey had tried to implement 
alternative service and CPS in a way that mirrored the armed forces in terms of an 
individual’s duty to serve.  Hershey’s beliefs towards ending CPS were no different, as he 
wanted to implement a point system for CO discharges similar to the army’s.  His initial 
plan involved one point earned for each month of service, twelve points for each child, 
and three points for a spouse.  Men serving less than one year could not be released, and 
an assignee lost one point for each day’s absence or refusal to work.  Furthermore, no 
assignee could be released if he had any legal prosecution against him.1  Though this plan 
                                                 
1Selective Service to C.P.S. Camps, Administrative Directive #24, (printed in 
Conscientious Objection, 137); and Selective Service and Victory: Fourth Report of the 
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seemed perfectly reasonable to Hershey, he came up against much opposition almost 
immediately.  As a result, he revised his plans considerably by the time the Selective 
Service began to send men home from CPS. 
Most of the initial discontent came from Congress and veterans groups.  The main 
point of concern for them was the use of points in determining the discharge of CPS 
assignees.  Many saw this as an unfair system that made it easier for COs to go home 
sooner than those who fought overseas.  It continued to be a source of frustration and 
disgruntlement between the Selective Service, Congress, the Peace Churches, and various 
veterans groups throughout 1945.  Hershey found himself caught in the middle between 
two groups that he dealt with on a frequent basis.  On one side were the veterans groups, 
such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, who called for the CPS 
men to remain in camp until every draftee in the armed forces came home.  On the other 
side were the Peace Churches, who wanted the men to be discharged as soon as possible.2  
Though Hershey dealt with many other matters concerning conscientious objection, the 
demobilization of CPS was the most pressing and most important CO issue he 
administered with during the final years of the war and immediately thereafter. 
As mentioned before, there were some early portions of Hershey’s plan that 
quickly fell by the wayside, such as how CPS men received their points.  Hershey 
initially thought that men involved in the firefighting (smokejumping) and the Guinea Pig 
Units should receive a few more points due to their individual sacrifices and the dangers 
                                                 
Director of Selective Service,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 
183.  
2Ibid., 184.  
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they faced, but little more appeared in discussions beyond his initial musings on the 
subject.  On May 15, 1945, the plans for discharging CPS men based on a point system, 
age, and dependency appeared in The Reporter, the bi-weekly publication from NSBRO 
on matters concerning conscientious objection.  This plan did not include extra points for 
the smokejumpers or the men in the Guinea Pig Units, but the men did receive one point 
for each month of service and twelve points for each dependent child, with a maximum of 
three children allowed.  Hershey and Kosch also made it clear in late May that they 
wanted CPS to end six months after the end of the war with Japan.3  This came to be 
wishful thinking on the part of Hershey and Kosch. 
In June, the plan for the end of CPS became more clear and explicit.  The 
Selective Service lowered the age limit from forty-two to forty.  CPS assignees now 
earned three points for a wife in addition to the aforementioned credits for time served 
and children.  June also marked the time when lost points for men who refused to work or 
were absent without leave at any point in their CPS service became publicly reported to 
the COs.  The Legal Section of Selective Service also announced that CPS would be over 
six months after the end of the war.4  However, as Hershey, Kosch, and the Peace 
Churches formulated plans for demobilization that summer, Hershey began to come 
under criticism from members of Congress and the veterans groups for what they viewed 
as unfair advantages being given to those who, in their minds, did not share in the 
sacrifices required by duty to the nation.   
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4The Reporter, June 1, 1945.  
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The veterans groups in particular were vehement in their opposition to the CPS 
demobilization plan.  They directed some of their critiques towards the spousal credit, 
because there were no points for spouses in the military’s plan for postwar 
demobilization.  The American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars were quite clear 
to Hershey and the Selective Service that they did not support discharging COs before the 
men in the armed forces came home.  The stock response from Hershey and the Selective 
Service was that they merely followed the legal dictates of Congress.  Because the 
Selective Service Act of 1940 provided for conscientious objection and the Selective 
Service held administrative power over COs, they were entirely within their legal rights 
to provide for and administer demobilization proceedings for COs as they saw fit.5  Their 
line of reasoning, though, did not quell the growing opposition to CPS demobilization. 
The actions of the veterans groups brought Hershey to a boiling point.  Hershey’s 
task was to raise an army for combat without extensively disturbing the industrial and 
agricultural production of the nation, all the while setting and approving policies for 
conscientious objection.  In all, it was a thankless job that brought criticism from many 
quarters.  By 1945, Hershey’s patience was running thin.  By simply examining the 
matter of conscientious objection, one can see how Hershey’s friendly demeanor with the 
Peace Churches during the first couple of years of the war began to change as he became 
more frustrated with camp discipline, administrative problems, and the ever-looming 
public opinion issue.  Being told by veterans groups how to do his job (which was how he 
viewed the situation) was simply too much.  Kosch relayed Hershey’s attitude to French 
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during a meeting between the two on June 15.  Hershey’s staff drafted a number of letters 
to the various veterans groups responding to their critiques and outlining the stance of the 
Selective Service, but Hershey rejected them because the language in them was not 
forceful enough.  Cooler heads prevailed when Kosch reasoned with Hershey.  In the 
words of French, “The General felt that they should tell the Legion and the VFW that the 
matter was none of their business – with the usual Army profanity – and Kosch agreed 
with him, but felt it unwise to write such a forthright communication.”6  The public 
response from the Selective Service was that it only followed the law as set forth by 
Congress,7 
The veterans groups were not the only people who thought the initial plans for 
CPS demobilization provided COs an unearned advantage.  Hershey and the Selective 
Service faced criticism from Congress as well.  Many of the grumblings in the legislature 
focused on the point system.  The initial response from the Selective Service was the 
point system simply determined the order of a person’s discharge, not the percentage of 
men sent home from CPS.  Another source of criticism was that the CPS men had more 
opportunities to accumulate points because the Selective Service decided not to limit the 
number of children that could be counted toward a point total.8  Congressman Arthur 
Winstead (D-MS) introduced legislation that strictly limited the demobilization 
proceedings for CPS.  Winstead felt that it was “unfair” for COs to receive a wife credit 
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and points for children beyond the three received by those in the army.  In the army, the 
maximum number of children for which a soldier could receive points was three, while 
there was not limit on children for men in CPS.  As an alternative, Winstead offered a bill 
that made a point system for CPS exactly like the army’s.  However, as structured under 
Winstead’s plan, no assignee would have qualified for a discharge from CPS based on 
points.  Under this plan, the highest number of points possible for the CPS assignees was 
eighty-four (in most cases).  They needed eighty-five points to be discharged.  Winstead 
pointed to armed service morale as one of his major reasons for introducing the bill.  He 
stated, “If the Selective Service follows this plan, it will be one of the most demoralizing 
blows to this country and to the men in service we have had during the entire war.  If the 
conscientious objectors are conscientious, they will not want advantages over the fighting 
man.”9   
Privately, Winstead expressed a more tolerant viewpoint, but his words rang 
hollow with Kosch and French.  Winstead told French in a personal conversation that he 
did not wish to end demobilization completely, but Kosch thought Winstead’s 
motivations were more nefarious than he let on.  Later, French came to agree with Kosch, 
believing Winstead had lied to his face.  In order to keep demobilization going at an 
acceptable rate and avoid any impediments, Kosch was willing to drop the wife credit 
and limit the children for points to three, thereby mirroring the plan for the army, 
something Hershey clearly would have supported if only for avoiding more negative 
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reactions.10  It was becoming quickly clear that Hershey needed to compromise if he 
wanted to send COs home in a timely fashion. 
Winstead made even more restrictive, calling for complete removal of the point 
system for CPS.  In an informal hearing before the House Committee on Military Affairs 
on July 9, the committee expressed that it did not support Hershey and the Selective 
Service’s plan for the end of Civilian Public Service and instead backed Winstead’s 
proposal.  Responding to the charge that the Selective Service’s plan was much too 
lenient, Kosch argued that the points system might seem more liberal than that of the 
armed services until one considered that the men received no dependency benefits.  
Another line of reasoning from Hershey’s legislative liaison Frank Keesling maintained 
that CPS was a form of government or national service, comparable to serving in the 
military.  Keesling implored the committee to consider the CO in government serviceas 
having status similar to that of a soldier.  However, it was all to no avail.  Only July 11, 
the committee approved the Winstead Bill, but at the behest of Congressman John 
Sparkman, one of the few legislators the Peace Churches could count on for support, it 
agreed to allow for hardship cases to be discharged.  In its report, the committee 
described its motivation for backing the Winstead Bill. 
It is the opinion of the committee that conscientious objectors performing 
assigned civilian work should not be permitted release to resume normal life 
while the armed forces are still engaged in combat with the enemy and members 
of such forces are denied release.  To provide for release of such conscientious 
                                                 
10French Diary, July 5, 1945.  
 237 
objectors under the point system would adversely affect morale in the armed 
forces. 11   
The Winstead Bill, did not prove to be the final word in the demobilization of Civilian 
Public Service, as it never came to a vote in the House.  However, it provided a 
significant roadblock for Hershey because the possibility of it passing remained for a 
time.  With the Winstead Bill looming over their heads, Hershey, the Selective Service, 
and the Peace Churches sought ways to discharge conscientious objectors in a systematic 
fashion. 
With the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 
and 9 respectively, it appeared as though the war with Japan would be over soon.  This 
was a fact not lost on Hershey as he appeared to be in an excellent mood during an 
August 8 meeting with Kosch and representatives of the Peace Churches.  French claimed 
it was “…one of the most friendly meetings we have had with the General in a year or 
two.”12  By the end of August, with the Winstead Bill languishing in the legislative 
process, Hershey and Kosch decided it was in their best interest to implement their own 
plans for demobilization if the House of Representatives did not act on the bill by 
October 1.  They had stopped pressing for the point system on July 19, waiting to see 
what Congress was going to do with the Winstead Bill, but they held out hope they could 
still implement some form of points.  They were also going to try to have a representative 
                                                 
11French Diary, July 9-11, 1945; The Reporter, July 15, 1945, 1-2; and Congress, 
House, Committee on Military Affairs, Preventing a Point System from Being Applied in 
Connection with the Release of Certain Conscientious Objectors, 12 July 1945, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess., H. Rep. 904.   
12French Diary, August 8, 1945; and The Reporter, August 1, 1945, 1.  
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at the American Legion convention in September, to soothe some of the vehement 
resistance to the Selective Service’s CPS discharge policy.  Hopefully, they thought, they 
could prevent the American Legion from passing a resolution denouncing the 
demobilization plans for CPS.13  This is further evidence of Hershey’s desire to have 
public opinion reflect positively on the provisions for conscientious objection and to have 
all matters remain within the walls of national headquarters.  Hershey definitely did not 
like outsiders telling him how to manage conscientious objection.  Though he became 
frustrated with certain issues at times, he believed, and rightly so, that he alone held the 
power to decide exactly how CPS should end and the men should be discharged from 
their national service. 
Hershey’s desire for the Selective Service to maintain autonomy also manifested 
itself in his correspondence with the War Department, yet another entity that pressured 
Hershey on the CPS demobilization issue.  One mistake Hershey made in his early plans 
for the end of CPS was that he did not consult the White House on the issue.  President 
Harry Truman, in office after the death of Franklin Roosevelt in April 1945, was not 
particularly sympathetic to the conscientious objector.  Hershey’s plan also came under 
the scrutiny of the War Department.  In June, Under-secretary of War Robert Patterson 
informed Hershey the he was not happy about Hershey’s plans to demobilize quickly 
based on a point system.  Patterson told Hershey that he understood COs were outside of 
                                                 
13French Diary, August 28, 1945; and Lewis B. Hershey to Claude Pepper, 
August 8, 1945, General Hershey’s Staybacks, 1945, part 3, Lewis B. Hershey 
Collection, Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  Hershey’s letter to 
Senator Pepper states that the Selective Service issued a press release temporarily 
dropping the point system for CPS demobilization on July 19.  
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the War Department’s jurisdiction, but he was concerned about the effect on morale in 
the armed forces “if men who refuse to fight are relieved prior to the relief of men who 
do the actual fighting.”  Patterson concluded, 
 “From the viewpoint of the War Department it would appear that an individual 
who has been classified as a conscientious objector and assigned to a civilian 
public service camp for work of national importance should not be released until 
the major demobilization is completed after the defeat of Japan.”14   
Hershey made it clear to Patterson that as the Director of Selective Service, he 
was the chief administrator of Civilian Public Service.  He wanted to demobilize CPS as 
quickly as possible because the men in the camps received no benefits, yet many 
expected COs to remain in the camps for the same amount of time as the men in the 
armed forces.  He argued that his system favored men with dependents to a greater degree 
than those in the army because of the lack of dependency allotments in CPS.  Even so, 
Hershey was aware of the possibility of negative morale consequences if men in CPS 
went home more quickly and in greater percentages than those in the military overseas.  
He told Patterson, as he had told many others before, that the discontent from certain 
quarters, mainly veterans groups, seemed to be more with the laws established in 1940 
than the present Selective Service administration of CPS.  He said that if Congress did 
not think that the Selective Service was carrying out the original intent of the law, then 
Hershey was willing to change his approach.  He firmly supported his stance and the 
work performed by the COs.  He wrote, 
Inasmuch as these men have complied with the law and performed the duty 
required of them, I can see no reason why they should be discriminated against.  It 
                                                 
14Robert P. Patterson to Lewis B. Hershey, June 27 1945, Letters to Hershey, 
1944-1950, Trine University Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Angola, IN.  
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would appear just as logical for the Navy to complain that the discharge of men 
from the Army was detrimental to their morale at this time.15 
The War Department, though, disagreed. and Patterson told Hershey that they wanted 
him to wait until Congress took final action on the Winstead Bill.16 
Hershey formulated another line of argument beyond the “congressional will” 
justification.  He intended to argue to the Budget Bureau that continuing CPS and 
keeping men in the camps for a prolonged period was a waste of taxpayer money.  
Hershey understood the effectiveness of using financial arguments with an agency that 
was fiscal in nature.  When the war officially ended with Japan’s surrender in September 
1945, Hershey still held on to his treasured point system for CPS (though he and Kosch 
suspended public advocacy of it), hoping to make the CO discharges as equitable as 
possible with those in the military.  He and Kosch also suggested that CPS needed to end 
in three months.  To facilitate this, Hershey met with a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Military Affairs consisting of Sparkman, Paul Kilday (D-TX), Andrew 
May (D-KY), Dewey Short (R-MO), and Leslie Arends (R-IL).  French believed that 
these particular committee members wanted to see CPS demobilize as quickly and 
painlessly as possible.17 
                                                 
15Lewis B. Hershey to Robert Patterson, July 12, 1945, General Hershey’s 
Staybacks, War Department Staybacks, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
16Robert Patterson to Lewis B. Hershey, August 4, 1945, General Hershey’s 
Staybacks, War Department Staybacks, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  
17French Diary, September 6, 1945.  
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After the meeting with the members of the House, Hershey was ready for 
demobilization to commence, but without one of his favored elements: there was to be no 
point system.  The sub-committee members told Hershey that if the Selective Service 
instituted a point system, the Winstead Bill would be revived.  The reasoning for this was 
the ever-present worry about public opinion.  It concerned everyone on the sub-
committee, Hershey, and Kosch.  The representatives supported Hershey’s plan, but they 
ordered that the Selective Service should in no way call it a point system and that they 
were not willing to go on the public record for supporting the plan.  Public opinion and 
their possibility of reelection apparently trumped their concern for conscientious 
objectors.  Even Winstead had no vested concern about conscientious objection.  During 
a September 12 meeting, Kosch informed French “that Congressman Winstead told him 
that he had little personal interest in the bill he had proposed, but that he had introduced it 
at the request of veterans groups and would push it if the veterans demanded such 
action.”  Hershey and Kosch concluded that a rational approach to the situation would not 
work, and they needed to get men out of CPS as quickly as they could.  They believed 
that a no-win situation was on the horizon with public opinion, especially with the 
veterans groups.18  That meant dropping the point system entirely and discharging the 
oldest men in CPS quickly. 
At a meeting on September 21, Kilday and Winstead agreed to allow CPS 
demobilization, and Winstead agreed to withdraw his bill.  By mid-October, NSBRO 
thought it was no longer a problem in ending CPS.  The plan for discharging CPS 
                                                 
18French Diary, September 12, 1945.  
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assignees “on a basis of age, length of service, dependency, and hardship….”  However, 
as had been made clear in previous meetings with congressmen, there was no point 
system in place.  French wanted to get 3,500 to 4,000 men out of CPS by the end of 1945.  
Kilday and Winstead had no objection to those numbers, but Kosch doubted the 
administrative apparatus was up to the task.  Soon after the meeting, Kosch and French 
agreed on a goal of 2,500 to 3,000 men out by the end of the year and assignees with 
more than two years of CPS service out by May 15, 1946.19 
Hershey and Kosch also attempted to placate the veterans groups, particularly the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars.  The VFW agreed to stop pressuring Congress on CPS 
demobilization in mid-September.  Hershey decided to attend the VFW convention in 
early October to put forth the position of the Selective Service and, hopefully, to mollify 
the more obstinate chapters.20  However, over the next few days, Hershey began to 
change his mind concerning CPS demobilization.  He informed Kosch that he wanted the 
discharges of men to wait until the beginning of 1946, waiting for the various veterans 
groups’ conventions to occur.  The only people he felt should be released until then were 
those over the age of thirty-eight.  Hershey’s decision bitterly disappointed French.21  
French had worked hard to achieve timely discharges for the men in CPS, but he also 
knew the overwhelming power of Hershey in the Selective Service.  If Hershey said no, 
then that was the end of the discussion. 
                                                 
19French Diary, September 20-21, 25,1945; and The Reporter, October 15, 1945, 
1. 
20French Diary, September 25, 1945.  
21French Diary, September 28, 1945  
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Hershey’s abrupt change of heart is somewhat puzzling.  Throughout the summer 
of 1945, he had supported the efforts to demobilize CPS and discharge the assignees.  
Recall, though, that Hershey was always conscious of public opinion and the sometimes 
tenuous regard Congress held toward conscientious objection.  Hershey sensed that it was 
best to wait until after the national VFW convention and allow some of the most vicious 
attacks on conscientious objection to die down.   
French traveled to the VFW convention in Chicago to convince Hershey to 
change his mind.  Hershey demurred, saying the VFW lobby simply had too much pull in 
Congress and that pressing for immediate demobilization while military personnel were 
still overseas risked making matters even worse for COs.  French reminded Hershey that 
some of the men in the camps believed that they were being singled out and refused equal 
treatment because they had taken an unpopular stance during the war.  Hershey 
legitimately sympathized with them and wanted to see them discharged in a timely 
fashion, but he firmly held that waiting until early-1946 was the best way to avoid a 
public relations or legislative problem.  French continued to press Hershey on this issue, 
and Hershey listened with concern, but he refused to relent.  He even cited the American 
Legion’s national convention in November as a further reason to avoid large-scale CPS 
discharges in 1945.22 
This was simply not acceptable to the representatives of the Peace Churches.  On 
October 10, French and Paul Furnas, Director of Friends CPS; Albert Gaeddert, Director 
of Mennonite CPS; and Harold Row, Director of Brethren CPS, met with Hershey and 
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Kosch to voice their displeasure.  They called for more immediate demobilization of 
Civilian Public Service and that it “should continue on a systematic basis,” the position of 
the veterans groups notwithstanding.  They did not give the same credence to the reaction 
of the veterans groups that Hershey did.  Hershey reaffirmed his stance, again citing 
public opinion as his main reason.  After three hours of deliberation with the Peace 
Church contingent, he was more receptive to a limited demobilization in 1945.  He 
believed that by November 30 he could discharge men over thirty-eight, and those over 
thirty-five with two or more years of service.  He thought that men with four years of 
CPS service could be out by December 30 and that proceedings for the discharge of men 
with three years of service could begin on January 1, 1946 and finish May 30.  The next 
day, though, he made it clear that while their agreement stood, he was not going to issue a 
public declaration or put a formal decree in writing, because he still felt that it could 
cause a negative public reaction.23 
At this time, Hershey believed that much of the discontent towards him and his 
organization over the demobilization of CPS would soon pass now that the fighting in the 
Pacific Theater was over.  This was something he expressed often in his official 
correspondence, particularly with senators and representatives.  As the opposition died 
down, Hershey believed that it would become much easier to release men from their 
alternative service.24  He also believed that his new plan would not rouse the ire of the 
                                                 
23French Diary, October 10-11, 1945.  
24Hershey to Pepper; Lewis B. Hershey to Aime Forand, October 2, 1945, General 
Hershey’s Staybacks, 1945, part 3, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA; and Lewis B. Hershey to Henrik Shipstead, October 2, 
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public.  However, remaining cautious, he did not announce the CPS demobilization plan 
publicly until February 1946.25 
Hershey and Kosch were concerned with public opinion, though, from the end of 
1945 into early 1946.  In early 1946, Kosch publicly responded to an editorial in the 
Washington Daily News that actually supported the COs.  Now, Hershey and Kosch faced 
criticism on both sides of the equation.  The editorial in the Daily News criticized the 
Selective Service for its slowness in discharging the men from CPS.  In response, Kosch 
wrote, “Inasmuch as conscientious objectors did not start their program until 
approximately six months later than the armed forces, it is felt that in fairness to 
everybody concerned their demobilization should fall somewhat behind that of the armed 
forces.”26 
Another issue that Hershey dealt with during the latter part of 1945 and into early 
1946 was the end of the draft itself.  Because Hershey’s primary role was to administer 
the draft through the Selective Service, the possibilities of ending the draft commanded 
much of his attention.  Hershey saw conscription in the United States after the war as a 
means of ensuring global security, but the armed forces disagreed with his emphasis on 
an army of draftees.  Congress, too, wanted to end the draft.  President Truman took a 
different approach.  Truman wanted to replace the draft with Universal Military Training.  
                                                 
1945, General Hershey’s Staybacks, 1945, part 3, Lewis B. Hershey Collection, Army 
Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.  This is a small sampling of Hershey’s 
numerous responses citing his belief that V-J Day lessened some of the criticism levied 
toward the Selective Service concerning CPS discharges. 
25Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 133.  
26The Reporter, February 1, 1946, 1,4.  
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Under his plan, all eligible men would receive military training for six months instead of 
military service for a specified duration, though his plan did not come to pass.  From the 
military came the argument that while ultimately the draft was not the answer, the army 
of occupation required conscripts to fill its ranks.  Then, in early 1946 manpower 
problems emerged.  Low draft calls coupled with a low volunteer rate meant that 
demobilization became more deliberate.  Hershey, along with others such as General 
Dwight Eisenhower, Robert Patterson, and Secretary of State James Byrnes called for the 
draft to be lengthened.  Furthering the intensity of the argument was the emerging tension 
with the Soviet Union over foreign policy and fears of Soviet aggression in Eastern and 
Central Europe.  As a result, in June 1946 Congress extended the draft to March 31, 
1947.27 
 By the spring of 1946, CPS demobilization was still crawling along too slowly for 
the taste of the Peace Church representatives.  Though a plan was in place, they believed 
that not enough men were leaving the camps.  On March 4, Hershey and Kosch met with 
French, Furnas, M. R. Zigler of the Brethren, and Orie Miller of the Mennonites.  The 
Peace Church contingent expressed their desire for a faster rate of release.  Kosch 
responded that over fifty percent of the men in CPS had been sent home, which was 
actually a higher rate than that of the army.  Hershey told the men that plans were for all 
men with eighteen months of service to be discharged by October and after that, eighteen 
months’ service would automatically merit release from CPS.28   
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By the end of January 1946, the Selective Service had demobilized about forty-
five percent of the men in CPS, compared to about sixty-one percent in the military.  
Although the Peace Churches may have been unhappy with the rate of discharge for CPS, 
the Selective Service sent men home at a fairly steady rate from late 1945 until early 
1947.  To be fair, the steadiness of the rate was never an issue with the churches; rather, it 
was the quantity of men being sent home.  Though the Selective Service continuously 
sent men home throughout 1946, the last man did not leave CPS until the end of March 
1947, the same time the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 expired.29 
 All told, about twelve thousand men performed their national service in an 
alternative fashion by serving in CPS.  This was out of the seventy to seventy-five 
thousand men who initially claimed to be conscientious objectors.  An estimated twenty-
five thousand men served as noncombatants in the military, fourteen thousand were 
reclassified after first receiving a I-A-O or IV-E classification, the Justice Department 
convicted sixteen hundred for failure to report, and roughly twenty thousand men who 
claimed CO status never received that classification from their local draft board.30 
 During World War II, the United States had 34.5 million men register for the 
draft.  The fifty-two thousand men who received either the I-A-O or IV-E classification 
made up about .15% of the total draft population.  The largest percentage of COs came 
from the states of Kansas, Indiana, and Washington.  Not surprisingly, the largest 
denominational representation in the CPS camps came from the Mennonites (4,610 men), 
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96; and Gingerich, 85.  
30Conscientious Objection, 313-315.  
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the Brethren (1,468), and the Society of Friends (902).  However, the Methodists (845) 
and the Jehovah’s Witnesses (532) also had a strong representation compared to other 
denominations in CPS.31 
Though Hershey was an immensely powerful person within his own bureaucratic 
institution, he was not above the political process, and he was not able to inflict his will 
wantonly on any organization or group he chose.  Hershey was also adept at the political 
game as evidenced by his dealings with Congress throughout the war and during the 
negotiations for demobilizing Civilian Public Service.  Were it not for Hershey’s efforts 
in discharging CPS assignees, Congress or the War Department might have required COs 
to remain in camps even longer.  Granted, the men remained in camps for longer than the 
Historic Peace Churches may have wanted, but Hershey was walking a fine line 
throughout 1945 and 1946.  Trying to make two groups happy when they came at the 
issue from two entirely different viewpoints was a thankless task, but one that Hershey 
performed adeptly.  He put forth the best plan possible given the situation.  He needed to 
make sure that Congress or the veterans groups did not become too agitated while 
maintaining some form of demobilization that was fair to conscientious objectors.  It may 
not have been the result for which COs had hoped, but the likelihood of any person doing 
better than Hershey was low.  Indeed, this was yet another example of how Hershey 
shaped alternative service and in some ways, protected COs from entities that did not 
have their best interests at heart. 
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CHAPTER 10 - EPILOGUE 
 
As CPS demobilized in 1946 and into 1947, Hershey began to muse on the 
successes and failures of the alternative service program.  During the final days of CPS, 
Hershey and Kosch discussed with the Peace Churches what they believed had worked 
and what needed to be changed in the future.  In those CPS evaluations, many came to 
the conclusion that if any person other than Hershey had been in charge of conscientious 
objectors during World War II, the tale of COs would have probably been much different 
and perhaps even tragic.  However, though many lauded Hershey’s leadership in a 
difficult position, not everyone held a celebratory view of his role.  Throughout the years 
of Hershey’s term as director, the concept of alternative service for conscientious 
objectors remained intact, though there was a brief period of deferment for COs during 
the early years of the Cold War.  There were changes, as the Supreme Court altered the 
fundamental definition of who was a conscientious objector in the case United States v. 
Seeger (1965), but alternative service remained firmly entrenched.  By firmly outlining 
the service duty of all eligible men, Hershey’s administration of conscientious objection 
during World War II established the principle that even if a man objected to military 
service, his national obligations must be fulfilled.  These tenets remained firmly in place 
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as Hershey continued to be the Director of Selective Service until his removal by 
President Richard Nixon in 1970.   
 After a long and sometimes tenuous six years of CPS, Selective Service Director 
of Camp Operations Lewis Kosch mused on what the best alternative service policy 
would be for the future.  Kosch felt that the church administration made things entirely 
too difficult.  He and Hershey wanted the COs to work directly for the government rather 
than the Peace Church service agencies.  They both believed that COs receive pay, 
dependency benefits, and workmen’s compensation.  Furthermore, alternative service 
should not be seen as a lesser form than the armed forces.  In their eyes, the government 
should sponsor a civil service program equal to the armed service but less confusing and 
convoluted than the numerous administrative groups and projects sponsored by various 
government agencies.1 
 About the same time as Kosch was meeting with French in July 1946, Philip 
Jacob and Mulford Sibley, authors of Conscription of Conscience, were interviewing 
Hershey for their book.  In this interview, Hershey echoed some of Kosch’s views, but 
Hershey had more to say on other topics as well.  Hershey believed that COs should be 
paid and the funds should come from the government, though a CO receiving higher pay 
than an army private could cause a public relations problem.  He also believed that the 
most efficient way to ensure CO compensation was probably a government-controlled 
camp system rather than the cumbersome dual administrative roles of CPS.  However, he 
also supported “private agencies and individuals” developing and supporting CO 
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programs without pay, if men chose to work in those endeavors.  Hershey also 
commented “in vigorous language” that he supported dependency and compensation 
payments to CPS assignees, reaffirming the position he had put forth to Congress.2  
However, Hershey eventually changed his mind about the camps.  For the remaining 
years of conscription in the United States, the Selective Service did not use work camps 
as a means of alternative service.  It did, however, retain control over conscientious 
objectors. 
 In his evaluation of CPS and the Selective Service’s handling of conscientious 
objectors, Hershey was cognizant of his own responsibility for both CPS and the 
assignees.  He noted that President Roosevelt’s executive order placed the responsibility 
for the conscientious objector on him.  Although he delegated some of his authority to 
men like Lewis Kosch, any problems that emerged came to his feet no matter the 
circumstances.  The final say rested with Hershey alone.  He was grateful to the Peace 
Churches for their help in developing CPS because he believed that they knew better than 
anybody else the nature of the objectors.3  
Hershey was the federal government’s authority on conscientious objection and 
became the architect of alternative service.  Though he had to compromise at times and 
delegate his authority, in the end it was Hershey’s voice that rang above all others on the 
matter, whether in public or behind closed doors. 
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 Hershey also evaluated the role of the Peace Churches in administering CPS.  He 
had glowing remarks for the Mennonites.  He believed that they had the best and 
smoothest administrative system because the local Mennonite ministers and fathers 
provided an authoritarian tradition.  He found the Brethren to be more in the middle, but 
to him, the Friends caused considerable trouble.  Sibley and Jacob relate that, “Hershey 
said the Friends believed no one should give orders to anyone else.”4  Recall that most of 
the discipline problems in the camps came from those operated by the AFSC.  
Furthermore, the AFSC was frequently at odds with Hershey and the Selective Service 
over the administration and direction of CPS.  There appeared to be no love lost between 
the AFSC and Hershey. 
 Hershey was willing to admit that CPS definitely had its problems and failed at 
some of its objectives.  He said that the introduction of the government-run camps was a 
result of those failures.  Hershey claimed that there were three reasons for men to be 
assigned to government camps: “they were persona non grata in church camps,” they 
“didn’t want to be on church charity,” or they “did not want to be subjected to religious 
rites – to be ‘prayed over’ at meals, as [Hershey] put it.”5  Therefore, in Hershey’s mind, 
the government camps existed to solve some of the problems in CPS by providing a place 
for the recalcitrant COs, some of whom likely did not fit the “religious training and 
belief” definition of the Selective Service Act. 
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 Hershey and his staff were constantly concerned about public opinion in CPS.  
They made sure to select projects and locate camps in areas where they believed there 
would be less resistance to conscientious objectors.  There were not many camps in the 
South, nor did they put any in Oklahoma, where, according to Sibley and Jacob, “greater 
intolerance was expressed toward c.o.’s than anywhere else in the country.”  Hershey 
maintained that though there was greater public acceptance of conscientious objectors 
during World War II then there had been during the First World War, people of older 
generations and veterans groups were still likely to harbor ill feelings towards COs.  He 
mentioned that in confronting the veterans groups, Kosch could be particularly 
persuasive, appearing in his military uniform with a “Prussian” bearing (Hershey’s 
words), and telling them “I don’t like the damn thing, but it’s the law.”6 
 Finally, Hershey reiterated his belief in the role of local draft boards and the 
importance of a decentralized system of conscription.  For him, a true democratic 
government was decentralized.  He believed that the draft boards, overall, had done a 
adequate job in the classification of COs, though there were some instances of 
discrimination.7  Hershey’s belief in the importance of the draft board was central to his 
concept of conscription in the United States.  Conscientious objection was also handled in 
a decentralized fashion, true to Hershey’s wishes.  For example, in a 1955 interview, 
Hershey, speaking specifically about the Jehovah’s Witnesses, decried national 
centralized definitions of classification as denying certain Americans the freedom of 
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worship.  He said, “If we decide in Washington that a certain man is not a minister of the 
Gospel, when he says he is, then we are denying to a segment of the population the right 
to worship as they choose.”  Using some of his trademarked humor, he remarked, “Jesus 
himself couldn’t have gotten deferment as a minister under some standards.  He was 
engaged in secular employment – he was a carpenter.”  Finally, he brought his comments 
full circle when he said, “I know many persons have taken advantage of this loophole, 
but I’m willing to get away with it in order to protect freedom of worship in America.  
You can’t have conformity and liberty at the same time.”8  Where Hershey drew the line 
was the insincere objector. 
Although there were other men involved in the creation of alternative service 
during World War II, none were more instrumental than General Lewis B. Hershey.  This 
was not lost on those who clamored for greater recognition for conscientious objection.  
Without delving too deeply into a dangerous game of counter-factual history, a military 
man other than Hershey in charge of the draft and conscientious objectors opened the 
possibility of a nightmare scenario similar to World War I.  Numerous men who worked 
for the benefit of conscientious objectors said as much during or after the war.  One 
example was the executive secretary of NSBRO, Paul French.  Though their relationship 
was strained at times, particularly during the latter years of the war, Hershey and French 
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bore a mutual respect for one another.  French spoke quite highly of Hershey, noting 
many times that Hershey was a “big man” above petty bureaucratic squabbles and biases 
aiming for what was best for the conscientious objector.9  Other men saw this as well.  
Joseph Weaver, a Mennonite NSBRO staff member, commented that without Hershey, 
“we would have never gone through the war as intact as we were as a peace 
organization.” 10  Weaver’s statement illustrates that Hershey’s efforts created an 
atmosphere that allowed for the Historic Peace Churches to maintain their peace witness 
while Hershey argued that all eligible men were required to serve their nation in some 
capacity. 
The best evaluation of Hershey’s importance to conscientious objection came 
from M. R. Zigler, a major leader in the Church of the Brethren throughout the twentieth 
century.  Zigler’s efforts in peacemaking garnered him much attention both in the Church 
of the Brethren and other Protestant denominations.  Though French had more frequent 
contact with Hershey throughout the war, Zigler was the chief executive of NSBRO and 
developed both a personal and professional relationship with Hershey.  Over the years, 
Hershey and Zigler became good friends.  At Zigler’s behest, Hershey attended the 
Church of the Brethren Annual Conference in 1944 and Zigler’s On Earth Peace meeting 
in 1974.  Hershey viewed Zigler with “respect” and “affection.”  In an interview 
published in 1996 (many years after the deaths of both men), Zigler said that Hershey 
was “very sympathetic” to the COs and stated, 
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My own judgment, he’s [Hershey] a good man.  Very good man.  He had been a 
head of Boy Scouts along with his military, which explains some things to me, 
and I feel personally that Mr. Hershey had a religious background, even though he 
didn’t belong to any church, at least he claimed he didn’t.  He always said he was 
never washed [baptized].  But on the question of religious liberty he was very 
strong.  And I would say that perhaps he was the finest exponent of religious 
liberty that I’ve ever met, and certainly the best as far as any officials in American 
government are concerned.  He had a deep respect for opposition and even wished 
that that could be the position of everybody.  I mean, he didn’t like war.11 
Zigler had a long and storied career within the Church of Brethren and had the 
opportunity to meet thousands of people for whom he could develop a sense of their 
stance towards religious liberty.  For him to say that Hershey was “the finest exponent of 
religious liberty I’ve ever met” bordered on hyperbole, but it was a statement grounded in 
truth.  Zigler’s remarks reflect the deep appreciation Zigler had for Hershey along with 
the rare traits Hershey possessed, something many members of the Historic Peace 
Churches often found lacking in the American government.  Zigler, in the same 
interview, also pointed out just how important Hershey was in steering conscientious 
objection in a new direction during World War II, not only shaping a working 
relationship between the churches and the federal government, but also establishing 
alternative service as the means of providing for conscientious objection.  When asked 
whether or not the Peace Churches’ relationship with the government “worked fairly 
well,” Zigler responded, “Yes, but if we had a different man than General Hershey, … I 
don’t know what might have happened.  I think that ought to be said.”12  
                                                 
11Donald Durnbaugh, Pragmatic Prophet: The Life of Michael Robert Zigler 
(Elgin, Il: Brethren Press, 1989), 129, 185, 277; and Zigler, 6.  
12Zigler, 15.  
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However, not everyone celebrated Hershey as a great arbiter of tolerance within 
the government and military establishment.  No person was as sharply critical of Hershey 
and Civilian Public Service as Gordon Zahn, a Catholic conscientious objector.  Zahn 
believed that conscientious objection was a right, not a privilege.  Zahn was particularly 
critical of Hershey’s and the Selective Service’s policies and actions towards COs during 
World War II.  He stated that Hershey was wrong to seclude COs in remote camp 
locations.  Most of his criticisms about CPS were about perceived inequities in the 
program.  If Hershey had been truly concerned about the equality of sacrifice between 
COs and servicemen, there would have been pay and benefits for COs just as there were 
for soldiers.  He also believed that, “Men were routinely inducted into Civilian Public 
Service who never would have been accepted by the military.”13 
One of Hershey’s greatest abilities was to compromise in difficult situations and 
protect COs and alternative service from opponents.  However, Zahn was critical of 
Hershey in this respect as well.  He wrote, 
To give him his due, General Hershey did try to protect CPS from the more 
vindictive attacks and demands of Congressmen, veterans organizations, jingo-
journalists, and the like.  The protection, however, took the form of cushioning 
and compromising – in almost every case at the expense of those he was 
protecting.  Indeed, there are perfectly good sociological reasons to assume that 
he and the officials around him shared the general disapproval of conscientious 
objectors.  Given the circumstances, it is likely that concern for bureaucratic 
convenience and defence of ‘turf’ may offer a better explanation for those efforts 
                                                 
13Gordon Zahn, "A Pacifist's View of Conscientious Objection," in Selective 
Conscientious Objection: Accommodating Conscience and Security, ed. Michael F. 
Noone, Jr. (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1989), 59.  For Zahn’s memoirs on his 
time in CPS, consult Gordon Zahn, Another Part of the War: The Camp Simon Story 
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1979). 
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to forestall adverse public reaction than concern for the men themselves or respect 
for their rights.14 
As an objector, Zahn was clearly critical of the fundamental concept of CPS and 
Hershey’s methods of incorporating alternative service and he was certainly entitled his 
opinion.  However, Zahn’s criticism that Hershey possessed a “disapproval of 
conscientious objectors” misses the mark entirely.  Hershey may have disagreed with 
their stance toward military service, but his actions did not reflect a disdain for COs. 
As it turned out, Hershey’s insights into public opinion and his desires to protect 
COs from negative publicity were more on target than Zahn gave him credit for.  During 
the war, Princeton psychologist Leo Crespi undertook a study to discern the attitudes of 
some Princeton students towards conscientious objection.  The purpose of his study was 
to test the 1923 findings of Clarence Case, a sociologist who argued in Non-Violent 
Coercion that there was a general, negative view of COs throughout society.  Crespi 
administered a test to one hundred sixty-three Princeton students from sixteen to twenty-
three years of age.  Crespi found that rather than being overwhelmingly hostile, the 
students were more neutral in their attitudes.  He also discovered that the students were 
more accepting of religious-based objection than the secular variety.  Furthermore, if an 
objector fulfilled his service duty, the students were more tolerant.  In other words, the 
more work an objector did, the more he became accepted in the eyes of non-objectors.15  
These findings reveal attitudes very much in line with Hershey’s thinking. 
                                                 
14Zahn, "A Pacifist's View of Conscientious Objection," 59-60.  
15Leo Crespi, "Attitudes toward Conscientious Objectors and Some of Their 
Psychological Correlates," The Journal of Psychology 18, no. 1 (July 1944): 82-83.  
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However, Crespi did not find overwhelming sympathy for the CO.  Most of the 
students (seventy-eight percent) were against COs proselytizing their views, or 
convincing other people of their conviction.  Furthermore, eighty-three percent approved 
of keeping the names of conscientious objectors out of print in newspapers “in order to 
protect them from intolerance.”16  This piece of evidence suggests that while the students 
at Princeton may have been tolerant, there were bound to be sectors of American society 
that were not.  They believed most COs were sincere in their beliefs, but that was not 
necessarily the case among all Americans.  In the final line of his article, Crespi 
concluded, “… [A]ttitudes towards CO’s are as diverse as the individuals who hold them, 
and related significantly to their frames of reference.”17  All of this underscores the 
wisdom of Hershey’s attempts to keep the COs and alternative service out of the public 
eye.   
The fact that a number of people involved in conscientious objection appreciated 
Hershey’ administration of alternative service speaks volumes about his importance.  As 
evidenced by their actions during the interwar period, the Peace Churches wanted to 
avoid the poor treatment and confusing policies of World War I.  There were bound to be 
disagreements and tensions between Hershey and the churches because they approached 
the matter from two separate viewpoints, but many of those involved understood the 
difficulties Hershey faced and they appreciated his efforts.  Hershey’s cooperation with 
the Peace Churches was not just significant because it helped to shape conscientious 
                                                 
16Ibid., 96-98. 
17Ibid., 115-116.  
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objection.  It was also significant because many of the leaders in the Historic Peace 
Churches found this high-ranking officer in the army to be a person with whom they 
could work with and respect, something unseen in the years prior to World War II. 
CPS formally ended in 1947, and it would not return to the American landscape 
again throughout the rest of the twentieth century.  Though this “experiment in 
democracy” did not last after the end of the World War II-era draft, the fundamental 
concept behind it, alternative service, remained firmly entrenched.   
The initial concern of the Historic Peace Churches in the postwar era was 
President Harry Truman’s call for universal military training (UMT) rather than 
conscription and military service.  Though his plan did not ultimately pass, an escalation 
of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the reinstatement of the 
draft in 1948.  The Selective Service Act of 1948 was quite similar to that of 1940 
concerning conscientious objectors, but with explicit language that only religious 
objectors qualified for CO classification and civilian service.  The impetus behind this 
was to avoid the ambiguities about political, ethical, and moral objectors that had 
bedeviled Hershey during World War II.18 
The provisions for conscientious objection, found in section 6 (j) of the 1948 Act, 
were much more explicit than they had been in the previous acts.  It read, 
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be 
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to 
participation in war in any form.  Religious training and belief in this connection 
means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties 
                                                 
18Chambers, "Conscientious Objectors and the American State from Colonial 
Times to the Present," 39.  
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superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.19 
Whereas the Selective Service Act of 1917 had limited objection only to those members 
of the Historic Peace Churches and the Selective Service Act of 1940 was ambiguous in 
what constituted “religious training and belief,” the 1948 version was much clearer on 
these points. 
Conscientious objectors found themselves in a new situation than in 1940-1947.  
Rather than requiring induction and alternative service, the 1948 Act granted a deferment 
to any CO who did not accept noncombatant military service.20  The deferments did not 
last long, though.  Part of the reason for the total deferment was that Hershey did not 
want to be directly responsible for administering a program of alternative service for 
COs.  Because the United States was not at war, people were more tolerant of a complete 
deferment.  That point of view eventually changed.  The 1948 draft law was to last for 
five years, but an amendment cut the length of the draft to two years.  President Truman 
and Congress then extended the draft only a matter of days after the invasion of South 
Korea by North Korean forces, with the intent of conscription lasting for one year.  
Deferment continued for conscientious objectors, but it did not last.  The higher number 
of draft calls and increasing casualty lists caused a fair amount of criticism of officials for 
the perceived lack of sacrifice by conscientious objectors.  Ray Wilson, a Quaker in the 
Friends Committee on National Legislation believed that Hershey did not want to 
reinstitute CPS because of the difficulties incurred during World War II, but Wilson 
                                                 
19Selective Service Act, Statutes at Large 62, Part 1, 612-613 (1948). 
20Ibid., 613.  
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envisaged the return of the program due to the new war.  The wording of the new draft 
legislation in 1951 called for COs to engage in “work of national importance,” just as 
they had during World War II.21  The total deferment of COs ended, and some form of 
national service was once again required of all drafted men. 
Although Congress determined that alternative service should return to the United 
States, there was no consensus on what form that service was going to take.  The only 
item that seemed to be clear was that work camps were not ideal, and very few supported 
a model of service based on CPS.  Furthermore, nobody else in the federal government 
wanted to handle conscientious objectors and alternative service, so Selective Service 
once again received the unenviable task.   
The Selective Service began by instituting new classifications for the CO.  The 
Selective Service replaced the old IV-E classification with two new classifications: I-O, 
which meant the CO was “available for civilian work,” and I-W, which meant the CO 
was “performing civilian work.”  With an executive order on February 20, 1952, 
President Truman officially sanctioned the Selective Service’s new alternative service 
program.  Unlike CPS, there was no work camp structure, but the concept of service 
remained the same.  The Peace Churches avoided the cumbersome administrative 
                                                 
21George Q. Flynn, "Selective Service and the Conscientious Objector," in 
Selective Conscientious Objection: Accommodating Conscience and Security, ed. 
Michael F. Noone, Jr. (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1989), 40-41; and Keim and 
Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience, 127-197. 
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responsibility they had possessed during World War II, and the government lifted some 
of the old restrictions on the type of work, such as overseas assignments.22   
The men were freer to choose the service they performed.  Once classified, the 
individual CO proposed three possible means of fulfilling his service obligation, and the 
Selective Service settled on one of the suggestions.  Men could serve in either paid or 
volunteer jobs administered by the government or non-profit entities.  They held jobs in 
health, education, science, and charity, though they could not work in their local area.  
Furthermore, men could volunteer for alternative service before being drafted.  
Specifically, some men worked on farms, while others labored in overseas relief efforts, 
agriculture, or construction.  Some served as test subjects for the National Institutes of 
Health in Bethesda, Maryland, harkening images of the Guinea Pig Units from World 
War II.  However, most of the men worked in hospitals.  In the words of Keim and 
Stolzfus, “…I-W became nearly synonymous with hospital work, since so many 
conscientious objectors engaged in such jobs.  By 1954, more than 80 percent of all I-Ws 
held hospital jobs.”23 
The I-W program marked a considerable improvement over the CPS model of 
World War II for COs, Hershey, and the Selective Service.  COs could now receive pay, 
something they had been clamoring for since 1940.  As he stated during the final days of 
CPS, Hershey desired pay for COs as well.  COs also had a more meaningful form of 
                                                 
22Flynn, "Selective Service and the Conscientious Objector," 41; and Keim and 
Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience, 139-141. 
23Bush, 173; Flynn, "Selective Service and the Conscientious Objector," 41; and 
Keim and Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience, 144-145. 
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service, and the cumbersome dual-administrative structure with its ambiguities and 
tensions was gone.  Furthermore, the men had a set limit for the duration of their service, 
much like their military counterparts.  They did not serve for the entirety of the war, as 
they had during World War II, but for two years, just as the military servicemen.   
The I-W program was by no means perfect, however.  Congress did not provide 
the funding requested by the Selective Service, so much of the money had to come from 
elsewhere in the Selective Service’s budget.  Finding jobs for the COs was still difficult, 
and COs still received no benefits for dependents, despite Hershey’s support for this 
measure.  Furthermore, the Peace Churches remained uneasy about the control of the 
Selective Service over the individual CO, despite changes in the relationship.  This 
caused the AFSC to remain out of the I-W program, while the Mennonites and the 
Brethren conceded overall control to the Selective Service.  This was definitely the desire 
of General Hershey, as he informed the Peace Churches in no uncertain terms that this 
time the Selective Service had the ultimate authority over placement, transfers, and the 
like.  If the Peace Churches helped coordinate activities and service opportunities, that 
was fine, but they were completely subordinate to the Selective Service.  Hershey was 
perfectly clear on that point.24 
The Vietnam era saw a seismic shift in the classification of conscientious 
objectors, but, much like Korea, the concept of alternative service remained in place, 
harkening back to the desires that General Hershey first put forth during World War II.   
In fact, the specific alternative service plans refined in 1951 remained in place throughout 
                                                 
24Flynn, "Selective Service and the Conscientious Objector," 41-42; and Keim 
and Stoltzfus, The Politics of Conscience, 142-144, 146. 
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the remaining years of conscription in the United States.  What changed during Vietnam 
was the definition of a conscientious objector.  This momentous shift came from United 
States v. Seeger in 1965, which established the right for individuals to claim moral or 
ethical reasons for conscientiously objecting to military service, a distinct shift from the 
overtly religious definitions of conscientious objection required earlier.  Five years later, 
the Supreme Court upheld the Seeger decision in Welsh v. United States, stating that an 
established belief in atheism or “characterization of his beliefs as ‘nonreligious’” was 
permissible, as long as the person’s objection to war was still “moral, ethical, or 
philosophical.”25 
United States v. Seeger was the most important U. S. Supreme Court case in the 
history of conscientious objection because it fundamentally changed the requirements for 
a man to be a conscientious objector.  United States v. Seeger was actually one of three 
cases argued together before the Supreme Court in 1965, along with United States v. 
Jakobson and Peter v. United States.  During the 1950s, Seeger, Jakobson, and Peter had 
claimed conscientious objector status when called before their local draft boards.  
However, they did not cite traditional religious beliefs as their reasoning for objecting to 
military service.  All of the men based their objections on a more secular interpretation of 
personal religion, invoking moral, ethical, or secular spiritual reasoning.  The Selective 
                                                 
25United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 
333 (1970); and Chambers, "Conscientious Objectors and the American State from 
Colonial Times to the Present," 40-43.  
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Service Act, as passed in 1948, exempted men who objected to war based on “religious 
training and belief,” just as in the 1940 Act. 26 
In majority opinion, Justice Thomas Clark argued that the central issue in the 
arguments was the axiom “religious training and belief.”  The Supreme Court decided 
that “religious training and belief” could be extended to much broader moral and ethical 
connotations.  In the words of Clark, “A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in 
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly 
qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.”27  In other words, an 
ethical or moral objection to war that stood in place of a mainstream religious belief was 
an acceptable basis for conscientious objection to military service.  In Welsh v. United 
States, the Court upheld its 1965 Seeger ruling, finding in 1970 that Elliott Welsh should 
have his conviction for draft evasion overturned because his reasoning for objecting to 
military service fell under the findings of the Court in United States v. Seeger.  The 
particulars of the case were similar to those in Seeger, and the Court found that Welsh’s 
beliefs constituted a personal form of religion for him.28 
Therefore, the only real change for COs after World War II (beyond the 
elimination of work camps and the introduction of individualized service) was the shift 
from sacred to secular conscientious objection.  With the Seeger ruling, a man could 
object to war if his personal convictions constituted a form of religion for him.  However, 
                                                 
26United States v. Seeger.  
27United States v. Seeger.  
28Welsh v. United States.  
 267 
the principles of service established during World War II remained firmly in place 
throughout the years of conscription in the United States.  It is for that reason that 
Hershey’s efforts in World War II administering and shaping alternative service were so 
pivotal.  All subsequent efforts following those years either built upon his actions or 
sought to rectify some of the problems coming out of CPS. 
One of the most vivid enduring memories of the Vietnam War in the United 
States was the antiwar movement and its large national and local protests.  Hershey was 
not immune to the unrest on the home front.  As the war in Vietnam became more 
unpopular and protests grew, Hershey became one of the focal points for the protestors.  
The protestors pointed to him as one of the major members of the establishment 
responsible for sending young men to die in Vietnam.29  Hershey had become so 
unpopular in many circles by the late 1960s that he was now a political liability, a fact not 
lost on Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee for president of the United States in 
1968. 
Nixon announced during his election campaign that he wished to end the draft 
after achieving victory in Vietnam.  He argued that it was not the proper instrument to 
use in a guerilla war like the one in Vietnam.  While his sincerity is debatable, Nixon 
certainly gained political capital by calling for the end of the draft.  Once Nixon assumed 
office in 1969, he began the shift towards an all-volunteer force with some reforms.  His 
advisers recommended a number of changes to quell the growing antiwar protests and 
alleviate some of the resentment among America’s youth.  Their two most visible and 
                                                 
29Small, 109.  
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viable recommendations were shifting to a lottery system and replacing Hershey as the 
head of the Selective Service.  Hershey was now seventy-five years old, and though he 
was still in good health, his unpopularity was a political liability for Nixon.  As George 
Flynn adeptly explains, “Hershey was like an embarrassing corpse in a murder mystery, 
which kept falling out of closets or appearing in bathtubs, to the general consternation of 
the host.”  Though there were calls for him to resign, Hershey refused and said he would 
only respond to a direct order from President Nixon.30 
That order came on October 10, 1969.  Nixon informed Hershey that he was 
going to be reassigned as a manpower adviser to the president, effective February 1970.  
He also recommended Hershey’s promotion to a full, four-star general.31  So ended an era 
in the history of American conscription.  Hershey had been in charge of the Selective 
Service for twenty-nine years, served six presidential administrations, and provided the 
manpower management for three major wars.32 
Hershey’s new job in the Nixon White House was largely ceremonial, though he 
tried his best to convince Nixon to preserve the decentralized draft system Hershey had 
built over the past three decades.  When Nixon’s advisers recommended an all-volunteer 
force in 1970, Nixon wholeheartedly agreed.  Hershey tried to persuade him to wait until 
1971 for any major changes because that was the year the draft was up for renewal.  The 
draft did not end as quickly as Nixon wanted, as Congress extended it for two more years.  
                                                 
30Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 273-284; Flynn, The Draft, 225-226, 229, 237-239; 
and Small, 109.  
31Flynn, The Draft, 243.  
32Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 289; and Flynn, The Draft, 244-246.  
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Inductions finally ended in 1973, bringing an end to the era of conscription in the United 
States.33  This also meant the end of conscientious objection and alternative service under 
the auspices of a draft. 
With the draft gone and Hershey’s health beginning to wane, Nixon terminated 
Hershey’s position.  No longer fit for duty because of his age, health, and his expertise in 
manpower seemingly obsolete, Hershey retired as a four-star general on April 10, 1973, 
the highest-ranking officer in American military history to have never directly 
participated in combat.  Hershey spent his retirement caring for his wife, Ellen, whose 
own health was poor as well.  In February 1977, Hershey suffered a stroke, but 
recovered.  However, the stress of this episode contributed to Ellen’s death in April.  One 
month later, on a trip home to Angola with his son Gilbert alongside, Hershey died in a 
hotel room on May 19 near his boyhood homestead, where the many hours of farm labor 
and the values of the Midwest had helped to shape his entire outlook on life and service.  
He was buried next to Ellen in Arlington National Cemetery, under a rather large 
headstone.34 
Hershey’s death marked the passing of one of the most important American 
general officers of the twentieth century, though Hershey is not terribly well-known and 
                                                 
33Flynn, Lewis B. Hershey, 297-299.  
34Ibid., 300-302..  Some of the information on the final days of Hershey comes 
not only from Flynn’s biography, but from a scholarly discussion and tour with Dr. James 
Zimmerman, professor of history and administrator emeritus from Trine University 
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personally seen Hershey’s gravestone in Arlington National Cemetery, which rivals any 
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often overlooked because of his unusual dual role as army general and civilian 
bureaucrat.  Furthermore, he was not a field general in a society that celebrates its 
battlefield leaders as heroes.  In his role as the Director of the Selective Service through 
three major wars of conscription, Hershey was responsible for getting the men with 
which more well-known or celebrated generals such as George Marshall, Dwight 
Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway, and William Westmoreland fought.  
Hershey affected the individual soldier’s (and CO’s) life far more than any other general 
throughout the twentieth century.  Mentioning Hershey’s name to the average American 
born after Vietnam elicits a questioning glance, but any American male of draft-age 
during World War II, Korea, or Vietnam knows exactly who General Lewis B. Hershey 
was.  In addition, as has been presented here, his conception and administration of 
conscientious objection and alternative service had far-reaching effects that further 
defined the citizen soldier tradition in American history.  Those beliefs and actions 
mostly remained in place throughout the remaining years of conscription in the United 
States, emphasizing the duty of all eligible men to perform some sort of national service 
when called by the nation. 
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CHAPTER 11 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
After examining General Lewis Blaine Hershey and the CPS experience during 
World War II, it is clear that Hershey’s personal belief in a duty of service for all eligible 
males plus a sympathetic ear for religious liberty shaped alternative service during that 
conflict and beyond.  Through that dynamic, alternative service became the central 
precedent for conscientious objection to emerge from World War II, lasting until the end 
of the draft in 1973.  Furthermore, through Hershey’s efforts, the American military’s 
citizen soldier tradition became further defined as the duty of all eligible Americans 
extended even to those who conscientiously objected.  
Hershey’s efforts in creating, administering, and justifying alternative service 
were the engine driving the CPS experience during World War II.  By expressing his 
desire for cooperative body with which to negotiate, Hershey was instrumental in the 
creation of NSBRO.  As the final authority on what constituted “work of national 
importance” for the CO, Hershey ultimately decided what the CPS assignees would 
actually do.  His approval or denial shaped the character of alternative service and 
provided its tangible projects, as he authorized programs for farm labor, forestry work, 
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and the Guinea Pig Units, but he rejected some urban social work and other programs 
suggested by the Peace Churches.1 Through shrewd political negotiation during the war 
and at the end of CPS, alternative service remained under Selective Service control.  His 
desire to avoid negative publicity meant that many camps were located in remote 
locations and he sought to limit press coverage so as not to attract unwanted attention.  
Though CPS was a cooperative endeavor, the specter of Lewis Hershey loomed 
throughout everything. 
While some reacted negatively to Selective Service control, many others 
recognized just how important Hershey was to the peace witness of the Historic Peace 
Churches.  Some members of the Historic Peace Churches later recounted how Hershey’s 
directorship was of vital importance in protecting the CO during World War II.  Given 
the inconsistent treatment of conscientious objectors throughout American history, the 
precedent set by Hershey and the protections he enabled were no small feat.  There was 
no standardized policy during the colonial era and the alternatives available during the 
Civil War violated many of the COs’ beliefs concerning participation in war.  The most 
glaring example of what could go wrong in providing for conscience during wartime 
occurred during World War I, when the federal government placed COs into military 
camps and imprisoned them when they refused to cooperate. 
The World War II experience of Lewis Hershey in matters of conscientious 
objection and alternative service provides a fascinating insight into one of the great 
                                                 
1Sibley and Jacob, 226.  Sibley and Jacob state that Lewis Kosch’s Camp 
Operations Division denied requests, with Hershey’s approval, for work in various 
hospitals, youth-centered projects, settlement homes in Pittsburgh, and the Pennsylvania 
School for the Deaf.  
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paradoxes of modern military history.  Here was a man who rose to the rank of lieutenant 
colonel prior to the outbreak of World War II, which was no small feat in the interwar 
period.  He was a military professional when that career path was only beginning to be 
accepted in American society.  As one might expect of a career military professional, 
Hershey possessed a strongly held conviction that it was the foremost duty of all eligible 
men to serve their nation in times of national emergency.  During World War II, he 
oversaw a massive bureaucracy dedicated to providing men for the military while 
maximizing industrial and agricultural production.  Fundamentally, the role of the 
Selective Service was to administer the manpower of the society so the state could 
advance its national and international interests.  Yet, in the face of that mission, Hershey 
was the most ardent champion of the rights of conscientious objectors within the federal 
government.  He was simultaneously a protector of conscience and a proponent of 
service. 
That duality in Hershey’s character regarding service and the CO helps to explain 
further who Hershey really was.  Using broad brush strokes to describe him will usually 
result in inaccurate portrayals.  He viewed himself as both soldier and civilian, hence his 
frequent public appearances in civilian clothing.  He was a classic bureaucrat, fully aware 
of his place in the federal government, yet he wielded significant power in administrating 
his office and he was able to use his considerable influence to bend certain projects, 
mandates, or legislation to his desires.  He did not merely assume his role as a bureaucrat 
and administer CPS with no say in its direction.  He had a vision for alternative service 
and sought to make that a reality.  He was a complex man full of what appeared to be 
contradictions, yet his reasoning seemed to make those contradictions disappear.  
 274 
Singularly representing two seemingly antithetical viewpoints – the obligation to serve 
and the right to object – fits perfectly with an overall description of Hershey.  How an 
individual could believe in such seemingly mutually exclusive dynamics is complicated, 
but it can be explained. 
Of considerable importance in Hershey’s attitude about conscientious objection 
was his belief in minority rights.  As he said at the opening of the CPS camp at Patapsco, 
Maryland, in May 1940, CPS was an “experiment in democracy.”  The idea behind it was 
to prevent the individual rights of a small minority in the United States from being 
completely trampled.  In his mind, it was important for a democracy to tolerate dissenting 
viewpoints and provide for individual liberties.  However, that did not exempt one from 
the duties of service.  No objector was completely deferred based on his resistance to 
military service.  The rights of minorities when it came to national service did have 
limits. 
Hershey’s belief in the rights of sincere religious objectors was in place even 
before his ascendancy to the director’s office.  Before the establishment of the Selective 
Service and Roosevelt’s order granting him the authority to define work of national 
importance, Hershey made it clear that he supported the rights of sincere religious 
objectors during the tense discussions in Congress over peacetime conscription in 1940.  
This stance stood in contrast to some of his army colleagues, who called for strict 
limitations for conscientious objectors.  For the chief expert on manpower in the United 
States to advocate CO protection was an enlightened viewpoint, indeed.   
Hershey’s insistence on decentralization of the draft was also of major importance 
for conscientious objectors during World War II.  Throughout his years as director, 
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Hershey staunchly defended the decentralized draft.  This held significance for 
conscientious objectors as well as men in the armed services.  The local draft boards held 
one of the most important jobs in raising an army of conscripts: classification.  For the 
CO, this meant that the local draft board determined his initial fate.  Granted, Hershey 
centralized the policies of induction at the national headquarters, but he left the operation 
of classification to the local boards.  This emphasis on decentralization further shaped 
conscientious objection during World War II, as some of the draft boards were 
inconsistent.  Some COs had no problem gaining their IV-E or I-A-O classification, while 
others faced blatant hostility to their objection.2  This was a part of the story of 
conscientious objection during World War II, and Hershey’s belief in decentralization 
played a significant role in shaping that. 
Though pivotal and central to conscientious objection and alternative service, 
Hershey’s power was not limitless.  Most of his obstacles came from Congress.  Where 
he ran into trouble was in situations where government funding or transportation was to 
be used for COs, such was with the CPS Training Corps.  Recall that the majority of CPS 
funding came from the Peace Churches, not the federal government.  Though he decided 
what constituted work of national importance, he opened himself to interference if 
funding from outside the Peace Churches was involved.  He approved of the overseas 
relief training and activities in the CPS Training Corps, but the efforts of Congressman 
Joe Starnes killed any chances for the COs to help rebuild the war-torn areas of Europe 
and Asia during the conflict.  He was unable to secure workman’s compensation or 
                                                 
2Eller, 26-27.  
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dependency benefits for CPS assignees, even though he pushed strongly for them before 
Congress.  He also wanted to implement a point system to end CPS and send the 
assignees home, but found himself rebuffed by a reluctant Congress.  Even though 
Congress limited his power at times, he proved to be an adept negotiator and possessed a 
keen understanding of negotiation, as evidenced by his success in developing the means 
to discharge COs from CPS after the war. 
Hershey carefully considered the role of public opinion and the publicity that 
could focus on a controversial program.  Hershey was wary of any negative public 
reaction against CPS or the institution of conscientious objection.  Accordingly, he tried 
to keep conscientious objectors out of the limelight as much as possible.  This was not 
limited to the press.  Hershey seldom discussed conscientious objection publicly.  If 
interviewed on a specific subject, such as conscientious objection, Hershey would put 
forth his thoughts on the matter, but he would not voluntarily elaborate.  An examination 
of Hershey’s speeches reveals that when he addressed manpower and service, he did not 
mention conscientious objection.  He only really discussed the matter when speaking to 
the COs themselves, or representatives of their religious denominations.3 
Though all of the aforementioned beliefs of Hershey were significant in his 
shaping of CPS, they all revolved around his concept of a duty of service for all eligible 
males.  While he did not personally agree with the stance taken by the civilian servant 
conscientious objector, he respected it.  However, that did not translate into a complete 
                                                 
3Various gatherings of Hershey’s speeches can be found at the following archives: 
Records of the Selective Service, RG 147, National Archives II, College Park, MD; and 
Lewis B. Hershey Papers, Trine University, Angola, IN. 
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and total deferment for religious objectors.  Instead, the federal government required 
them to perform some type of national service, the so-called “work of national 
importance.”  It was that point that made many of the COs unhappy, with many of them 
viewing the work as menial and unimportant.  But to Hershey, conscientious objection 
was a privilege in a democratic society, it was not a guaranteed right.  He believed it was 
the duty of all who were eligible to serve when called upon.   
Hershey’s views on service and the CO is what further defined the tradition of the 
citizen soldier in the United States. With the introduction of alternative service in the 
form of CPS, the central ideas behind the citizen soldier became intertwined with 
individual liberty.  Under Hershey’s perception of civic responsibility, if a person 
objected to service in the military based on sincere religious beliefs, he could perform 
alternate service to fulfill his duty to his state, but he would not be entirely exempt from 
his national responsibility.  World War II and Hershey’s efforts in shaping alternative 
service set the pattern for alternate means of fulfilling national commitments, which 
continued throughout the years of conscription in the United States.  After the Second 
World War, even when the definition of conscientious objection changed, the obligations 
of the objector did not.  He was obligated to serve in some capacity.  Therefore, the 
concept of the citizen soldier no longer pertained only to armed service.  As a result, 
some form of service, whether it was as a soldier, noncombatant, or civilian servant, was 
required when the state called upon its citizens in times of crisis. 
The central dynamic driving the citizen soldier concept is the idea of service, just 
as service was at the heart of CPS.  Since Americans have traditionally viewed 
professional armies as separate from the state and a threat to its very existence, the best 
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defenders of the nation are those with the strongest interest in its survival: its citizens.  
The American citizen soldier tradition blurs the line between military and civilian 
society, rendering the interests of the two coincident.4  To be sure, there may be flaws in 
the logic of the citizen soldier, particularly when one considers that many young male 
citizens did not have a choice once drafted, but it was a concept structure that Hershey 
fervently believed in.   
Hence, an examination of Lewis Hershey’s significant role in conscientious 
objection and alternative service during World War II is fundamentally a subject of 
military history, under the auspices of the New Military History approach.  Examining 
conscientious objection and alternative service through the lens of the federal government 
and the military, or more specifically, Hershey and the Selective Service provides an 
insight into how the government sets the parameters for national obligation during a time 
of threats both real and perceived.  During World War II, alternative service became a 
possible means of fulfilling one’s service duty.  This continued after World War II.  Only 
for a very brief time after the war did conscientious objection result in deferment.  
General Hershey’s actions during World War II in the establishment, administration, and 
protection of conscientious objectors and alternative service placed the concept of service 
ever more firmly in the American military tradition. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4Cohen, 121-125.  
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